Intellectuals, institutions and ideology: the case of Robert Strausz-Hupé and 'American geopolitics'

Andrew Crampton

Department of Geography, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK

AND

Gearóid Ó Tuathail

Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA

Abstract. Robert Strausz-Hupé is a somewhat forgotten and unexamined figure in the history of 'American geopolitics'. In the early 1940s Strausz-Hupé, an Austrian émigré to the United States, was one of a number of intellectuals who introduced 'geopolitics' to the American public and championed a 'geopolitical approach' to international politics in his work for the US government during the Second World War. With the help of funding from American conservatives in the 1950s, Strausz-Hupé established the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania and its influential journal Orbis. Together with a number of others, Strausz-Hupé produced a remarkable number of books and articles on the 'Soviet threat' to the USA and the western world. The influence of Strausz-Hupé and the FPRI extended into the US military, where its form of anti-communist indoctrination was challenged by Senator William Fulbright in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Strausz-Hupé served as US ambassador for the Nixon and Ford administrations and as a member of the revitalized Committee on the Present Danger. With Ronald Reagan's ascent to power, he once again became a US ambassador, this time to Turkey. From the early 1940s to the mid-1980s, Strausz-Hupé made a career in the analysis but also production of geopolitics as propaganda. The circumstances of his biography are a fascinating window into the intellectuals, institutions and ideology of a dominant strain of 'American geopolitics'. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
tradition of geopolitics, an American tradition of geopolitics, and so on. Such descriptions have a general utility but they tend to homogenize the heterogeneous mix of geopolitical perspectives and approaches that characterize any particular configuration of world order. This is particularly true of the term ‘American geopolitics’, which has not only a number of different variants or strains but is also a tradition owing a great deal to the influence of European émigrés who exercised considerable power in American political and intellectual life from the early 1940s. Most scholars are familiar with the role played by Arnold Wolfers, Nicholas Spykman, Hans Morgenthau and later on Henry Kissinger in the development of variants of American geopolitical thought. A lesser known but nevertheless consistently significant figure is Robert Strausz-Hupé, an Austrian by birth who came to the USA in 1923 and, through fortune, circumstances and the appeal of his political journalism, became a key figure in the codification of a well-funded, virulently anti-communist form of American geopolitics which had considerable influence over the discourse of US foreign policy from the mid-1940s. The strain of American geopolitical thinking that Robert Strausz-Hupé helped codify, and the circumstances of Strausz-Hupé’s biography, are particularly interesting for three reasons.

First, the biography of Strausz-Hupé spans the last 50 years of world history, from the tumult of the 1930s to the turmoil of the 1990s. Strausz-Hupé first made a name for himself as a journalistic ‘expert’ on German geopolitics in the late 1930s and early 1940s and, on the strength of this work, obtained permanent employment as an instructor in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and with Isiah Bowman’s ‘M’ Project during the Second World War. After the war, Strausz-Hupe became an intellectual popularizer and polemicist, who in both academic textbooks and middlebrow policy books sought to promote a totalizing form of anti-communist geopolitics in US political discourse. He deliberately sought access and entry into the corridors of power, a strategy that paid off upon Richard Nixon’s election to the presidency. Strausz-Hupe’s attempt to cultivate himself as a ‘foreign policy expert’ provides an interesting case for investigating how intellectuals of statecraft write their own identity and subjectivity.

Second, Strausz-Hupe’s career provides insight into the ways in which a particularly conservative form of ‘American geopolitics’ became institutionalized and propagated itself in the post-war period. With the help of funding from the extreme American right in the 1950s, Strausz-Hupe established the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) at the University of Pennsylvania and its influential journal, significantly entitled Orbis. Together with a number of others at the FPRI, Strausz-Hupe produced numerous books and articles on the ‘Soviet threat’ which were widely circulated by popular magazines like Current History, National Review, Reader’s Digest, The Saturday Evening Post and US News and World Report. The influence of Strausz-Hupe and the FPRI extended into the US military, where its form of anti-communist indoctrination was challenged by Senator William Fulbright in the 1960s. Strausz-Hupe moved more directly into politics in the 1960s, serving as a foreign policy adviser to the Goldwater campaign for president. An ambassador for the Nixon and Ford administrations, Strausz-Hupe was a member of the revitalized Committee on the Present Danger (Dalby, 1990) during the Carter administration before becoming an ambassador, once again, when the Republicans returned to power under Ronald Reagan.

Finally, Strausz-Hupe’s career is a fascinating window into the discourse of geopolitics. Strausz-Hupe began his career writing of Nazi Germany as a pressing global threat to the USA and the western world. In the post-war period, he consolidated it by writing of the Soviet Union in the same terms. In both cases, the genre of writing geopolitics was the same: discourses of danger constructed about a formidable, global enemy represented as
Other. As should be well known from those who have studied the social construction of Otherness in foreign policy discourse (Dalby, 1988; Nathanson, 1988; Shapiro, 1988; Campbell, 1992), problematizing the discursive strategies by which Otherness is produced does not imply that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were not threats to the USA. However, the way in which this threat was narrated had profound political consequences during the Second World War and during the Cold War. In Strausz-Hupe’s narrations, we encounter many of the same motifs: (1) selective use of enemy doctrine and propaganda statements as illustrations of secret intentionality; (2) attributions of coherence and design-following a pre-established blueprint for world conquest—to enemy foreign policy; (3) contradictory claims that the enemy’s beliefs are irrational and diabolical yet super-intelligent and calculated, and (4) a pervasive jeremiad tone about the need for the USA to wake up to the ‘real’ nature of the threat that faces it. Strausz-Hupe’s writings provide an interesting case for an examination of how the discursive scripting of Nazi Germany during the Second World War established the textuality within which Soviet Union as a ‘red fascist’ state came to be represented. A great deal of what Strausz-Hupe claimed about German geopolitics and Soviet strategy was fundamentally false and specious. Nevertheless, it was significant in producing a culture of permanent danger in US political life from the 1940s, a culture that allowed an American-led and transnationally extended militarism to thrive and a military-industrial-university complex to establish a lock on the budgetary priorities of the American state. In claiming to decode enemy propaganda, Strausz-Hupe was in fact engaged in the production of an American propaganda and the conditions of possibility for Cold War militarism.

Examining all of these issues in the detail they require is obviously impossible in one paper. Thus, this paper concentrates on providing a general introduction to the biography of Strausz-Hupe and the dangerous strain of American geopolitics he propagated, a type of monologic geopolitics that overdetermined international politics and closed off any space for dialogue and diplomacy. Strausz-Hupe is a forgotten figure in political geography circles; the recent Dictionary of Geopolitics, for example, contains no entry on him (O’Loughlin, 1994). In organizing this introduction to him, there was much we had to leave out and many themes we do not develop sufficiently. Our introduction is organized around three distinct periods of Strausz-Hupe’s career and around three key texts—Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (1942), The Balance of Tomorrow (1945) and Protracted Conflict (Strausz-Hupe et al., 1959)—together with a whole host of popular articles. It also draws upon two personal interviews with Strausz-Hupe, the first conducted in May 1995 (Crampton), the second in November 1995 (Ó Tuathail). We have given emphasis, to the extent that space allowed, to the institutional and political context within which Strausz-Hupe wrote. Obviously there is much more to the story of Strausz-Hupe—his international relations philosophy, his view of NATO (to which he served as US ambassador for a time), his diplomatic career and his activities with the Committee on the Present Danger—and there may be more to come for, at the age of 92, he continues to write, his latest book being Democracy and American Foreign Policy (1995). In confronting the biography of Strausz-Hupe, we are not simply confronting the career of one intellectual but the history of the theory and practice of geopolitics in America.

Negating Geopolotik and promoting geopolitics

Robert Strausz-Hupe was born in Austria, Vienna in 1903. He spent his early years living in a politically unstable Europe that was transforming itself through nationalism, war and revolution. Born into a relatively wealthy landowning family in the upper middle class of
Austrian society, Strausz-Hupé was groomed from an early age by his parents for a career in the diplomatic service or the military, careers whose prestige appealed to his family. He read widely and had a particular fondness for tales of geographical exploration. As a schoolboy he was, he recalled, a great admirer of the Swedish geographer, Sven Hedin (Interview, 27 November 1995). Despite some doubts on his own part about these careers, the financial standing of his family was such that a future as a cultivated man of leisure beckoned. In his early autobiography In My Time (1965), Strausz-Hupé writes of his future prospects in terms of a freedom to explore the world:

I could travel abroad, explore remote places, coast along tropical seas, sample exotic philosophies and return to Austria, a polished cosmopolite with an aura of adventurous exploits . . . the century was still young and my family fortune, depleted as it was by paternal extravagance, was still large enough to support a life of judicious leisure and studious travel. (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 15–16)

The earth, he continued, ‘was still a Western preserve—a good deal of still untrodden and in the alluring state of nature—which beckoned the select traveler in search of knowledge and adventure’ (1965: 16). However, the financial strains put on Austria’s estate-owning classes by the dislocating effects of the First World War and collapse of the Habsburg monarchy fundamentally transformed Strausz-Hupé’s life. Having invested their wealth in government bonds, his family was bankrupted when the Austro-Hungarian empire collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War. In 1919, the family split up and he moved to Munich with his mother where he soon witnessed the fighting between communist revolutionaries and the counter-revolutionary Iron Brigade. In his description of this period, Strausz-Hupé begins to articulate three fundamental concerns that became mantras in his work. The first is security. Strausz-Hupé abhorred social revolution because, he argues, it ‘mocks the one common aspiration of mankind this century: security’ (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 20).

The second is propaganda. The upheavals alerted Strausz-Hupé to the ‘total’ nature of modern warfare, where the battle for peoples’ minds is an integral component of military strategy. The third is organization. Writing on this period in his autobiography, his prose is replete with references to the importance of organization, planning, professionalism and single-mindedness in times of war. The failed communist revolution, he argues was ‘not master minded by seasoned professionals’ but by Schwabing literati who wrote bad verse and obscure prose. By contrast, the communist revolutionaries in Berlin and Budapest were ‘fomented and led by seasoned professionals, civilian and militancy, bent single-mindedly upon the bloody liquidation of the opposition and thus upon committing their followers irrevocably to the cause of the revolution’. These men were, ‘first and foremost, efficiency experts in the making of revolution and the allied arts of conspiracy, guerrilla warfare, assignation, liquidation, and propaganda’ (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 24–25).

In October 1923, Strausz-Hupé left the turmoil and disintegration of Europe behind him and emigrated to the USA. It was, in fact, quite accidental that he chose to travel there. Entrusted by a member of the Bavarian aristocracy to take care of his wayward son, it had been arranged that the two would travel from Amsterdam to the East Indies, to train and serve as rubber plantation managers. The Bavarian count hoped his son would become more responsible if taught a trade, and wanted him out of the country after he had recently married and divorced in the same week! Upon arrival in Amsterdam, Strausz-Hupé noticed a poster of the Holland-America line and decided that ‘since we were launched upon distant adventure, we might as well seek it North America, a country that, by common agreement, was new and fraught with unlimited opportunities’ (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 56)
Upon arrival they found work in a Chicago department store but the following spring they moved to New York and parted company. Strausz-Hupé moved in exiled 'White' Russian circles in the city and imbibed their bitter anti-communism. Living in America at the onset of the depression, Strausz-Hupé was fortunate in that he spoke the financial languages of Europe. Fluent in German, French and English, he found employment as a foreign investments liquidator for a Wall Street banking firm. In this position he frequently traveled to Europe where, witnessing the rise of fascism and totalitarianism, he developed an interest in writing about European politics (Kinter and Pfatzgraff, 1973).

Strausz-Hupé began his career as a political commentator in the late 193Os, writing on the European political situation for Current History, a small New-York-based magazine affiliated to the New York Times. One of Strausz-Hupé's earliest essays was a piece speculating on the possible return of monarchical rule to France (Strausz-Hupé, 1939a). At this time he marketed himself as 'a special authority on French Politics' (Current History, June 1939: 19) and 'a specialist on international banking and finance' (Current History, March 1939: l), but as the Nazis marched through Europe he turned his attention to German foreign policy. While working for Current History he undertook a series of public lectures aimed at middle-class audiences who, as he later described it, 'stood in the Great Centre of American politics' (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 178) and whose support for intervention in Europe was essential. Billed as 'an American journalist of Austrian birth' he gave his inaugural lecture on 'The Rape of Austria' at a civic forum in Boston. After speaking to a group of students and teachers at the University of Pennsylvania on his lecture tour, he was offered the position of part-time instructor in political science at the university.

Strausz-Hupé's overarching purpose in this period was to overcome America's traditional isolationism and state the case for US interventionism in the war raging in Europe. Like many of the émigrés at this time, he viewed his own personal experiences with political upheaval and turmoil in Europe as providing him with an education in power politics that most Americans lacked. The role he scripted for himself was that of a 'prophet' warning America about the brute realities of power politics. What mattered in politics was not law, but power. Americans failed to recognize that basing foreign policy on question of law and morality was no longer relevant in international politics. Torn between two identities, being in America and yet not of it, he later described the period thus:

Up to World War Two the US could choose what it wanted to choose and not choose what it didn't want to choose. We were 'not interested in power politics'—we were interested in trade and international law. The great names of foreign policy were lawyers and people interested in international law and the moral aspect of international politics... I, being European, had a somewhat different orientation. I felt in my gut, that somehow things had profoundly shifted for America. The Americans were not going to stand up to Hitler, or Stalin, who one way or the other were going to take over the world... I had settled in America chiefly because I wanted to live a free and rewarding life of my own, and I [therefore] didn't like the idea of the world being conquered.

(Interview, 15 May 1995)

The first book Strausz-Hupé worked on was Axis America: Hitler Plant Our Future (1941a). It was while researching this book, which is a rather labored analysis of German and Italian propaganda, the he came across geopolitics and the work of the German geopoliticians (Interview, 15 May 1995). Although Strausz-Hupé himself considers his second book Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (1942) to be
his first substantial piece, he makes a number of important arguments in his preceding publications (Strausz-Hupé, 1939b, 1940a-e, 1941a,b). First, Strausz-Hupé clearly states the fundamental premise behind most of his work in the 1940s—that German writings and propaganda are worthy of study because they illuminate German thinking and strategy. Strausz-Hupé's argument on this is deeply contradictory, a contradiction that would also haunt his later writings of the Soviet threat. On the one hand, he is concerned with the exposition of German propaganda, based, as he points out, on lies, falsity and exaggeration. On the other hand, he organizes his writings on the principle that 'the writings of these Nazi and Fascist publicists [are] dead give-aways of German and Italian intentions' (Strausz-Hupé, 1941b: 41). A second motif of Axis America, one that would also recur in this post-war anti-communist writings, is the representation of Germany as an expansionist threat that tests the very manhood of Europe and the USA, Nazi foreign policy is described using what would become a common sexualized language of penetration, thrusts and emotional desires, a pop psychology of a scheming rapacious enemy that is both rational and mad. The USA was being mocked and needed to rise to the challenge. 'Do the young Germans of Hitler's Third Reich—the backbone of the Nazi Paty—either fear or respect the United States? They do not. They believe America to be a feminist country, its manhood gone' (Strausz-Hupe, 1941a: 69).

The work that made Strausz-Hupé a public reputation as a decoder of the workings of foreign propaganda was Geopolitics: The Struggle For Space and Power (1942). Although not the first book to address German geopolitics, Geopolitics was the first to receive widespread national attention. Strausz-Hupé appeared on the cover of The Saturday Evening Post on 27 June 1942 and the book became a 'minor bestseller', firmly establishing his name within the American community of scholars knowledgeable on geopolitics.

Strausz-Hupé makes two key arguments in Geopolitics. First, he seeks to explicate the link between geopolitics and Nazi foreign policy, arguing, in keeping with the more sensationalist popular narrations of geopolitics at this time (Ó Tuathail, 1996), that 'geopolitics is the master plan that tells what and why to conquer, guiding the military strategist along the easiest path to conquest. Thus the key to Hitler's global mind is German geopolitics' (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: vii). As is now well known, this claim is itself propaganda, a patently exaggerated and inaccurate description of the relationship between Haushofer's school of geopolitical thought and Nazi foreign policy (Bassin, 1987). Second, through a genealogical exploration of geopolitical theory, Strausz-Hupé judges the 'scientific merit' of German geopolitics. Geopolitik is, for Strausz Hupé, a 'portmanteau science' (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 86) that has blindly appropriated long-existing theories in political geography and amalgamated them to produce a doctrine of war. Strausz-Hupé's genealogy serves to highlight key theorists from whom Haushofer has stolen his ideas and illustrates the key points where their 'science' comes off the rails, becoming nothing more than irrational dogma. It is important to note that although Strausz-Hupé's overriding purpose in Geopolitics is to critique the 'new' German science, the subject position he adopts to do this is a subject position produced by his encounter with German Geopolitik. Half-way through the book he declares:

In this book the German spelling 'Geopolitik' is retained throughout to denote the peculiar use to which the German school of thought has put geopolitical theories. It should not be assumed, however, that this perverted use, destructive to world peace as it is, necessarily invalidates all geopolitical theories. (Strausz-Hupé, 1942: 140)
*Geopolitik* is a corrupt faith, a fallen geopolitics, but geopolitics as the name for the relationship of the state to its geographic environment is necessary for the conduct of US foreign policy. In a 1943 review in *The Saturday Review of Literature* entitled simply ‘It’s Smart to be Geopolitical’, Strausz-Hupé bluntly makes the following distinctions: ‘there is geopolitics; German *Geopolitik*; and American geopolitics. The first is a discipline; the second a plan for German world conquest; the third is a doctrine of American geopolitics’ (Strausz-Hupé, 1943: 4). Strausz-Hupé’s position is to utilize the ‘scientificness’ of the first to supplement the third so America could address the second. The decoder of German geopolitical propaganda had become an advocate and prophet for an American geopolitical practice that took greater heed of the material geographic basis of power. By this time, Strausz-Hupé was getting a chance to practise what he preached for he was working for the government trying to make it smartly geopolitical.

**Institutionalizing an American geopolitics in the wartime state**

By the time the USA entered the war in 1942, interest in geopolitics had extended well beyond media and literary circles. Business leaders began to study how knowledge of geopolitics could inform investment decisions and a number of government agencies looked at how geopolitical theories could assist with the war effort. On 1 August 1942, the editors of *Business Week* used a discussion of Strausz-Hupé’s *Geopolitics* to put the case for the formation of an American Geopolitical Institute. Convinced that ‘the German Army’s thorough training in geopolitics’ underlay their wartime successes, the editorial concluded: ‘it is plain now that the United States is gradually taking over the leadership of this war. This demands that we define our long term needs and objectives, tighten up all our planning organizations, and objectively co-ordinate all our activities’ (*Business Week*, 1942: 68). Calls for those charged with planning and co-ordinating the war effort to embrace geopolitical theory were not ignored in Washington. In the early 1940s, a number of government agencies experimented with geopolitics.

One of the first attempts to use geopolitical theories in government took place in the War Department. In July 1940, Eric Archdeacon had called for the establishment of an American Geopolitical Institute similar in function to Haushofer’s mythical Geopolitical Institute in Munich, and he encouraged business community assistance in developing such a project. However, Archdeacon’s plans for a ‘private institute that would co-operate with businesses, the State Department, and the General Staff’ ultimately failed to materialize because of security considerations and fears that an independent institute would not focus exclusively on research essential to the war effort (Coogan, 1991: 197). Nevertheless, his lobbying and the debates surrounding the proposal raised considerable interest in the War Department, and on 8 June 1942, a Geopolitical Section of the Military Intelligence Service was created. The section’s objectives were ‘to study physical, economic, political, and ethnological geography in order to advise on measures of national security and assurance of continued peace in the post-war world, as well as to conduct such studies as may be demanded for the immediate prosecution of the war’.1 However, just over a year later the Geopolitical Section was abolished after problems arising from the appointment of an excessively enthusiastic Lieutenant Colonel William S. Culbertson as director. Culbertson massively extended the section’s activities beyond its original directive, cultivating contacts with business and private research institutes. This presented a problem in that it blurred the line between the public and the private and, more importantly, inhibited secretive planning. In a vain attempt to further broaden its scope and appeal, and cast off the negative baggage of *Geopolitik*, Culbertson had
changed the section's name to the Analysis Section, an indication of the skepticism with which geopolitics was held by many at the time (Coogan, 1991).

One place where geopolitical thinking did flourish was in a secret intelligence and research division established by President Roosevelt in February 1941. Under the direction of journalist John Franklin Carter, the office collected geographical data and produced numerous intelligence reports, but its most significant involvement with geopolitics came with the establishment of what became known as 'M' Project. Headed by Isaiah Bowman and anthropologist Henry Field, the 'M' Project proposed a series of "Studies of Migration and Settlement" on a worldwide basis to assist in the relocation of the millions of people displaced by World War II and unable to return to their homes' (Bowser, 1963). With a staff of only Field, Bowman and Ales Hrdlicka, the 'M' Project initially limited itself to studying South and Central America. However, Roosevelt later agreed to the project's expansion, and Bowman, who was impressed with the recently published Geopolitics, recruited Strausz-Hupé as chief of the research staff. Surprisingly, it was not an appointment Strausz-Hupé later claimed he particularly relished.

After working for Current History, I got a job in government in the study of migration settlement. Mr Isaiah Bowman recruited me for this position and I was stuck pretty much with it until the end of the war. I wanted very much to go in the war, to have a good time—seeing the world—but Mr Bowman decided I should stay because it was the wish of the President. (Interview, 15 May 1995)

Along with Strausz-Hupé, Bowman recruited another Austrian émigré, Stefan Possony, to work on the project. Possony, who was born in Vienna in 1913, fled Austria for Paris following the Nazi Anschluss in 1938, and after the invasion of France in 1940 he moved to the USA. Before working on the 'M' Project, Possony was employed in the Psychological Warfare Department of the Office of Naval Intelligence, broadcasting propaganda messages to Austria over short-wave radio. Possony, a lifelong conservative defense intellectual like Strausz-Hupé, later became well known for his book The Strategy of Technology Winning the Decisive War (1970), which was one of the intellectual inspirations behind the Star Wars program of the 1980s.

Reports composed by the 'M' Project staff received a wide circulation within the offices of power. 'Geopolitical information' was distributed to the office of the President; Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce; the Library of Congress; the OSS; Herman Buekema at the Army Specialized Training Division; and Hardy Dillard at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville. Furthermore, occasional reports were requested by William Culbertson, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Medical Field Service School and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace (Coogan, 1991: 255). In his work for the 'M' Project, Strausz-Hupé became involved in attempts to increase the amount of 'geopolitical' training received by members of the armed forces. Most vociferous in calling for geopolitical education in the services was Colonel Herman Beukema, who headed the Department of Economics, Government, and History at West Point from 1930 to 1947. Like many geopolitical commentators in the 1940s, Beukema believed geopolitics was the key behind Nazi success and he argued strongly for its adoption in US military training schools. He believed that US success in forging a lasting peace after the war would depend on the caliber and geopolitical understanding of its military leaders. He proposed the establishment of a 'School for Statesmen' aimed at cultivating highly specialized experts in fields ranging from world mineral supplies, to military, air and naval tactics and strategy (Beukema, 1943). Beukema's plans bore fruition in the development of an Army
Specialized Training Division program in geography, developed in tandem with Bowman, Derwent Whittlesey and John K. Wright, the president of the American Geographical Society.

Attempts to provide a geopolitical education to members of the army was mirrored in the navy. Navy Undersecretary James Forrestal, an old acquaintance and close friend of Strausz-Hupe from his days on Wall Street, was already gearing up to fight to maintain a strong US navy when the war was over. He became interested in extending navy education programs because it assisted in his project of retaining experienced reservists, improving the quality of reserve officers and, more generally, strengthening the navy and preventing its rapid demobilization. Under his direction, Strausz-Hupe collaborated with Edward Mead Earle, Harold and Margaret Sprout and Isaiah Bowman in developing Navy V-12 course outlines which aimed to broaden the recruits' education beyond the use of military hardware into questions of power, national strategy and enemy objectives.

Forrestal asked me to assist the Bureau of Personnel of the Navy Department in the preparation of course outlines to be used in the training of midshipmen. For the war had brought to light some alarming gaps in civic and military education; though firmly grounded in the use of hardware, the young reservists entertained but the vaguest notions about the purposes of national policy, means and uses of national power, and the resources and objectives of their country's allies and enemies. (Strausz-Hupe, 1965: 210–211)

Harold Sprout opened the course to 50 trainees at Princeton University in March 1944 and by November 1945 the course had expanded to Northwestern, Yale Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Berkeley, and had become a required course for all ROTC students (Coogan, 1991: 227). Forrestal was wary of using the term 'geopolitics' in the course title, to avoid the negative image of *Geopolitik*, but the contents of the course would fit with any definition of geopolitics:

After opening with a quotation from Mackinder's 'Geographical Pivot of History,' the syllabus covered both the theories and the individual elements of geopolitics. Reading packets drew heavily from the Army Field Manual on *Geographical Foundations of National Power* and contained excerpts from Mackinder, Mahan, Haushofer, Spykman, Strausz-Hupe, Whittlesey, Earle, and many other theoreticians and commentators on geopolitics. (Coogan, 1991: 228)

In addition to assisting in curriculum development, Strausz-Hupe was involved in a lecture series designed to train instructors for the Navy V-12 course, lecturing on *Geopolitik* and on the general influence of geographic factors in international relations. Having been a prominent voice in arguments for developing a geopolitical world view in the early 1940s, Strausz-Hupe thus became, in the mid-1940s, a prominent figure in the use of geopolitics in government and in the development of education curricula for military personnel. The effects of these programs on US strategic thinking should not be understated. As Coogan points out:

Although the Army Specialized Training Division and the Navy V-12 program contributed only marginally to the war effort and were severely curtailed in 1944 due to manpower shortages, their efforts brought the language and literature of geopolitics into the classrooms on over fifty American colleges and universities. Wartime graduates of these programs who received even a passing familiarity with geopolitics included a future secretary of defense (Melvin Laird), a future secretary of the navy (J. William Middendorf), and ten future senators (including...
While working with Bowman on the 'M' Project, Strausz-Hupé completed a draft of his third book, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (1945), which considered the emerging post-war world. Besides the conclusions he draws regarding the shape of the post-war world, *The Balance of Tomorrow* is an important book because it sees a refinement of Strausz-Hupé's approach to international politics, and the relationship of this to geopolitics. Early in his study Strausz-Hupé eschews any approach concerned with developing blueprints for the provision of security in the post-war world. There are, he argues, too many intangible factors influencing foreign policy for it ever to be based on a purely 'scientific' approach. Nevertheless, he identifies one guiding axiom that can assist foreign-policy-makers: the most important factor influencing a nation's foreign policy is power. Power transcends the importance of plans, blueprints or grand designs because, he argues, 'security and peace cannot be planned; they have to be won everyday' (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 3). However, although exact predictions are not possible, some knowledge of a nation's power-political position is fundamental to the successful practice of foreign policy.

There are no exact methods for unraveling that complex of geographical certainties and human vagaries called international politics. The statesman must cast his lines into the future, and foreign policy deals mainly in probabilities . . . Rough measurements are better than no measurements at all. Although the tools of analytical research into the nature of power are crude, they are better than mere intuition. Once the facts and figures of state power are recognized as indices of extremely volatile matter, they can be used to great advantage in the workshop of foreign policy. (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 7)

Geopolitics is attractive because it 'provides a rigorous analysis of power politics and thus of the harsh realities facing all makers of foreign policy, be they lofty idealists or rugged realists'. It recognizes that 'moral convictions and reliance on treaties alone do not guarantee the survival of a nation and that the strength of a nation is determined mainly by the location, size, topography, and raw-material resources of its territory and the size of its population; i.e. its "power position"' (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 5). Rather than reject geopolitics, Strausz-Hupé redefines it as a 'scientific inventory' type of power politics which emphasizes the importance of studying the elemental geographic components of national power. This conceptualization of geopolitics as the study of a nation's 'power position' is consistent with Strausz-Hupé's earlier work. He is attracted to geopolitics because it allows the minimization, but not eradication, of factors of chance in international politics. Geopolitics is concerned with the production of panoptic surveys, and with the calculation of relative strengths, weaknesses and probabilities. International politics might be inherently unstable, rife with change and uncertainties, but geopolitical study gives valuable insight into the fundamental forces that effect change. Foreign policy, Strausz-Hupé argues, is not a science but an art—'the art of the possible'—and geopolitics is essential so what is possible can be known (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 11).

*The Balance of Tomorrow* was written at a politically sensitive time with the USA unsure of its role and identity in the post-war world. The book was published in the immediate aftermath of the Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks conferences, which had seen the nominal resurrection of a balance of power system and the division of the world into three 'spheres'. Article 51 of the UN charter secured for the USA regional domination over
the western hemisphere, but the USA acquiesced in Russian control over Poland and much of Eastern Europe. Resembling Haushofer's 'pan-regions', the Yalta system was a far cry from the open world system demanded by US businesses. For Strausz-Hupé, the Yalta system, based on the extension of tenuous wartime alliances into peacetime cooperation, was doomed to failure and his fundamental argument was to push for greater US leadership in building the post-war world. His analytical method involves an inventory of the world's resources and a demonstration that the USA has sufficient 'chips' to play the power game with all and sundry. He argues that the USA should finally reject hemispheric isolation, because it has the 'power potential' to take a leading role in international affairs and build a better order for all of mankind. The factors Strausz-Hupé analyses as components of national power are population, raw materials, political organization and geography. He does not believe these factors to be exhaustive of the components determining national power, but, of the factors that can be 'scientifically' analyzed, these are the most important. He begins his analysis with population, arguing that the 'dynamic use of population is the most important single phenomenon of modern power politics' (Strausz-Hupé, 1945: 16). Raw materials and political organization are important because of Strausz-Hupé's reduction of international politics to the question of power. Strategic raw materials such as coal and iron are fundamental to a nation's military might, and the form of political organization determines the efficiency of resource use. Finally, geographical location is important because it determines access to raw materials and has strategic implications in areas such as vulnerability to attack.

According to one reviewer, The Balance of Tomorrow was 'best attempt I have yet seen to calculate power on the adding machine and to forecast history by mathematical computation' (Harris, 1945: 30). Strausz-Hupé's inventory of the world's resources—his 'Geopolitical Index'—demonstrated not only the great power potential of the USA, but also that the Soviet Union was an emergent power mass that threatened the USA's global ambitions. However, it is interesting that his representation of the Soviet Union as a threat is much more moderate than in later texts. In 1945, debates in US strategic culture had not firmly established a policy toward the Soviet Union, and Truman's policy was still in a state of flux. It was not until George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' and his subsequent X article in Foreign Affairs that the Soviet Union became firmly established in US strategic culture as threatening to US ambitions and security. Interestingly, in his famous critique of Kennan's views in the book The Cold War that came to describe the age, newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann (1947: 31–33) quotes an extensive passage from an article by Strausz-Hupé ('a distinguished political geographer') on the western borders of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical counterpoint to what he interpreted as Kennan's over-emphasis on ideology as the motive force behind Soviet expansionism. Ironically, Kennan would later move away from his X article while Strausz-Hupé would embrace it. The Balance of Tomorrow was written at a time when the nature of the Soviet Union and its relationship to the USA was under contestation and a hegemonic script had yet to be developed. Once the outlines of that Cold War script became set, Strausz-Hupé would distinguish himself as one of the most manichean of the new breed of Cold Warriors.

**Institutionalizing and propagating Cold War geopolitics**

Strausz-Hupé's voluminous writing during the Cold War can be tentatively divided into three periods, each characterized by a particular set of concerns. The first of these covers the period 1948 to 1952, when the USA possessed nuclear superiority (absolute supremacy prior to 22 September 1949) and, not beset by internal problems on the scale
of the Soviet Union, was clearly the most powerful state in the world. During this period Strausz-Hupé was principally concerned with Europe, believing the USA could use its power supremacy to impose a favorable settlement over the objections of the Soviet Union (Strausz-Hupé, 1948, 1950a,b, 1951, 1952). It was also a period where, professionally, Strausz-Hupé consolidated his position within the Political Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania and within the newly emerging subfield of international relations. In 1950, along with Stefan Possony, he published the disciplinary textbook *International Relations: In the Age of Conflict Between Democracy and Dictatorship*. This text served as the basis for the graduate courses Strausz-Hupé taught at Pennsylvania until he departed the university for a diplomatic career in 1969.

The second period concerns the years 1954 to 1957, when the focus of the Cold War shifted away from Europe to include the Middle East and Asia. Strausz-Hupé's overriding preoccupation was the expansion of Soviet influence among the 'uncommitted peoples' of the world and their simultaneous consolidation of power over Eastern Europe. During this period Strausz-Hupé also worked to institutionalize his particular approach to international relations and extend its influence over policy-makers. In February 1955, with a grant from the North-Carolina-based Richardson Foundation, he founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) at the University of Pennsylvania. The institute hoped to produce a number of basic studies 'which will be of value in the formulation of future American policies', and to develop 'methods appropriate to basic research in international relations' (Orbis, 1957: 3). In addition to book-length studies, the FPRI established a quarterly journal, *Orbis*, to allow the publication of short articles and invite contributions from outside of the institute. Among its founder members the FPRI included the following: Stefan Possony; Hans Kohn, author of *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944) and, ironically, given the arguments Strausz-Hupé made in the 1940s a contributor in the 1930s to the *Journal of Geopolitics* founded by Haushofer in 1924 (Bassin, 1987); Henry Kissinger, a rising star of geopolitical discourse in the 1950s; and Colonel William Kinter, an army officer who, like Strausz-Hupé, wrote on German geopolitics during the 1940s. Not surprisingly, the FPRI considered geography to be vital to the conduct of US foreign policy:

My friends and I felt that the American people and American academia had not paid sufficient attention to developments abroad and new developments in the uses of geography. Very specifically, we believed that the foreign policies of the great powers were rooted in geography, even if they themselves did not understand it. You cannot argue with geography. It doesn't pay. (Interview, 15 May 1995)

The final, and most controversial period of Strausz-Hupé's intellectual work on the Cold War covers the period 1957 to 1961. On April 12 1957, Strausz-Hupé testified before Congress on foreign aid, one of his many testimonies before that body (Strausz-Hupé, 1957). In 1959, the FPRI released an extremely influential study of Soviet strategy entitled *Protracted Conflict*, which substantially raised the profile and influence of the FPRI. Soon afterwards, Strausz-Hupé became implicated in a political storm in Washington and at the University of Pennsylvania. At the center of the controversy was a memorandum sent from Democratic Arkansas Senator William Fulbright (an initially moderate and later vocal critic of US foreign policy in Vietnam and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) to President Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert S. MacNamara. In the memo Fulbright raised concern over abuse by certain military leaders of a 1958 National Security Directive, and more generally over military participation in radical right-wing
seminars conducted by the FPRI and the Institute for American Strategy (IAS). Both of these institutes were financed by the Richardson Foundation.

Fulbright had legitimate cause for concern. The Richardson Foundation was a well-financed right-wing organization bankrolled by the Vicks Chemical Company which in 1958 had assets totaling over $13 million. According to Lyons and Morton (1961), the foundation's interest in foreign affairs largely resulted from the appointment of Frank Barnett as research director. Before joining the foundation, Barnett, a former Rhodes scholar, had a long history of anti-communist activity. He was president of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, a committee formed to assist the escape of 'White' Russians from the Soviet Union and in 1951 in an article in the *Congressional Record* he proposed the formation of a 'Legion of Liberation' for refugees from communism, a proposal that induced Congress to appropriate $100 million to form iron-curtain refugees into military units for the defense of the Free World' (Hahn and Neff, 1960: 40).

In his position as director of research at the foundation, Barnett directed funds into the establishment of two research institutes, the FPRI and IAS, which received $153,000 and $108,000 respectively from the Foundation in 1958, 1959 and 1960. Although marketed as 'independent', the IAS had clear institutional links with the military, corporate elites and industrial–military conglomerates.

The Institute for American Strategy originally grew out of a symposium on the utilization of technical and scientific manpower, held in Chicago in March 1955, and sponsored by the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, the Society of American Military Engineers, the Illinois Institute of Technology, and various branches of the armed forces. Called the National Military-Industrial Conference, the symposium brought together leaders of industry and government and enjoyed sponsorship of some of the largest corporations in the country. (Lyons and Morton, 1961: 105)

Moreover, the figure of Barnett provides a close personal link between the IAS and the FPRI. Lyons and Morton (1961) argue that the two institutes were essentially formed to publicize Barnett's anti-communist message and program of action. The work of the FPRI formed the rationale for Barnett's message, while the IAS, through the organization of meetings and seminars, acted as a public relations unit.

In 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff invited the IAS and the FPRI to take over reserve officer teaching functions at the National War College. Strausz-Hupe was charged with curriculum development and he imported his own staff from the FPRI for teaching duties. In effect, as Lyons and Morton (1961: 106) argue, the double-institute Richardson Foundation 'took over from the services the responsibility for training reserve officers on active duty, even though the National War College, whose facilities were used, had been giving courses on strategy to senior officers on three services as well as civilians for the past ten years'. According to Walter F. Hahn, executive director of *Orbis*, and John C. Neff, Colonel in the US Army Reserve, the first National Strategy Seminar for reserve officers, held in July 1959, was attended by 218 reserve officers (representing all branches of the armed services as well as the 50 states and Puerto Rico), 2 governors, 3 congressmen, 70 educators, and over 40 members of the media from newspapers, radio and television (Hahn and Neff, 1960: xvii). Moreover, following the Washington seminars, numerous regional seminars were organized—in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, New Orleans, Wilmington, California, Massachusetts and Texas. The Richardson Foundation made available the funds needed to develop the curriculum which was published in 1960, with Hahn and Neff as editors, under the title *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*. Amongst
the texts that made up the curriculum were pieces by Dean Acheson, Herman Kahn, William Kinter, Henry Kissinger, J. Edgar Hoover, Stefan Possony, Walt Rostow, Strausz-Hupe, Alfred Wohlstetter and Arnold Wolfers. The volume ends with an article by Barnett, who did some of the lecturing, proposing the creation of a 'West Point of political warfare', an American 'fourth weapon' co-equal with the army, navy and air force and dedicated solely to subversion and propaganda warfare against the communists. Hahn and Neff (1960) claim that the seminars reached out to tens of thousands of Americans, the principal audience being drawn from business, finance, education, industry and military leaders. This astonishingly rapid expansion of the FPRI's and IAS's influence over national strategy led Cook (1962: 595) to comment that 'the speed with which Strausz-Hupe, Kinter and Possony have moved into a position of commanding influence as foreign policy oracles was in itself so remarkable as to suggest that somebody up there decidedly must have liked them'.

Fulbright's memo was initially prompted by an article in the New York Times that reported the reprimand of Major General Edwin A. Walker for indoctrinating troops and civilians with radical political theories 'resembling those of the John Birch Society' (Phillips, 1961: 1). Walker took his actions under a 1958 National Security Council Directive urging the 'mobilization of all arms of government—military, diplomatic, civilian—in the "cold war" struggle' (Phillips, 1961: 56). The Security Council Directive, Fulbright argued, had resulted in a proliferation of military-sponsored seminars that 'made use of extremely radical right-wing speakers and/or materials, with the probable net result of condemning foreign and domestic politics of the [Kennedy] administration in the public mind' (Fulbright, 1963: 224). At issue, Fulbright argued, was military subordination to civilian control, because 'military officers are not elected by the people, and they have no responsibility for the formation of policies other than military policies' (Fulbright, 1963: 222).

Fulbright's concern with the Richardson Foundation activities centered on the extreme right-wing message being taught to military officers and, more importantly, its sponsorship by government authorities, which gave a false legitimacy to Barnett's program. Moreover, attaching the Lyons and Morton article 'School for Strategy' to his memorandum, he expressed concern over the impartiality of these organizations, given their close connections with the military. Finally, Fulbright (1963: 225) argued that after Kennedy referred to 'the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out' in his inaugural presidential address, the USA was in a period of history where 'the menace of the Cold War' had great appeal to both the public and military. With this social climate, the impressionability of military officers, military attempts to 'educate' the public, and the fact that there are numerous military 'fingers on the trigger', Fulbright foresaw severe dangers in Strausz-Hupe's strategy seminars:

The radicalism of the right can be expected to have mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple solution, easily understood: scourging the devils within the body politic or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy. If the military is infected with this virus of right-wing radicalism, the danger is worthy of attention. If it believes the public is, the danger is enhanced. If, by the process of the military 'educating' the public, the fevers of both groups are raised, the danger is great indeed. (Fulbright, 1963: 226–227)

In response to these dangers, Fulbright made a number of recommendations to Kennedy and McNamara. These included reconsidering the National Security Directive; re-establishing the broad principle of civilian control over the military; reviewing the
organization, mission and operation of the National War College; exposing military officers to broader education opportunities; review by a civilian committee of troop education activities; and

... the relationships between the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Institute for American Strategy, the Richardson Foundation, the National War College, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be re-examined, from the standpoint of whether these relationships do not amount to official support for a viewpoint at variance with that of the administration. These relationships may give one particularly aggressive view a more direct and commanding influence upon military and civilian concepts of strategy than is desirable. (Fulbright, 1963: 229)

Fulbright's memo resulted in a small political storm in Washington and precipitated a heated exchange between Fulbright and Senator Strom Thurmond, a then conservative Democrat from South Carolina who still serves in the US Senate as a Republican. In language that reveals the degree to which the Soviet threat was also a sexual anxiety at the time, Thurmond charged that the nation was 'weaving the thongs for our own bondage' by succumbing to what he said was a campaign to 'muzzle anti-Communist comment'. Fulbright's memo was a gag rule on the armed forces that expressed the alarming viewpoint that Americans should be restrained 'in their desire to hit Communists with everything we've got' (New York Times, 1961a: 14). Thurmond later accused columnists writing about the Fulbright memo of falling into a 'Red Trap' (New York Times, 1961b: 3). A few days earlier, Senator Olin D. Johnson, a South Carolina colleague of Thurmond, charged 'that Communists are attempting to destroy anti-Communist movements and elements with smear tactics and organized propaganda' (New York Times, 1961d: 8). Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican from Arizona, also assailed Fulbright, charging that he was 'throttling military leaders'. Interestingly, he implicitly defended the interests of the growing labyrinth of conservative southern 'think-tanks' institutes by interpreting Fulbright's memo as one instance of 'the centralization of our government in Washington which is taking away the freedoms of the American people' (New York Times, 1961a: 4). The ease with which Fulbright's memo could be smeared as aiding the communists is intellectually connected to Strausz-Hupe's analysis of Soviet strategy in *Protracted Conflict*.

The FPRI published *Protracted Conflict* in May 1959, hoping that it would 'help to establish a conceptual consensus among American policy groups and opinion elites on the protean nature of the Communist challenge' (Strausz-Hupe et al., 1959: xiv). In addition to providing the theoretical framework for the 'national strategy seminars', the book's thesis was widely propagated by Strausz-Hupe before and after publication (Strausz-Hupe, 1956, 1958a–d, 1959, 1961a). *Protracted Conflict*, which had four credited authors (Strausz-Hupe, William Kintner, James Dougherty and Alvin Cottrell; since Strausz-Hupe is the principal author, we refer to him only below for convenience sake), actually resulted from a series of FPRI studies dating back to 1955. During its four-year preparation, Strausz-Hupe and other institute members visited and discussed their thesis with top American political and military personnel at home and abroad. In April 1958, five members of the institute held a series of seminars with staff and faculty of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, before drafting the final manuscript in late 1958. Because of the study's long preparation time a number of its arguments are evident in Strausz-Hupe's articles written in 1956 and 1957. At the core of these articles and the later book is the assumption that Soviet actions were driven solely by communist ideology.
This gross simplification allowed the constant reproduction of the Soviet threat without recognizing changes in the international political arena or inside the Soviet Union. On the original cover of *Protracted Conflict*, Henry Kissinger proclaimed that 'it should be read by everyone who wishes to understand the nature of our danger'. The book had extended extracts published in *Reader's Digest* in January and April 1961 (Strausz-Hupé, 1961a,c).

*Protracted Conflict* takes its name from Mao’s *On the Protracted War*, a discursive move that reinforces the notion of a monolithic communist campaign for global domination and overrides the significance of the late 1950s Sino-Soviet split. Its fundamental argument is that the communists, in their presumed quest for world revolution, have developed a different view of conflict to the West. Strausz-Hupé argues that communists take a very long-term view of conflict, seeing themselves in a perpetual state of revolutionary war, whereas the West tends to view war only in terms of ‘battles’. Thus, in periods the West conceptualizes as peaceful, the Soviet Union is still, if not explicitly, engaged in revolutionary warfare. Furthermore, protracted conflict strategy is one that utilizes all aspects of social, political, psychological and economical warfare to gain a strategic advantage over the enemy. It is a total view of warfare, the revolutionary doctrine dominating all aspects of society:

Our society does not subordinate all its aspirations to considerations of power; communist dominated societies do. And the struggle being what it is, namely a revolutionary one, communist presses all men and all things into the service of one cause: the overthrow of the existing social order and the establishment of a communist society. It is only within this context that we can read the real meaning of the communist threat and not merely seek to fill the breach opened by the latest communist thrust. (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 13)

Strausz-Hupé writes the communists as different and dangerous Others. Unlike ‘us’ in the West, they are consumed by their desire for power and world revolution. Because the West does not understand the true nature of the threat, western policy is reduced to reacting to each communist ‘thrust’. Strausz-Hupé’s exposition of this protracted conflict strategy is intended as a wake-up call to policy-makers to the real nature of the communist challenge. In this quest, Strausz-Hupé identifies four interrelated principles of protracted conflict strategy: the indirect approach, deception and distraction, monopoly of the initiative, and attrition.

**The indirect approach**

The strategy of protracted conflict is one that postpones the decisive battle until the balance of power has swung to the side of the revolutionaries and victory is assured. Thus, Strausz-Hupé argues, when in a position of military weakness, the communists will back away from direct warfare if their incursions are met with a display of force. This was the operating principle behind the Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946 and from South Korea in 1953, and explains communist reluctance to see the Berlin crisis in 1948 expand into outright war. However, the communists do not reject military tactics; they merely shift to subtler, irregular and indirect methods. The two methods Strausz-Hupé highlights are shifting conflict to ‘gray areas’ and conducting ‘war by proxies’ (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 53, 56). Gray areas are those parts of the world not covered by the western security system, such as Asia and Africa, and where existing national liberation movements serve as useful vehicles for gradual communist infiltration. The purpose of this approach is to
localize conflict and not present the West with an overt challenge. Lacking a clear communist threat and without a unified security system in these areas, the West is thrown into confusion. Uncertain of the challenge’s authenticity, it delays taking action until the situation can no longer be controlled.

Although ‘proxies’ such as nationalist movements are used to conduct war in the Third World, the proxies Strausz-Hupé concentrates on are the various national communist parties operating inside the West. Through national communist parties ‘the Soviet leaders are able to carry out an exasperating daily intervention in the political life of western and neutral states’ (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 57). In many western democracies the communist party holds the parliamentary balance of power, thus controlling many major decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, ‘no one can seriously question the fact, for example, that the hard core of western Communist parties would, in the event of a general conflict, transform itself into a fifth column at the disposal of the Communist high command’ (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 59). Because Strausz-Hupé assumes that all communist parties are directly controlled from Moscow, western communists are immediate threats to western democracy and freedom.

Deception and distraction

According to Strausz-Hupé, the communists have two primary methods of deception: policy shifts and exaggerations. He provides three examples of dramatic Soviet policy shifts, which, although he notes were primarily designed for domestic consumption, had the corollary effect of playing on western hopes for a peaceful world and undermining western resolve to confront the communist challenge. The first was Lenin’s New Economic Policy of 1921 which, he argues, suggested to western observers that the Soviets were moving toward a halfway house between socialism and capitalism; the second was Stalin’s appeals to nationalist sentiments in the mid-1930s, which suggested an abandonment of hard-line communism; and third was the more recent de-Stalinization campaign instigated by Krushchev. Discussing de-Stalinization, Strausz-Hupé argues that the communists recognized their hard-line policies had built unity in the West and in order to undermine this unity they projected an image of changing their ways. Moreover, he suggests that ‘Stalin himself, master opportunist, set the stage for de-Stalinization’ (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 70). This implication, coupled with the other historical examples of the same policy technique, draws a line of continuity in Soviet strategy, denying the existence of internal political power struggles and changes of policy. Those who believe the Soviets are changing are simply being fooled by their clever and subtle tactics. The second method of deception, exaggerations, concerns Soviet economic and military data falsification. Deliberate statistical deception was an argument Strausz-Hupé first made in *The Balance of Tomorrow* in a discussion of the Magnitogorsk industrial complex. Strausz-Hupé apportions blame for the escalating arms race on this Soviet tactic rather than on institutional interests perpetuating a military build-up.

The Soviet distraction technique elaborates on Strausz-Hupé’s analysis of Middle East politics and on ‘the indirect approach’ by providing a rationale behind the Soviet method of conflict by proxy. He argues that if the West’s attention is diverted and resources are spent containing ‘conflicts by proxy’, the Soviets stronghold in Eastern Europe can be fully consolidated. Moreover, challenges to freedom in other parts of the world are not merely random attempts to occupy the West’s attention. Rather, he warns that the Soviets are attempting to deprive the West of its ‘sources of strategic raw materials and markets
and to encircle it via Asia, the Middle East and Africa, until the West, its economic roots having withered, will fall under its own weight (Strausz Hupé et al., 1959: 24).

**Monopoly of the Initiative**

According to Strausz-Hupé, success in the protracted conflict is dependent on keeping the enemy in a defensive and reactive frame of mind. To this end, the communists subtly play on western moral and legalistic principles through demarcating a Cold War 'peace zone' and 'war zone'. The communists, Strausz-Hupé argues, have succeeded in gaining western acceptance that the Cold War is fought outside of communist-controlled territory in Europe. He finds a classic result of this strategy in the Truman Doctrine.

...the 'containment policy' which furnished the official framework for the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey and subsequent US foreign and security policies, rested on the 'war zone, peace zone' assumption. Under the containment theory, the United States was to pursue a reactive policy, by applying counter pressure against the Soviet Empire along 'a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.' In other words, the sites of the conflict were to be chosen by the Communists. (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 86)

Strausz-Hupé's fundamental concern with the containment doctrine is that the West only ever fights to maintain the status quo. In conflicts where the West is unsuccessful, such as losing control over the Suez Canal, power shifts in favor of the Soviet Union. Behind his analysis of the 'war zone/peace zone' division is the paranoid assumption that Moscow directs all communist/nationalist movements outside the Soviet bloc in the so-called 'war zone'. From Strausz-Hupé's perspective, over time the containment doctrine can only result in increased Soviet power. Unless the West takes the conflict into Soviet territory, the balance of power will eventually shift so decisively in the Soviets' favor that they will be in a position to mount the final decisive battle.

**Attrition**

There are two main techniques in the communist strategy of attrition. The first is communist utilization of freedom of speech in western societies to cultivate western guilt complexes and increase opposition to Cold War policies. He refers to Soviet charges of western imperialism aimed at inducing 'pangs of conscience', asserting that these charges are false and that the West has little to be ashamed of internationally. The second technique is the offer of peace and neutralization discussions, especially over the status of Germany and the demilitarization of Central Europe. Thus, Krushchev's consistent appeals for summit talks in 1958 are interpreted as nothing more than part of Soviet military strategy.

They were missiles of propaganda warfare rather than notes of diplomacy and aimed at public opinion outside of the communist bloc. Since the communist rulers do not tolerate free discussion at home, their propaganda campaign for a 'summit' conference is being waged like all 'cold war' battles upon the territory of the free world. (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 102)

If the West succumbs to these tactics, and considers a peace settlement in Europe, then Strausz-Hupé raises the specter of a Soviet sweep into the neutralized territories and a Europe under communist control.
The purpose of the Soviet neutrality campaign in Europe, waged with increasing vehemence and subtlety since Stalin’s death, is the dissolution of the Western system of alliances; secondly, the withdrawal of American and British forces from the European Continent; and finally, the creation of broad demilitarized regions in Central Europe which, exposed to Russian pressure unmatched by American power, would ultimately succumb to the Soviet Union. (Strausz-Hupé et al., 1959: 97)

_Protracted Conflict_ was published toward the end of Eisenhower’s second presidential term, which had seen a relaxation in US–Soviet tensions (Wolfe, 1979). Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ military strategy was cloaked in anti-communist rhetoric but was primarily concerned with achieving stability in military expenditures. Eisenhower did nothing when Soviet tanks rolled into Hungary in 1956 and the Hungarians pleaded for assistance. Looking to balance the federal budget in the face of recession and an increasing dollar drain from the US economy, Eisenhower refused to increase military expenditure following the Soviet launch of Sputnik, and he shelved the top-secret Gaither Report which warned of a looming ‘missile gap’ and urged ‘an immediate return to high defense budgets and an effort to indoctrinate the public into a crisis mentality’ (Wolfe, 1979: 21). Furthermore, in 1958 Secretary of State John Dulles explored ‘the idea of partial military disengagement in Europe and seemed to endorse a reduction in tensions with the Russians’ (Wolfe, 1979: 21). In the years immediately preceding the publication of _Protracted Conflict_, the Soviet threat was no longer as central as it once was in US foreign policy discourse.

_Protracted Conflict_ was part of a larger ideological offensive by conservative security intellectuals against the Eisenhower administration. This offensive sought to renew the flagging discourse of the Soviet threat as the central danger to the American way of life, thus necessitating increased military expenditure (McCormick, 1989). Although purporting to promote geography in foreign policy decision-making, the study is fundamentally ageographical in that it reduces the complexities of international politics to one overdetermining script: the global expansion of communism. Localized conflict becomes part of a global interpretative framework that effaces the significance of local conditions and meanings. Furthermore, in reading Soviet policy changes and peace initiatives as merely part of a fixed set of objectives established by Lenin, the study is also ahistorical. Soviet foreign policy is not situated within any historical and political context.

By the 1960s, the views of Strausz-Hupé and the FPRI were becoming part of mainstream Cold War discourse. While Eisenhower had attempted to cut military expenditure, Kennedy made the supposed ‘missile gap’ an issue in the 1960s election, and after his victory increased military expenditure by 40 percent to $56 billion. In 1961 Strausz-Hupé, William Kinter and Stephan Possony published _A Forward Strategy for America_ as a follow-up to _Protracted Conflict_ with the object of influencing the foreign-policy thinking of the new Democratic administration. The Cold War militarism of the Kennedy and later the Johnson administration was fully supported by Strausz-Hupé, particularly, as the decade wore on and the stakes became higher, the war in Vietnam. In 1964 his career entered a new phase when he began working as an adviser to Barry Goldwater during Goldwater’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination and, later, the presidency (New York Times, 1964). When the Democrats were defeated by Richard Nixon in 1968, Strausz-Hupé reaped the reward of his conservative political activities with a series of ambassadorships in the Nixon and Ford administrations. During the Carter administration, Strausz-Hupé joined the revitalized Committee on the Present Danger, though he had nothing to do with its founding (Dalby, 1990). He was, as he later put it, a ‘faithful out-of-town member’
(Interview, 27 November 1995). He became an ambassador once again when Ronald Reagan won the White House in 1980, serving as ambassador to Turkey.

Conclusion

In reflecting upon his early life amongst ‘White’ Russian exiles in New York City in the mid-1920s, Strausz-Hupé writes in his 1965 autobiography:

Forty years ago I found the so-called theoretical writings of Marx and Lenin unspeakably boring; I do so even now. Yet the mechanics of Communist political and psychological warfare are today of greater interest than they ever were, for they have been tested in the crucible of action. (Strausz-Hupé, 1965: 72-73)

The sentence is a revealing one for it indicates Strausz-Hupé’s lifelong passion for political and psychological warfare or, as it is more commonly known, propaganda. Indeed, the problematic of propaganda seems to have preoccupied Strausz-Hupé throughout his life, from his earliest writings ‘decoding’ German Geopolitik to his later efforts to alert his adopted country to the deceiving ways of the Soviet Union and all communists. In so doing, of course, the irony is that Strausz Hupé himself came to function as a type of counter-propaganda propagandist, an intellectual who ‘knows’ the enemy, has read their most revealing blueprints, and speaks the truth about their real intentions and the strategems they will use to achieve these ends. Like Strausz-Hupé’s counter-propaganda propaganda, the problematic of geopolitics also involves decipherment and truth telling, the dividing of the underlying ‘geographical realities’ framing the practice of statecraft and the subsequent speaking of the truth of ‘the geopolitical realities’ of statecraft. The intersection and mutual interdigitation of these two problematics in the making of the intellectuals, institutions and ideology of American geopolitics suggests a number of interesting themes for future research within critical geopolitics.

The first concerns the question of the subjectivity of the geopoliticians as foreign policy intellectual. From the biography of Strausz-Hupé, it is clear that the subject positions of the ‘translator’, ‘decoder’ and the ‘decipherer’ are significant. By virtue of his background, it was easy for Strausz-Hupé to be initially captured by and later cultivate the subject position of the knowledgeable insider, the German-speaking Austrian émigré who had first-hand experience of the ‘rape of Austria’ and the workings of German Geopolitik. Like so many other enterprising émigré intellectuals of the time, Strausz Hupé made a career out of his European background and acted as a literal and figural ‘translator’ between Europe and America. This subject position soon became transformed into a biographical mission as Strausz-Hupé and other émigrés saw it as their task to ‘educate’ (or, if one prefers, propagandize) Americans about the realities of ‘power politics’ beyond their borders. Strausz-Hupé and others sold Old World ‘wisdom’ to the New World. They were the experienced (realists) who sought to teach the innocent (idealists, legalists) about the world. Using the comparative advantage of his birth, Strausz-Hupé built a whole career for himself as a worldly geopolitician in the broadest sense, as a ‘translator’ who, by distinction of his background and experience, was able to claim unique authority and the subject position of ‘prophet’. Investigating the functioning of this web of cultivated subjectivity, a web of subject positioning also particularly relevant to strong self-identifying (auto-bio-graphs) intellectuals of statecraft like Henry Kissinger, is one important research front within critical geopolitics.
Second, the institutional circumstances within which these subject positions could be cultivated and used to propagate particular ideological agendas is another important research front within critical geopolitics. For a more thorough examination of Strausz-Hupé’s career, we would need to investigate, first, the mechanisms of discursive literacy in the USA, particularly the institutions of political journalism, current affairs publishing and popular mass-market magazines like the Reader’s Digest, The Saturday Evening Post and US News and World Report; second, the emergent ‘academic’ subfields of international relations, security studies and sovietology; and finally, the role of privately funded institutes and ‘think-tanks’ in producing ‘expert’ discourse on foreign-policy issues. It can be claimed that Strausz-Hupé was involved in the beginning of a radical power shift in American politics away from the north eastern establishment to the southern rim. This shift of political power had its genesis in Barry Goldwater’s campaign for the Republican Party presidential nomination. Although unsuccessful, Goldwater was one of the earliest campaigners to utilize a wide team of advisers (including Strausz-Hupé), drawn from conservative think-tanks and study groups outside Washington. By the 1980s, the ability of conservative think-tanks in the southern rim (such as the Hoover Institution, which was an important intellectual think-tank for the ‘Reagan revolution’) to empower, influence and give legitimacy to politicians had dramatically changed the discourse of American politics. The FPRI was one of the earliest research institutes funded by southern businesses and has become an important and respected institution within ‘the new Conservative labyrinth’ (Saloma, 1984).

Third, existing research within critical geopolitics on the social production of Otherness in foreign policy, and on the centrality of discourses of danger in sustaining militarism, are particularly relevant in any critical evaluation of the work of Strausz-Hupé. In scripting monologic and over-determined pictures of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Strausz-Hupé made it easier for the USA to make war and more difficult for it to make peace. In this respect, Strausz-Hupé’s writings appear to be less about foreign policy as the art of negotiation and dialogue and more about foreign policy as the policy of making ‘foreignness’. How Strausz-Hupé functioned as a professional diplomat is, therefore, particularly intriguing. In this paper we have obviously only scratched the surface of the biography of Robert Strausz-Hupé and the story of ‘American geopolitics’ from the 1940s. Much detailed historical research remains to be done, research that should focus not on narrow discourse alone but on the intellectuals, institutions and ideology that comprise the congealment of geographical knowledge and foreign policy discourse that is imperfectly described as ‘American geopolitics’.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Robert Strausz-Hupé for agreeing to be interviewed for this paper on two separate occasions. Thanks to Simon Dalby, Neil Smith and Anders Stephanson for useful comments and suggestions on the text and November 1995 interview.

Note

References


COOK, F. J. (1962) The ultras: aims, affiliations and finances of the radical right. The Nation (Special Issue), 30 June.


STRAUSS-HUPH, R. (1948) Red 'peace offensive' is a military weapon. Saturday Evening Post 221 (31 July), 96.

STRAUSS-HUPH, R. (1950a) Russia should be offered specific terms for settlement with the West. Saturday Evening Post 223 (9 December), 12.
ANDREW CRAMPTON AND GEARÓID Ó TUATHAIL


STRAINS-HUPÉ, R. (1951) It's time to tell the Kremlin what kind of peace we'll buy. Saturday Evening Post 224 (24 November), 12.


