On videocameralistics: the geopolitics of failed states, the CNN International and (UN)governmentality

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ABSTRACT

The discourse of state failure is a post-Cold War era phenomenon which provides a point of entry into the problematic of global regulation and governance after the Cold War. The mass media spectacles of chaos in the 1990s – in Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda – are windows into three overlapping dynamics which are re-mastering regulation and governance in the post-Cold War world. The first of these dynamics is the specter of state failure in international politics. The second is the power of global media machines as omnipresent visualization technologies, which are infecting and disrupting the political project of envisioning global order by hegemonic institutions and actors. The third dynamic is the regulatory imperatives of economic growth and political stability exerted by hegemonic states and institutions upon the strong and the weak alike. This article seeks to theorize critically the webs of power spun by all three, elaborating in the process a Foucauldian-inspired concept – videocameralistics – to describe their interweaving operation.

KEYWORDS

Chaos; state failure; television; governmentality; videocameralistics.

Here’s what we face. Mr and Mrs CNN sitting at home, they see some god-awful thing on television. They say stop the killing. They say, who can do that? The U.S. military. We struggle with it. We go in peace to do something not quite military; there is no single bad guy there. The party that is most disadvantaged from our being there has an incentive to kill Americans. That puts us in a pattern of dilemmas; add more people or get out. This is the new pattern for our generation.

(Senior Clinton administration defence policy strategist, quoted in Brownstein, 1994)

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We face great challenges to our humanitarian instincts in this era and far fewer barriers to action than there were during the period of superpower competition. Public pressure for our humanitarian engagement increasingly may be driven by televised images, which can depend, in turn, on such considerations as where CNN sends its television crews. But we must bring other considerations to bear as well.

(US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, 1993)

With the communications revolution, image is becoming more influential than fact.

(Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1996)

When there is a problem, and the policy has not been thought through, there is a knee-jerk reaction. They [world leaders] have to do something or face a public relations disaster.

(Current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, quoted in Gowing, 1994: 19)

[TV]elevision images cannot be the North Star of America’s foreign policy.

(Former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 1993)

In any consideration of the generalized crises of global regulation and governance that characterize the post-Cold War era, it is difficult to ignore the spectacle of ‘failed states’. News clips of kids shooting up the streets of Mogadishu and Monrovia, militias battling for control of Bosnia’s bombed-out cities, refugees fleeing ethnic pogroms in Rwanda, relief workers battling mass starvation in Somalia: all of these televisual images are now standard icons of a post-Cold War world where, in more and more places, chaos and anarchy rule (Kaplan, 1994). No longer a zone of competition between definite ideological zone-regimes in the capitalist First and communist Second Worlds, the so-called Second and Third Worlds are now fragmented, drifting apart as far more contradictory continents of mediatized ‘rogue states’, like Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya (Klare, 1995), ‘emerging markets’, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina or China (Ó Tuathail, 1997) and ‘failed states’, like Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan or Colombia (Broad and Cavanagh, 1995).

In this context, ‘the overriding threat is global “chaos” — a virus of disorder fed by environmental damage, overpopulation, poverty, refugee flows, ethnic conflict and failed states’ (Rosner, 1994: 1; Rotberg and Weiss, 1996). Chaos, in turn, generates what Richard Falk calls the ‘black holes of geopolitics’ or ‘countries whose governments have become powerless or ceased to exist, countries collapsing in on themselves as ethnic, religious or tribal hatreds and fears surge over the tenuous structure of multiethnic community life’ (Los Angeles Times, 11 December 1994, p. 4). Incapable of reflecting back conventionally accepted images
of sovereignty and development, these chaotic ‘wild zones’ (Luke, 1995: 91–107) place the very figuration of such Enlightenment concepts in question. As blank spaces on the world political map, they are reminders once again that the European system of states, the dominant model for thinking about global space for the last hundred years, is historically and geographically contingent and may no longer be able to master global space as it once did (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Shapiro, 1994).

Failed states are a troubling concern for their neighbors, residents and creditors, as well as for global media managers, UN authorities and the world’s sole remaining superpower – the United States. The emergence of failed states suggests that ‘the hard work of freedom’, once undertaken with such gusto by the USA and UN coalition during the Gulf War of 1990–1, still remains to be done. At the same time, this hard work of freedom cannot be an openly accessible universal public service available virtually on demand by anyone at any time. Failed states are numerous, but only a few ever will command our attention and become, as ‘seen on TV’, mediagenic ‘failed states’.

The discourse of state failure is a post-Cold War era phenomenon which provides a useful point of entry into the problematic of global regulation and governance after the Cold War. Mass media spectacles like the Kurdish refugee crisis after the Gulf War, the Somalia famine of 1992 or the Rwandan refugee crises of April–May 1994 and November 1996, all are windows into three overlapping dynamics which are re-mastering the meaning of regulation and governance in the post-Cold War world. The first of these dynamics is the specter of social, political and environmental chaos in international politics, one figuration of which is the rhetorical notion of ‘state failure’. The second is the power of global media machines as omnipresent visualization technologies, which are infecting and disrupting the political project of envisioning global order by hegemonic institutions and actors. The third dynamic is the regulatory imperatives of economic growth and political stability placed by hegemonic states and institutions upon the strong and the weak alike. In the case of Rwanda, all three dynamics – figurations of social chaos, televisualizations of searing individual human suffering, and imperatives of predictable governmentality – were at play. ‘Rwanda’, as one senior western official has remarked, ‘was on your television screens but not on our diplomatic radar screens’ (Gowing, 1994). Yet the screens quickly converged, if only momentarily. When the images of bloated bodies floating down crocodile-infested rivers and reports of half a million refugees spilling across the Rwandan border into Zaire and Tanzania were repeated night after night, western leaders and international institutions were forced to look as if they were ‘doing something’ (even though ‘doing something’ for some was what one British official described as publicly making ‘pseudo decisions’.
for pseudo actions’ (quoted in Gowing, 1994: 9)). President Clinton hastily held a press conference at the end of July 1996 to outline, as Bush did before him during the Kurdish (Operation Provide Comfort) and Somalian (Operation Restore Hope) crises, a high-profile military response (Operation Support Hope) to provide humanitarian assistance to helpless victims and starving refugees. While addressing the flow of refugees was the immediate goal, the long-term diplomatic concern of the USA, the UN and other international institutions was with re-establishing structures of local governance to contain the proliferating images of ‘chaos’. After all, chaos, as President Bush declared after the Cold War, is now the new enemy.

Even though the Clinton administration has not made chaos the foundation of its foreign policy, the theme persists in official statements. Undersecretary of State Timothy Wirth in July 1994 cast the chaotic forces of poverty, ecological degradation, disease and refugee flows as ‘the primary threats to human security’ (Rosner, 1994: 1). Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck described Rwanda as ‘a new world paradigm in which the containment of chaos is the most urgent task facing the international community’ (Shattuck, 1996: 172). And National Security Advisor Anthony Lake noted in an address during March 1996 that chaotic tendencies are a prime peril in the present. That is,

Old threats like ethnic and religious violence and aggression by rogue states have taken on new and dangerous dimensions. And no one is immune to a host of equal opportunity destroyers: the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation... Together, they have the potential to cause terrible chaos around the world and in our own society.

(Lake, 1996: 127)

While what Clinton’s lieutenants call ‘isolationism’ would have the USA turn its back on such chaotic events, Secretary of State Christopher asserts for the US that

we can no more isolate our nation from the world than we can isolate our families from our neighborhoods, or our neighborhoods from our cities. As a global power with global interests, retreat is not a responsible option for the United States. We must continue to lead.

(1996: 12)

In this article, we seek to theorize critically one network in the emergent order of power congealing around the site of chaos, rhetorics of televisualization, and expectations of global governmentality as ‘failed
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states' are defined, detected and dealt with by the post-Cold War world system when the entire globe increasingly is racked by generalized 'state failure'. Thinking about these dynamics forces us to address speculatively some of the constraints upon reconstituting sovereignty, governmentality and territoriality 'on the fly' in a world where humanitarian NGOs, 24 Hour Headline News services, and United Nations bureaux increasingly are cogenerating the signs, discourses and practices of our international political culture along with what traditionally are considered 'nation-states' (Shaw, 1996). Inspired by Foucault’s (1991) concern with governmentality, Virilio’s (1989, 1994, 1995) engagement with the logistics of vision, and Baudrillard’s (1994) provocations on hyperreality, we seek to describe an ascending order of power which we term – echoing in part the late-eighteenth-century doctrine of state management called ‘cameralism’ (Tribe, 1984) – videocameralistics. At its most elemental, this notion seeks to describe a global political condition where televisualizations of chaos constantly threaten to overwhelm the fixed cultural categories beneath an institutional vision of a New World Order. As a result, the practices of regulation and governance provided by international institutions increasingly are forced to become exercises in simulation, or projected collective visions qua images of a reality that is absent or not yet present (Debrix, 1996: 68).

To elaborate these speculative considerations, we have divided the article into three parts, the first addressing the notion of the ‘failed state’ as one mark of the fraying of global space as a transparent order of state governmentality and sovereignty, the second advancing the concept of videocameralistics, and the third pursuing some implications of this emergent order for United Nations interventionist forces as a ‘governmental rescue’ service in contemporary global politics. Our goal is to push the implications of certain inchoate tendencies in the contemporary era to reveal the still barely appreciated and certainly under-theorized informational/televsual face of global regulation and governance at the end of the twentieth century. Our work, in its broadest sense, is an exploration of the struggle over the re-imagining and re-mastery of ‘global space’ in a time of geopolitical vertigo (Ó Tuathail, 1994, 1996b).

FRAYING GOVERNMENTALITY:
DELINEATING ‘FAILED STATES’

According to political realists, states bring an ethic of coercive self-help under conditions of general anarchy into their realm of administrative competence by mobilizing all internal resources against any external threats. Most significantly, these realists parallel Foucault, who sees state authorities mobilizing what he defines as ‘governmentality’ to bring about ‘the emergence of population as a datum, as a field of

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intervention and as an object of governmental techniques, and the process which isolates the economy as a specific sector of reality' so that now 'the population is the object that government must take into account in all its observations and savior, in order to be able to govern effectively in a rational and conscious manner' (Foucault, 1991: 102, 100). The networks of continuous, multiple and complex interaction between populations (their increase, longevity, health, etc.), territory (its expanse, resources, control, etc.) and wealth (its creations, productivity, distribution, etc.) are those sites of governmentalizing rationality where state rulers allegedly manage the productive interaction of these forces (Foucault, 1991: 1–48). The *sine qua non* of successful state sovereignty equals economic growth, social stability, and strategic defense for subjects/citizens. As an agency of governmentality, the disciplinary articulations of successful state power center upon establishing and enforcing 'the right disposition of things' between human populations and their primary habitat – territorially defined statal space.

Failed states are those that have lost, or perhaps never truly found, their links to such codes of 'world governmentality' when internal forces wrongly dispose of things by disrupting rational control over populations, territory and resources. Refugees, for example, are destatalized populations, fleeing territories and abandoning resources where such stataлизed agencies are no longer either capable or interested in productively generating, extracting, applying such reserves of biopower. Failed states may remain semi-credible, quasi-sovereign hulls, sustained strangely by global codes of external/negative sovereignty prevailing outside of their borders even as the demands of internal/positive sovereignty evade them (Jackson, 1990; Grovogui, 1996). Nevertheless, they still can be judged as mismanaging their state property (resources, territories, peoples) as well as their state properties (sovereignty, authority, power).

The extent and depth of state failure is, and has been, tremendous in the post-colonial, and now the post-Cold War, New World Order. During the Cold War, of course, the games of bloc building and containment construction masked sites of state failure within the ideological alliances, military assistance and economic aid of the competing zone-regimes centered in the Soviet Union and United States of America. Since 1989, things have changed. The logic of superpower rivalry has been shelved, while what were once barely successful systems during the Cold War, particularly in the socialist Second and Third Worlds, are becoming failed states. Lacking effective governance outside of the pressures of Cold War competition, many states are cracking and collapsing in the more general vacuum created by the implosion of the USSR. For the world's sole remaining superpower, the specter of communism has been replaced by the specter of chaos.
J. Brian Atwood, USAID administrator and President Clinton’s special envoy to Rwanda, summarizes the main strategic threat looming before the United States and the world at large as ‘chaos’. ‘Disintegrating societies and failed states’, he argues, ‘with their civil conflicts and destabilizing refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability’ (1994a: 21). From 1947 through 1992, the global dynamics of Cold War competition often either displaced or sublimated tendencies toward social disintegration and state failure as the USA and USSR coopted such regimes in these regions into their global strategic games. The conflicts of 1947, in a very real sense, suppressed many of the still unresolved issues that led both to 1914 and to 1939. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, however, even these minimal frameworks of ‘stability’ evaporated along with the other artifacts of Cold War alliances, leaving behind, as Atwood suggests, ‘countries without leadership, without order, without governance itself’ (1994a: 21).

Indeed, Atwood almost wistfully remembers the Cold War as a time of comparative order, noting that

the building blocks of a successful Cold War foreign policy were military alliances, nuclear deterrence, international organizations and a body of international law that formed a framework for cooperation, dispute resolution and interstate relations. Geostrategic considerations dominated the policy approach, and relative power, measured in economic, political and military terms, was a constant measure of success.

(1994a: 21)

Atwood and other American officials now see two interrelated sets of factors creating chaos. On a systemic level,

a highly dynamic and increasingly interdependent set of nongovernmental variables – information and financial flows, international citizen networks, proliferating and accessible weapons of war and millions of migrating people – is challenging our analytical capacity and undermining traditional diplomacy.

(Atwood, 1994a: 21)

And, on the plane of country-by-country comparison, the combustion of a collective chaos ‘is being fired by common fuels: long-simmering ethnic, religious and territorial disputes; proliferating military stockpiles built dangerously high during the Cold War; endemic poverty; rapid population growth; food insecurity; environmental degradation; and unstable and undemocratic governments’ (Atwood, 1994a: 21). For President Clinton, chaos has had a profound intellectual effect on policy making in that ‘the once bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring. . . . so much so that we now need to stop dividing
state action into “foreign policy” and “domestic policy” to start discussing economic policy, security policy, environmental policy – you name it’ (1995: 45). After 1991, then, the crises of 1914, 1918, 1929 or 1939 all returned along with new economic or ecological problems, faced first in 1973 with OPEC or 1986 at Chernobyl.

Failed states are decentered jurisdictions where ‘things come apart’, sliding away from the organized legal circuits of world trade where they must subsist without leadership, without order, without governance itself. Of course, these attributes are not uncharacteristic of scores of states around the world. Many of them, however, seem to contain their civil conflicts or stabilize their refugee flows well enough to avoid international intervention. Very few instances of state failure become transformed into ‘failed states’, at least as it is seen on post-Cold War television (Shaw, 1996). Many cases of state failure continue to evoke total breakdown by charging some minimal circuits of governmentality, which might be maintained by substatal/extrastatal/counterstatal forces in religious institutions, local organizations, criminal syndicates, NGO’s, guerrilla armies, kinship systems or urban networks. Yet, in certain special circumstances, like racial pogroms, ethno-religious strife, ecological shocks or all-out civil war, even these last capillary grids of governmentality are cut, leading to the syndrome now identified as ‘the failed state’, which quickly can be cast on TV as a site for possible external intervention by the UN and/or the USA.

International recognition of state failure as ‘the failed state’, then, tends to be a special event, typically marked by a spectacular civil conflict that threatens ‘westerners’ or deeply offends their sensibilities as mass media publics. At that juncture, chaos erupts destructively on the networks for days or weeks as it becomes a fresh mini-series from CNN as ‘mass murder in the country’, ‘mayhem in the streets’ or ‘starving refugees at overcrowded border camps’. Unless and until state failure captures mass media attention, as Sudan and Cambodia illustrate, conditions of anarchy frequently are ignored and/or tolerated by international institutions, transnational corporate capital and the world’s sole remaining superpower (Rotberg and Weiss, 1996). If and when foreigners are forced to flee or massive numbers of refugees stream across the borders into squalid camps like Liberia in 1996, Rwanda in 1994, Somalia in 1992 or Zaïre in 1996, the state may become certified by the global media as ‘failed’, and global alliances are forced to intervene in some way to deal with the state failure’s impact abroad, if not also somehow with destruction inside existing borders. The video cameras of global media machines, in other words, begin working as the chambers and chamberlains for video-cameralism.
ON VIDEOPHOTOGRAPHERS

VIDEOPHOTOGRAPHERS AND THE
CNN INTERNATIONAL

Cable Network News is simply the first and most visible tip of a vast elaborate informational apparatus dedicated to, first, providing real-time video and audio reportage from somewhere on the globe to anywhere all the time from around the world, and, second, maintaining active twenty-four hour news broadcasts available for constant viewing by local, national or global audiences. In addition to the CNN complex based in Atlanta, there are other parallel services provided by ABC, CBS and NBC from New York and Washington, C-SPAN in Washington, or CNBC in Charlotte within the United States. Outside of the US, Sky, Superchannel, BBC World Service and ITN, as well as WTN, Associated Press Television and Reuters, also all participate in generating services not unlike CNN. News Corp's Fox twenty-four-hour news service has begun broadcasting while MSNBC, a joint venture between Microsoft and NBC to create a twenty-four hour on-line interactive news service, and CBC News World International are also up and broadcasting (Culh, 1996). And similar networks of informational generation are up and operating for the German, Spanish, French, Chinese, Arabic, Russian and Japanese language markets (Friedland, 1992). This worldwide web provides the visual material needed to construct a 'world watch' of/over/for the 'world action' of global affairs. As a powerful informational complex, the geo-panopticon is itself a new world order with its own global logistics of perception that opens up new forms of observation and discloses new ways of imagining global space (Wark, 1994).

Videocameralistic intervention was impossible prior to 1965 when INTELSAT's first satellite, Early Bird, went into operation over the North Atlantic. Even then all voice and telex traffic had to be suspended to free bandwidth for the one live TV channel (Goldstein, 1994: 53). Full-time dedicated twenty-four-hour TV service from INTELSAT came on line during 1981. By the mid-1990s, over 100 twenty-four-hour-a-day, long-term television channels and many other short-term twenty-four-hour services operate everyday, and INTELSAT satellites carry an average of 150 to 160 telecasts a day (Goldstein, 1994: 56). Small transportable news-gathering terminals became commonplace as portable up-links into the INTELSAT network during 1986, and they were first used during the Philippine elections of 1986. However, the Gulf War in 1990-1, Operation Provide Comfort in no-fly zone Iraq in 1991, and the Somali civil war and famine relief missions in 1992 are the events in which videocameralistics came into full power.

The deployment of CNN-like imaging systems is costly, but not beyond the reach of even local stations in medium-sized media markets, as the global saga of the O. J. Simpson trial in Los Angeles illustrates.
Equipping a journalist or two with a sophisticated laptop computer, a high-quality video camera, a satellite or cell phone, and a portable uplink dish creates the rudiments of a fully capable image-capture, story-processing, and news transmission unit needed to sustain CNN-like coverage in full-color, surround-sound stereo chambers of reportage. Even small-town journalists, as a consequence, can parachute to the site of global news events to operate as videocameralists. When coupled with the immense broadcast capabilities of CNN-like networks through cable or wireless transmissions, the stage is set for videocameralists, like Kate Adie, Christiana Amanpour or Peter Arnett, to generate mediascapes that reveal all 'the global crises' so urgently demanding immediate attention.

Given the power of global television images – capturing the desperation of Kurds fleeing Saddam's military, Somalis dragging a dead American soldier down Mogadishu's back streets, or mortar shells shredding weekend shoppers in Sarajevo's market-place – to move foreign policy managers into action, there has been considerable speculation about the 'CNN factor' or 'CNN curve' in contemporary global politics. Many foreign policy makers, like former British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, have been outspoken in their opposition to what they see as the emotional blackmail of graphic television pictures. Resisting the challenge to respond to televulsified generated emotionalism is one of the latest ways in which the subjectivity of the statesman as the hardnosed state's man is delineated. For Hurd, reporters in Bosnia, moved by the horrors they witness, become 'founding members of the "something must be done" school', thus making life more difficult for cool-headed foreign policy experts like himself (Hoagland, 1994). For Christopher and others, maintaining control is all-important. American foreign policy cannot be driven by where CNN positions its television crews. Television pictures cannot become the North Star of US foreign policy. Why not? Because videocameralists making rulings from their daily stand-ups on mediascapes then begin to set agendas, frame policies, judge options, rather than statesmen at their diplomatic posts.

The fact that Hurd, Christopher and others must inoculate themselves against television images only underscores their ability to disturb and trouble even the best foreign policy visions and visionaries. What Hurd and Christopher's complaints reveal is not, as has commonly been assumed, a perception that contemporary global media machines are 'catalysts' for foreign policy actions or are 'driving' global politics. Both of these interpretations, which Gowing (1994), Natsios (1996) and Neuman (1996) use as foils for their analyses, are inadequate conceptualizations of the contemporary threat posed by mass media infrastructures to established foreign policy practices. Rather, what Hurd
and Christopher's complaints reveal is a fear of some loss of control over their institutional ability to envision global space and organize it into official maps of prescribed scenes and dramas. What is at stake for these and other foreign policy managers, like Boutros Boutros-Ghali who also has complained about the distorting effects of television images, is the clash between well-established official strategies for the visualization of global space and the capabilities of mass media video-camerlists to disrupt its scenes and simulations. The steady visionary symbolics of statesmen lose focus as the voyeuristic frenzy of the more-visible-than-visible captures the eyes of the audience. Official scenes lose out to the televisual obscene, because people have 'seen' what is really happening on TV. Global media machines can expose the unfixed seams in the official organization and presentation of global political space by international institutions and actors, creating, as Kofi Annan notes, public relations disasters. Their potential power of exposure renders the envisioning of global space into an ongoing geopolitical struggle twenty-four hours a day. Gowing's (1994: 87) conclusion that real-time television 'creates emotions but ultimately makes no difference to the fundamental calculations in foreign policy making' under-conceptualizes its pervasive conditioning power. The same is true of Natsios' (1996) analysis. Neuman's (1996) simple-minded argument that media technologies are mere tools in the practice of diplomacy - somehow separate and distinct from the real - misses the overarching power of global media technologies to represent the real as more real than the real itself. The most recent instance of this was the launching in November 1996 of an international mission, led by Canada with participation from France and the United States, to Zaire to address a 'catastrophe' that did not, in fact, exist (Fitchett, 1996).

Perhaps the power of CNN-like screens, so simplistically conceptualized by many, is best expressed as a postmodern form of cameranism: the eighteenth-century 'science of administration' that championed centralized and rationalized government 'informed by systematic statistics gathering, and subject to universal administrative and fiscal rules' (Mann, 1993: 447). The camerists, who were mostly jurists, professors and prominent officials, provided an important impetus for the governmentalizing of the state in central Europe at the time, their idea later giving way to more modern governmental arguments of the physiocrats and political economists (Foucault, 1991). The abhorrence of the camerists for what they considered to be mismanaged state property echoes the discourses and images congealing around 'failed states' in the late twentieth century. In some sense, the twenty-four-hour canopy of CNN/BBC/ITN world news becomes its own chamber of judgment, constituting an arch of activity, or vault of value, over the territorial domains of failed states where images are systematically gathered to be
held up to global administrative comparisons and fiscal expectations. So conceptualized, televisual media coverage can be thought of as new rhetorical registers for judgment and analysis to operate in camera, or as in some authoritative judge’s chambers, on the global mediascape. The televisual surveillance of the mass media panopticon is directed, produced and reported on site and/or in voice-overs from remote locations; yet, in both modes, the journalists’ videocameralistic judgment rises and falls in global terms against the local mismanagement of both the state property and statist properties by the failed state. CNN 24 Hour Headlines News becomes operationalized videocameralistic discourse in which the televisual news formation works simultaneously as judge/jury/prosecutor/defender/bailiff/warden on camera, transmitting a daily writ of damning indictments in video clips on the workings of each failed state. Being on camera turns into being captured in camera, the failed state being subjected to accusations of mismanaging all its state properties so thoroughly that basic essential services come to a standstill and putting its population on the move as refugees.

The authoritative gaze of videocameralistics derives from the material and discursive practices of globalization (Herod et al., 1997). The 24 Hour CNN Headline News is the ‘world watch’ keeping its eyes and ears open to the news broken by all the moves made by the ‘world action’ of states and peoples. Globalization is remaking many socio-cultural world-systems inherited from tradition/history/culture into global spaces, or the new linkages formed in the accumulation, circulation, consumption, production and regulation regimes of transnational enterprises. Videocameralists monitor how and why states should or should not now manage ‘state properties’ in the global exchange networks with transnational firms. Nightly business reports monitor the signs of success and the indices of failure, informing us which places are making the grade, which are falling behind and which need to be read the rites of globalization as economic transnational liberalism. Travel-weary transnational elites in a hurry can catch the latest on Wall Street in airport lounges and corridors. Clearly, as Gill claims, globalization is part and parcel of vast processes of restructuring ‘the state and civil society, and of the political economy and culture. It is also an ideology largely consistent with the world view and priorities of large-scale internationally-mobile forms of capital’ (1995: 405).

Thus, 24 Hour Headline News is often much more than simply journalism or news reporting. ‘Rogue states’ are jurisdictions that refuse such televisual interventions, ‘emerging markets’ are economies whose growth prospects are touted in their mediagenetic coverage, and ‘failed states’ are territories open to such on-the-air administrative guidance. Defining what successful state properties are, showing why managing these state properties is a vital service, indicating where, when and how
state properties are verging on failure, and identifying who has failed and who must now intervene to manage state property more efficaciously all unfolds on the hourly segments of a televisual administrative brief rendered as headline news, day-in-review punditry or editorial commentary. The reportage builds chambers of attentive concern, bringing the crisis of state failure off the streets or in from the backwaters into the headlines at the top of the hour as videocamfeeds fill a daily docket where governmentalizing effectiveness will be judged for success or failure. All the circumstantial evidence – refugees, civil strife, urban anarchy, bureaucratic corruption, ecological collapse – indicates, of course, already that it often is an open and shut case. Here the videocameralistics of the global mass media remand the most visible perpetrators to the custody and care of the New World Order magistrates, or to an application of US superpower and/or some UN commission to reunite the nation and/or direct the application of superpower.

CNN 24 Hour Headline News and BBC World reconstitute geopolitical space by opening sites of interpretation/contestation/reclamation on the world’s mediascapes that they help to produce every day around the clock. In and of itself, nowhere is particularly important; yet the act of televising it intensively ports its problems or conducts its crises all over the world, creating new crises with its televisual (dis)placements of defensible space, vital territory and threatening trends for any remote viewers. The mass media news cycle scripts the failed state with familiar narratives, conventional characters or topical tropes to activate and accentuate viewing pleasure as living-room wars are joined by living-room refugee camps, death pits, ethnic pogroms, government crises and ecological disasters (Hammock and Charny, 1996; Shaw, 1996). Continuous media attention on failed states, in turn, can spark audience awareness of a state failure, turning it into ‘a North Star’ of superpower foreign policy and requiring outside intervention to set right, or at least appear to set right, the affairs of the failed state.

Failed states are, and have been, plentiful since 1945; however, on the terrains of televisual mediascapes, some failed state – Lebanon, Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti – becomes transmogrified by videocameralists as a state of failure for the USA or the UN. Hence, the American role, as the world’s sole remaining superpower nation-state, is decisive for videocameralists. Of course, France, Britain, Russia, China and even Israel, Nigeria or India have the capabilities to intervene in the affairs of failed states, but perhaps only France does so with the same predictability as the USA. Even so, as Nye suggests, the USA ‘could not and should not get involved in every potential or on-going conflict’ (1995: 6), because it is not the world’s policeman. Instead, ‘where it has important interests’, the USA in cooperation with the UN or other great
powers, 'must continue to aspire to a role more like the sheriff of the posse, enabling international coalitions to pursue interests that it shares whether or not the United States itself supplies the bulk of the military forces involved' (Nye, 1995: 6).

To sustain the mediascape as well as frame the failed state, the videocameralists' televisual scripts ask how the USA/UN could let this failed state, from Biafra in the 1960s to Bosnia in the 1990s, 'happen'. Why does not, the videocameralists ask, something or someone 'do something'? Positive sovereignties and effective governmentality, even if they are from above and without, must be mobilized as remedies for the catastrophic failure of such 'negative sovereignty'. Of course, the responses become 'the hard work of freedom' as ungovernable spaces are turned by videocameralist decrees temporarily into UN (United Nations)-governable domains. To contain the disin-stated or un-stated territory, there may be one last chance: careful applications of American superpower between the cloaks of UN multilateralism create (UN)realistic rules of order in simulations of sovereignty that benignly stress human rights/formal legality/public welfare in the (UN)stated spaces under (UN)governed stewardship. Failed states, then, provide settings for the videocameralists to affirm the hard work of freedom and apply superpower televisualy by displaying the merits of UN-governable environments against the normal background condition of failed governmentality. The televisual news apparatus maps, if not actually manufactures, the various conflicted spaces under rhetorical contestation, as well as theorizes, if not actually tests, permissible strategies and tactics for answering such 'failure' by states.

The videocameralists as they assess the management or mismanagement of state properties in almost every territorialized domain on the planet do not shrink from reamerating global spaces, dividing and redividing nations, peoples, societies into new chambers for their surveillance, coverage and service provision. Against the costs of 'wild zones', they tout the benefits of 'tame zones'. In war-torn Sarajevo or Grozny, videocameralistic treatments deplore the absence of peace, but exalt in the presence of war. In impoverished Lagos or Nairobi, videocameralists weigh the costs of underdevelopment against the benefits of structural adjustment policies. In terrorized London or Tokyo, videocameralistic coverage celebrates obedient normalization as it stigmatizes extremism, fanaticism or cultism as unwelcome departures from the cyberpanoptic agendas of permissive individualism as it covers them every half-hour, around the clock, as news, business, sports and entertainment. These are the vaults of subjectivity in which life ought to be lived. Outside the chambers of news, business, sports and entertainment, videocameralists beam back the sights and sounds of anarchy.

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WORLD GOVERNMENTALITY? UN-REALITIES AND UN-GOVERNED SPACES

On an ideal level, the United Nations, as an institutionalized site of power, represents an incipient but largely imaginary world government composed of sovereign autonomous nation-states, working collectively as equal partners to make the world safer, better and more secure (Luke, 1993). It provides an ideal microcosm of social order, political purpose and cultural cooperation on an immense transnational scale. When each one of the national flags of its nearly ten score members snaps crisply in the wind in front of its Manhattan headquarters building, it signals through all of the traditional diplomatic signs, tropes and colors of the real that their owners are truly authentic. In turn, the member states’ respective UN delegations come and go from their national capitals to this global capital, affirming their sovereign nationhood, in-statement and countrydom before all the other members going through the same sovereign performances. The UN also continues to be essential for American superpower. As President Clinton maintains, ‘those who would have us walk away from the U.N., not to mention the international financial institutions – they would really threaten our ability to lead’ (1995: 47). Of course, working through the United Nations is ‘sometimes frustrating and almost always difficult. But it is very important. We don’t want to run off into the future all by ourselves. And that means we [the US] have to work through these international organizations’ (Clinton, 1995: 47).

Staying on this ideal level, all the realist values of modern nation-state, like autonomy, sovereignty, legitimacy and power, are exalted by the UN, only in a miniaturized form, in a detailed digest of its highly rationalized international life. There is a Security Council convened in New York that guards global peace and security with its ‘blue helmet’ and/or ‘blue beret’ peacekeeping troops and observers. There is a General Assembly, also based in New York, that brings all the world’s nation-states together to deliberate jointly on their common interests. There is a World Health Organization based in Geneva that polices outbreaks of epidemics and disease around the planet. There is a Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome that promotes greater food production and more equitable food distribution. There is an International Monetary Fund located in Washington, DC, that organizes financial aid and fiscal support for many of the world’s nation-states. There is an International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (linked to the UN but not a specialized agency) that regulates global applications of nuclear energy. There is an Educational, Social and Cultural Organization in Paris that backs improvements in educational, social and cultural development. And, of course, there are many, many more
smaller, but still important functional agencies that all offer other vital services in the areas of communications, law, labor standards, weather monitoring, postal services, trade and development, etc. for the UN’s members.

In other words, perhaps the UN is an imaginary world government, which is tied to no ‘real’ world nation or state, that constantly rejuvenates the realist fiction of national governments through the imaginary powers of simulation. For Baudrillard (1994: 1), simulation becomes ‘the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal’. Consequently, on this level of action, the UN itself actually proves to be quite potent inasmuch as its operations conceal how ‘unreal’ the nation-state actually has become by making us believe the world of nation-states outside of the UN’s walls are ‘real’, when New York, Paris, Geneva, Vienna, Washington, and the countries surrounding them increasingly are arrayed, in fact, in the orders of hyperreal simulation (Weber, 1995). Perhaps, following Baudrillard’s musings, the UN presents itself as an imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real. The United Nations, and each of its united nations, conceals the fact that ‘the real’ (assumed by realpolitik as being represented accurately by modern realism) is no longer real, and thus it works – perhaps neo-realistically or structurally – to save this reality principle. Like Disneyland in America, the UN in today’s world exists to conceal the fact that much of the real world, many real nations, most actual states, ironically approximate a classical realist or cynical isolationist reading of the United Nations: they are coagulations of irrelevant assembled generals, powerless insecurity councils, failed uneconomic anti-social disorganizations, lumbering bureaucracies, ineffective famine and monoculture organizations, agencies of atomized international energy, or corrupt fundings of international money. Of today’s nearly 200 nation-states, only a quarter or less could be seen as fitting the usual criteria used in tagging the results of positive sovereignty in nation-states. The overwhelming majority are little more than negatively sovereign simulacra of nations, states or nation-states, organized loosely around the most superficial signs of in-stated nation-ness used in signaling some semblance of national authority and state sovereignty. The absence of the real amidst such quasi-states assures that ‘the real’ will continue to be absent, while providing potent anti-bodies against any potent body – like racism, communism, fascism, nationalism, fundamentalism or transnational crime – that might up-end the precession of simulated nation-states with some real ‘anti-nation-state’ transnational/poststatist community. For better and for worse, under conditions of global hyper-reality, perhaps the real works best as the (UN)real.

While a few Americans do see the UN as a real world government, they mostly are found amidst the militia movement or religious Right.
And, try as they might, the specter of the UN as a unified decisive world government is extremely unreal, hobbled as it is by a permanent financial crisis induced through the slow payment or non-payment of national assessments by the United States and other laggards. Yet its unreality does suggest signs of this (UN)reality, and these might be reread as traces of a world governmental. Where the agendas of global business, national state apparatuses and local politics coalign enough to interoperate, one might regard many Third World, negatively sovereign, nominally national countries as spaces where a modicum of ‘world governmental’ organizes everyday life. Here, polydictive forces from within and without, above and below, inside and outside organize, as Foucault argues, ‘people and things so as to serve convenient ends’. This (UN)reality may not be realpolitikische, but it is a useful convenience. For the unruly chaos of failed states, the videocameralists prescribe a course of (UN)ruinless.

During the Cold War, space was nationalized and statalized relentlessly in post-imperial games of decolonization, dependency and detraditionalization as the blocs of liberal democratic capitalism and bureaucratic state socialism competed for members. Recognizing that nation/state/economy building projects were difficult at their best and disastrous at their worst, a global structure invented by a handful of unified nations during the Second World War purported to be a United Nations apparatus. The simulacra of global unity, in turn, help generate simulations of ‘united nations’ to play, and be played with, in the geopolitical games of ideological bloc struggle. Once the USSR disappeared, however, the geostrategic scene of ideological competition shifted shape and direction, slipping into new, or maybe old, (ob)scenes of ethnic cleansing, racial brutality and religious strife. No longer merely the organic prehistory of traditions awaiting capitalist or socialist modernization, these particularities (traditionalism vs. rationalism) are reinterpreted by Huntington (1993) as an enduring universality (the west vs. the rest). But the rest is cast as restless or even so wholly unredeemable in that it will never be a space of united nations. Hence, the UN may simply eschew any pretense of drawing these regions into unity, nationality, stability. Anthony Lake’s (1993) ‘other considerations’ can come to bear here, and such sites simply can become ‘reexternalized’, like Somalia, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Chechenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tajikistan or Zaire, as dead zones that the New World Order consigns to old local disorders (Myers et al., 1996).

Reterritorialization after the Cold War, then, appears to be moving along two divergent tracks. One tame zone line is fabricating telemetrical domains of virtual command and control by digitizing communication/production/consumption/transportation functions for alliances of transnational corporate capital to administer as the infrastructures of
the Knowledge Revolution/Cybernetic Society/Information Age. This is the core cyberspace of succeeding firms, aimed at succeeding perhaps the sovereignty of politics with the power of markets. But another line tracks into the territorial turfs of those protection rackets embedded in the wild zones beneath old local disorders overseen by criminal syndicates, ethnic authorities, racial mythologists, religious institutions or rural potentates, catching many nation-states in the bind of territorial irrelevancy. Like Zaire in the face of its many real ethno-national localities or in the grip of a few foreign firms consuming its copper, cobalt and copra to feed some of the world's transnational commercial ecologies, a united nation is difficult to instate as a sovereign entity in the 1990s. At best, it often becomes little more than a legal container of many small-time rackets aiming to exploit people locally, in which a few big-time transnational concerns extract materials from peripheral pockets needed for the ongoing virtualization of the Information Revolution's hyperreal estates. Beyond these remainders, a vast new external region, essentially opaque to sustained commerce, resurfaces amidst postperipheral chaos (Kaplan, 1996).

The United Nations, we wish to suggest, anchors a global regime of expectations and performances that normalize spaces and populations, pointing them toward aspiring to become united nations in accord with the UN's universal vision of liberal democratic community. This project is (UN)iversal: a macroviral program for a New World Order unleashed across the operating systems of the world's economic peripheries, semi-peripheries and cores. Becoming the mandatory drill within videocameralistic monitoring, international inspectorates and transnational enterprise, the UN represents ISO 9000 for nations and states. No regime is up to snuff until it fits this international standards organization's 9,000 rules of interoperation. As the dominant operating system of world order, it provides systemic operations to dominate world disorder. And, when disorder becomes too threatening to the world at large in any single country, blue-helmeted/blue-bereted UN-informed troops can be deployed as vanguards of (UN)iversal order to establish IFORias and SFORias, or zones of global policing where transnational videocameralistics might rightly guide the (re)implementation and (re)stabilization of force(s) to retrack the locals into the reproduction of this (UN)real, (UN)iversal, (UN)ity of collective practices (Chopra, 1996).5

To cope with state failures that need to be coped with, a mechanism of 'contact groups', like the Bosnian posse of the USA, Russia, France, Britain and Germany, can be mobilized to establish a group contact by the UN as well as the great powers with the failed state. The UNPROFOR from the UN or the IFOR/SFOR from the former Warsaw Pact/current NATO forces can surgically intervene, supply, stabilize and
attempt to sterilize the spaces plagued by state failure. At one level, contact groups might only transport and organize additional support resources for humanitarian NGOs that are already on the ground in the failed state (Rwanda), or, at higher levels of support, contact groups may constitute an armature of authority for establishing a joint UN expeditionary force of soldiers, bureaucrats and experts to restart civic processes that have seized up during the state failure (Somalia). At the highest levels of engagement, the group contact might attempt to reinvent both civil society and the state (Cambodia, Haiti, Angola) by applying both superpower and united nations building unity measures of sufficient scope and intensity to re-instate some indigenous ruling authority. Hence, IFORias – or zones of implemented force for reconnections with world governmentality – arise where an IFOR rolls.

Once contact groups make a group contact in a failed state, however, what happens to IFORias? Does the ungovernable domain of the failed state become (UN)governed space? That is, does this world implementation force actually attain some sort of reorganized stability without a domestic sovereign or does global governmentality coexist uneasily as a dual power with various site-specific sovereignties? As Lake (1996: 130) argues, IFORias must not become ‘self-defeating efforts to take on responsibilities that are not ours – to create unsustainable dependencies instead of giving nations a chance to act independently’. The record appears to be mixed at this juncture in the New World Order. That is, the minimal disciplines of matching people/territory/resources/authority in a productive reinsertion of human bodies into environmental machineries has proven useful, as the partial revitalization of Cambodia, Mozambique or Ethiopia might suggest.

Haiti, Bosnia, Cambodia all indicate how (UN)governable IFORias can bring failed states back on line by ‘having set deadlines for withdrawal based on accomplishment of those missions’ (Lake, 1996: 129), tied to reactivating effective agencies of governmentality ‘in-country’. Echoing the assessment of videocameralist analysis, Lake claims deadlines are (UN)governmentality’s essence. Otherwise, first, ‘providing a security blanket for an indefinite period without making clear it’s on loan – and not for keeps – only gives those we are trying to help the comfort of believing that they can evade their own responsibilities’; second, ‘assuming too much responsibility for a nation’s future tends to undercut the very government you are trying to help’; and, third, ‘overstaying one’s welcome ultimately breeds resentment of our presence and provides an easy target for blame when things go wrong’ (Lake, 1996: 129–30). If (UN)governmentality ‘creates unreasonable expectations that the hard work will be done for them, not by them’, then state failures will persist in failed states; that is, local forces will not freely choose their own leader; rebuild roads, schools, factories and hospitals; reunite

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children with parents and families with their homes to permit the (UN)governed peace to take ‘on a life and logic of its own’ (Lake, 1996: 129–30). Without saying so, Atwood suggests the pay-off for failed states in IFORias is the renewal of a world-class governmentality:

New partnerships and new tools are needed to strengthen the indigenous capacity of people to manage and resolve conflict within their own societies. Technology should be better exploited and shared to empower individuals and enhance the networking of nongovernment groups, increase food supplies, slow population growth and preserve natural resources. Sustainable development that creates chains of enterprise, respects the environment and enlarges the range of freedom and opportunity over generations should be pursued as the principal antidote to social disarray.

(1994b: 9)

Videocameralism provides the strategies of intervention into the affairs of failed states, but (UN)governmentalities require, as Anthony Lake claims, an ‘exit-strategy doctrine’ in order for the peacekeeping/market-creating/law-ordering forces of an IFORia to operate effectively. So before the USA or UN intervenes, ‘we should know how and when we’re going to get them out’ (Lake, 1996: 129).

By the norms of videocameralistics, such (UN)states are expected to remedy chaotic state failure by providing orderly governmental outputs that could lessen civil strife, check ethnic pogroms, or halt refugee flows. These regimes, however, are not autochthonous authentic authorities; they are instead at best a temporary humanitarian simulation of some benign service state, rarely attained domestically in the realm of wealthy superpowers, much less seen in the workings of peripheral post-colonial countries. Their success on the air is judged by how many refugees they keep home, how many peasant farmers stay on their land, how many bodies remain alive as producers, how much infrastructure continues operating undestroyed. Partly symbolic politics to appear responsive and effective on 24 Hour Headline News, and partly emergency economics to provide material but temporary infusions of essential services, (UN)stated regimes succeed inasmuch as they close the failed state, end global media surveillance, stanch refugee flows, or keep management of state properties on site.

**CONCLUSION: CONTAINING CHAOS/SUSTAINING SOVEREIGN SIMULATIONS**

To conclude, UNPROFORias, IFORias and SFORias are quick fixes for the fast capitalist world-system to cope with the spectacle of chaos. For populations and territories in failing states, videocamerialists direct what
little global governance there is to intervene in the interests of a world
governmentality. Anarchy, or at least total anarchy, also may be avoided
by the heterarchy of these IFORias and UNPROFORias as a diverse un-
stable array of forces attempt to administer some form of virtual gov-
ernance over territories that either lack actual sovereignty or find their
actual sovereigns contested. UNPROFORias are regimes for moving
troops, NGO personnel, media representatives, as well as the material
wherewithal of essential services, into contested, sovereignless spaces.
Prompted into action by videocameralistic agitation, these virtual gov-
nernance structures can provide needed relief at those points where their
influence impacts upon local people and structures. For the most part,
however, UNPROFORias are not promoting sovereignty or territoriality.
In fact, their heterarchical interventions either stimulate more internal
strife by contesting who is sovereign or generate greater dependence
upon the global NGOs, UN peacekeepers and CNN videocameralists
that displace the operations of domestic sovereignty. The persistent erup-
tion of spectacles of graphic violence from Liberia, Rwanda/Zaire and
southern Lebanon is grim evidence that (UN)governed space is often not
that different from ungoverned territories.

The diplomatic duo of failed states and applied superpower appears
to be the product of policy panics aimed at sustaining the systems of
sovereignty simulation just beyond the (UN)reality of the New World
Order. All states arguably are failing, from the United States (with its
government shutdowns and enormous budget deficit) and Russia
(dependent as it is upon IMF handouts) down to North Korea and Zaire.
Yet, to maintain the fictions of effective sovereignty and international
community, a new world order for coping with this extreme rupture
has been patched together to capture and contain the chaos that is intens-
sifying everywhere. Contact groups are clots of states with sufficient
sovereign order/territorial integrity/national unity to remain in contact
with the simulation, grouping their governmental efficacy to energize
the simulation and still give some hope in the face of the spreading
chaos of old local disorders around the globe. State failure is detectable
almost everywhere as the human rights monitors of Amnesty
International, the worldwatchers of Greenpeace, or the bureaucracy
busters of the Cato Institute will all attest; finding limit cases in the
failed states of Haiti, Cambodia, Angola, Panama, Afghanistan or
Mozambique gives the superpower(s) maintaining the UN some oppor-
tunities to recharge the sovereignty simulation of the UN, reapply
superpower to the vocation of nation (re)building and possibly even
revitalize a moribund state apparatus for the failed state. So, ironically,
powerful territorial entities, infected themselves with state failure, inter-
vene in weak failed states with ‘vague entrance requirements’ in the
hopes of fighting off the viral afflictions of state failure by having ‘clear
exit strategies. By acting as strong states to recreate stronger states, the hard work of freedom aims to keep the (UN)reality of international organization and order at its strongest pitch of simulation. But, with states destined to fail and fall into the foreseeable future, how long can these simulations last?

NOTES

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1 There is a gender politics at play in this dual conceptualization of television as a site for transient emotion and the sight of foreign policy expert as that of a worldly and realist statesman. For an exploration of the gendering of geopolitics see Ó Tuathail (1996a).

2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali has suggested that 'lives lost in one place seem to matter more than lives lost in another. War in one country may get enormous attention, while war elsewhere may be virtually ignored' (1996: 91). However, as Fouad Ajami (1996) notes, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's barbs against the uneven geography of the global mediascape were themselves motivated by mediagenic concerns as he campaigned in vain for a second term as UN Secretary-General while avoiding the videocameralistic indictment of the UN's performance in Bosnia. His 'southern' representation of Bosnia as a 'rich man's war' and the UN 'safe haven' of Srebrenica as merely 'a village in Europe' reveal his own skewed geography of moral visibility and responsibility. On videocameralistics in Bosnia and the failure of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), see Rieff (1995) and Ó Tuathail (1996b).

3 The very statement of Neuman's thesis is blithely unaware of its own contradictions:

This book argues . . . that while technology has enabled faster feedback from the public in matters of war and peace, while it has speeded the deliberative process and shortened reaction time, while it has written a new job description for diplomats and given the public a sense of being there, it has not, in the end, changed the fundamentals of political leadership and international governance.

(1996: 16)

Neuman's reasoning is only possible by her separation of 'leadership' from 'communication', a rather extraordinary separation for a journalist. For a thorough analysis of the games for mutual use and abuse played by diplomats, government spokespersons and the mass media tied to the media's daily production routines, see Pearce who argues that 'in no area of government is the nexus between media coverage and policy tighter than in the coverage of foreign affairs' (1995: 25).

4 In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Richard Rosencrance has used the notion of the 'virtual firm' to generate a discourse about the 'virtual state', which
he portrays as a lean, downsized, hollow headquarters state. At one point he argues: ‘the world may increasingly become divided into “head” and “body” nations, or nations representing some combination of those two functions’ (1996: 53). Resistance, however, does not follow the implications of his argument far enough for it to jell. The fact that knowledge, and not territory, is strategic nowadays problematizes the very notion of the state as a territorial entity. He only hints at the divisions within the state between the globally connected virtual classes and those real people actually at the receiving end of downsizing. Nevertheless, his somewhat confused hymn to the ‘virtual state’ is significant as an optimistic extrapolation of an idealized state based on the model of an idealized virtual firm. Perhaps here we glimpse the new imaginary state ideal for the wired virtual class, a state that is fully corporatized, downsized, lean, mean and connected to the global web of commerce. The downsized and disconnected underclass are externalized and out of sight. For more discussion see Luke (1997).

One recent example of this discourse is the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime which was addressed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He suggested that a market without a state and without the rule of law resembles a jungle; and the organization qua virus born from this jungle is the Mafia. Transnational crime undermines the very foundations of the international democratic order, because it poisons the business climate, corrupts political leaders and undermines human rights. It weakens the effectiveness and credibility of institutions and thus undermines democratic life. When order is in retreat, and when law, morals and democracy are under attack, all kinds of criminal ventures and deviant behaviour may be spawned.

(Boutros-Ghali, 1994: 131)

He concludes his analysis by calling for more UN-stated inter-governmental cooperation and for the preparation by the International Law Commission of a uniform draft code defining transnational crime. During 1996, the United Nations had deployed 24,000 military and civilian personnel from seventy member countries in sixteen separate peacekeeping missions. Over 750,000 have served since 1948 in UN peacekeeping operations, and nearly 1,500 have died to enforce some sort of peace for the United Nations (Wye, 1996: A-14).

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