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Abstract: It is commonplace to suggest that the Cold War ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Eastern European dictatorships. Implicitly this view assumes that the Cold War was fundamentally about Soviet control of Eastern Europe. It also ignores the Cold War nature of U.S. foreign policy in 1989. This paper outlines a more comprehensive definition of the Cold War as a geopolitical system made up of two different geopolitical orders, an American-organized order and a Soviet-dominated order. The structures of the Soviet geopolitical order began to collapse in 1989 but the structures of the American geopolitical order remained in place. Using a critical geopolitics perspective, one which focuses on the geopolitical ‘scripts’ used by foreign policy elites, the Cold War nature of U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and Europe in 1989 is documented. U.S. foreign policy did evolve and change in 1989 but it continued to legitimate U.S. militarism, Cold War alliances, and U.S. power projection in the Third World. Yet the Cold War as a geopolitical system began to lose its meaning as a consequence of the events of 1989. The persistence of the structures of the American geopolitical order after the Cold War and their attempted relegitimation in the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991 has now left an important disjuncture between economic realities and geopolitical authority in the post-Cold War era. This is one factor contributing to the ‘new world disorder’.

Understanding 1989 and the End of the Cold War

1989 was a year of geopolitical earthquakes in Eastern Europe. The year’s transformation began with the election of a non-Communist government in Poland and continued with the physical dismantlement of the Iron Curtain in Hungary, the televised fall off the Berlin Wall, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, and ended with the dramatic videotaped death of the Ceausescus in Romania. For the television and print media these events were packaged and projected as ‘the end of the Cold War’. For politicians and public alike 1989 was the year the Cold War finally came to an end.

Simply accepting that the Cold War ended in 1989, however, may hide more than it reveals. The diplomatic historian Anders Stephenson points out that almost all American historiography on the Cold War has, to a remarkable degree, failed to specify what it is the concept designated and explains. The failure, he notes, begins with Walter Lippman who first popularized the concept of the ‘Cold War’ by choosing it as the title for his series of critiques on Kennan’s concept of ‘containment’ (LIPPMAN, 1947). Since then the concept has been ‘used promiscuously, designating a whole host of possible periods, events and relationships’ (STEPHENSON, 1993). A narrow definition of the Cold War is as a description of a bilateral state of near-war hostility,

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characterized by a suspension of regular diplomacy, between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Given this definition the Cold War ‘ended’ in the early 1950s, again after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and again in the 1970s.

The international relations scholar Fred Halliday has attempted to specify the Cold War in a precise historical fashion by dividing it up into a First Cold War (1946–1953) and a Second Cold War (1979–1987) (HALLIDAY, 1983, 1989). He also has a broader understanding of it as a rivalry between ‘communism’ and ‘capitalism’, which began in 1917 and became, as a result of World War II, the constitutive divide in world affairs (HALLIDAY, 1990, pp. 6–7). For him what gave the Cold War its particular strength was “its inter-systemic character, the fact that it expressed the rivalry of two different social, economic and political systems” (HALLIDAY, 1990, p. 7).

THOMPSON (1990) challenges Halliday’s systemic interpretations of the Cold War by stressing the domestic political origins and consequences of Cold War ideologies for the citizens of both Western and Eastern bloc states. The Cold War, Thompson argues, was distinguished by its suppression of genuinely democratic politics within states and “the substitution of the threat of annihilation for the negotiated resolution of differences” (THOMPSON, 1990, p. 142). KALDOR (1990) expresses this argument more extremely. In systemic terms the conflict between East and West, she argues, was an “imaginary war” which serves as a “disciplinary discourse” “which expresses and legitimizes power relations in modern society” (KALDOR, 1990, p. 4).

Kaldor’s Foucaultian-derived emphasis on the Cold War as a disciplining discourse has similarities with the new research tradition of critical geopolitics within contemporary political geography. The focus of critical geopolitics, DALBY (1990, p. 180) notes, is on exposing the plays of power involved in grand geopolitical schemes. Both the formal codification of geopolitics into grand theory and the practical deployment of geopolitical reasoning in the conduct of foreign policy are the objects of analyses (DALBY, 1991; Ó TUATHAIL and AGNEW, 1992). Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international politics in particular ways. From a geographical perspective this can be described as their power to write international political space by constituting, defining and describing security, threats and perceived enemies in regularized ways. These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular ‘scripts’ in international politics concerning places, people and issues (Ó TUATHAIL and AGNEW, 1992). Such ‘scripts’ then become part of the means by which hegemony (in a Gramscian sense) is exercised in the international system (GILL, 1986; GILL and LAW, 1988).

Empirically documenting the relationships between discourse and intellectuals, institutions (such as NATO), and political economy in the operation of hegemony is a complex task. TAYLOR (1990) provides a Wallersteinian-inspired example in his study of the role of geopolitical reasoning by British national security elites in the creation of the Cold War. His world-systems theory elaboration of the Cold War as a geopolitical world order understands it as a moyenne durée pacification structure produced by the U.S. hegemonic cycle (TAYLOR, 1991, forthcoming). This interpretation, however, departs fundamentally from the more post-structuralist and Gramscian-inspired perspective of critical geopolitics. First, the notion of hegemony is different. Hegemony, for Wallerstein, is a condition of dominance among states, whereas hegemony in the Gramscian sense is concerned with the management of a ‘consensus’ within national and international society (GILL, 1986; GILL and LAW, 1988). The difference is crucial for Gramscians do not accept the contention that the U.S. is in hegemonic decline, something Wallerstein and others assume (GILL, 1986). Second, Wallerstein’s approach devalues the significance of ideology and discourse. The meanings of events for participants themselves are ignored. WALLERSTEIN (1991, p. 7), for example, goes so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union was “a sub-imperial power of the U.S. for Eastern Europe” during the Cold War. Third, the methodology of world-systems theory is such that significant qualitative differences in historical periods are neglected and ignored. The transformative impact of nuclear weapons, the persistence of NATO, and the globalization of production and finance in the post-World War II era, for example, are three processes WALLERSTEIN (1991) fails to address.

COX (1986, 1990) offers an alternative non-
Wallersteinian understanding of the Cold War as a system. “What began life as a series of U.S. measures designed to rebuild Western Europe became a system—reinforced by a crisis here, a Soviet move there, and an analysis of the protagonists which insisted that Moscow was impelled to expand and that only the United States could prevent it from achieving world domination” (COX, 1990, p. 30). I wish to extend this to suggest that the Cold War became a geopolitical system with two constituent geopolitical orders, each of which was characterized by a particular organization of domestic, interallied and Third World space. The geopolitical order established by the Americans after World War II was geographically more extensive than the Soviet order. First, domestic politics within the U.S. was organized around visions of the Soviet threat (the Soviets and their domestic fellow-travellers as Other). This facilitated the militarization of the U.S. state and its politics (MANN, 1988). It also had an important economic dimension. The Cold War, according to WOLFE (1982, 1984), was central to the creation of a consensual ‘politics of growth’ in post-war America. Through exaggeration of the Soviet threat U.S. foreign policy elites were able to transform the U.S. from a reluctant isolationist power into a crusading interventionist power dedicated to promoting an open world economy and safeguarding the free enterprise system (COX, 1990; WOLFE, 1984). ‘Containment’ became an unquestioned imperative within American foreign policy. Cold War visions of ‘containment’ were also extended into American domestic politics and popular culture, where it attempted to reinforce the cultural authority of the white Anglo-Saxon male establishment (CAMPBELL, 1990; MAY, 1989; ROSS, 1989).

Second, the establishment and modernization of a global system of extended deterrence, by means of NATO in Western Europe and the mutual Security Treaty with Japan, helped incorporate and subordinate the U.S.’s major capitalist allies into an American-led military system (BARNET, 1983). The economic reconstruction and recovery of Western Europe and Japan was facilitated by generous aid from the U.S. and its promotion of an open capitalist world economy. A convergence of interests among the ruling classes in all three regions facilitated the establishment of an American ‘empire by invitation’ (LUNDESTAD, 1990).

Third, the U.S. sought to establish for itself the freedom, in the space which became demarcated as the ‘Third World’, to intervene and attack peoples and states U.S. national security elites considered a threat to their version of ‘American’ values, institutions and economic interests (KOLKO, 1988; CHOMSKY, 1991). The general proclivity of the U.S. for unilateralist interventionism to oppose radical social revolution was already manifest in Central America and the Caribbean before the Cold War. This proclivity became a global one after World War II and led the U.S. into bloody interventions in Korea and Vietnam, among other places.

The geopolitical order established by the Soviet Communist elite in the wake of World War II was largely confined to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Its order was defined by, first, the domination of domestic politics by the Communist Party; second, the maintenance of a system of extended deterrence in a ‘Eastern bloc’ by means of pro-Moscow ruling elites and the Warsaw Pact Organization; and, third, the selective sponsorship of radical developmentist states in the ‘Third World’.

Europe was the principal theatre where both competing geopolitical orders faced each other and the site of its greatest militarization. Ironically both superpowers came to share a mutual interest in the Cold War as a system because it guaranteed their mutual positions on the European continent. COX (1990, p. 31) notes that:

Historically . . . the Cold War served the interests of both the USSR and the United States. For this reason neither sought to alter the nature of the relationship once it had been established. Their goal, therefore, was not so much victory over the other as the maintenance of balance. In this sense the Cold War was more of a carefully controlled game with commonly agreed rules than a contest where there could be clear winners and losers.

Yet there were real winners and losers but within not between the respective geopolitical orders. Evaluated in terms of war, death, and destruction the Cold War saw the Soviet state wage war in its geopolitical zone against popular uprisings. The U.S., with the help of certain allies, sought to police radical movements in its zone and waged war against radical social change in the Third World. From Vietnam to Afghanistan
the Cold War was far from being an ‘imaginary war’ or a ‘long peace’.

What came undone in 1989 was the Soviet geopolitical order in Eastern Europe. As a geopolitical order it had never been as comprehensive, expansive and consensual as that established by the U.S. in Western Europe (Migone, 1987). This latter American order was considerably more successful but it was not without its own structural problems. Since World War II the economic order established by the U.S. had undergone profound changes. Western Europe and Japan made strong recoveries from the war. The international monetary order built around the Cold War ended in the early 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. While the economic structures were evolutionary and flexible the military structures were, in practice, hierarchical and rigid. Military decision-making for the West still ultimately lay in the hands of the U.S. and would remain so even after the collapse of the Cold War as a geopolitical system.

This paper provides a critical geopolitics of the Bush administration foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and Europe in 1989. Focusing on the key national security intellectuals and the origins, formulation and articulation of their discourse about Gorbachev, the Soviet Union and the international system it seeks to demonstrate that, while the Soviet geopolitical order was being dismantled by the people of Eastern Europe in 1989, the Bush administration was continuing to function and conceptualize the global system using standard Cold War scripts. Up until the fall of the Berlin Wall the Bush administration did not publicly acknowledge that the threat from the Soviet Union had fundamentally changed. Even after this, Cold War style geopolitical reasoning and practice in U.S. foreign policy continued to persist into 1990 (Deibel, 1991). The significance of this for contemporary world politics is addressed in the conclusion.

The Geopolitical Reasoning of the Bush Administration in 1989

The Nixon succession

The central figure in the political education of George Bush was not Ronald Reagan but Richard Nixon (Blumenthal, 1990, p. 67). After being encouraged to run for the Senate in Texas by Nixon, where he was defeated by Lloyd Bentsen, Bush was appointed by Nixon to be his Ambassador to the U.N. After Nixon’s re-election in 1972 Bush hoped to become an understudy to Henry Kissinger and lobbied for the position of Deputy Secretary of State (Blumenthal, 1990, p. 62). In the Ford administration Bush became director of the CIA and managed to get his Texan friend, James Baker, a job as Under Secretary of Commerce. By the end of the administration Baker had proved himself invaluable and ended up running Ford’s campaign for re-election.

Bush’s first act as President-elect of the U.S. was to nominate his old friend James Baker as Secretary of State, a nomination that was soon ratified by the Senate. More than 80% of the top White House staff that Bush appointed by the end of January 1989 had served there previously (Kramer, 1989). Most were veterans of the Nixon–Ford administrations. Bush’s appointment of Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Advisor and Lawrence Eagleburger as his Deputy Secretary of State signalled a return to a more Kissingerian-style foreign policy than that of Reagan. Both Scowcroft and Eagleburger had served as presidents of Kissinger Associates, a Washington-based consultancy firm established by Kissinger to advise corporate clients on questions of international politics and trade. Dick Cheney, Bush’s approved Secretary of defense, had served as Ford’s White House Chief of Staff. All of Bush’s top staff were professionals who had made a career of the Cold War. Maynes (1989) noted that the irony of George Bush’s first year is that “a man supremely prepared for a traditional foreign-policy agenda will confront an entirely new one”. The same held for his entire foreign policy leaders, the group Woodward (1991) termed ‘The Commanders’.

The intellectual foundations of the Bush administration foreign policy was provided by the quintessential Cold War geopolitics of Kissinger and Nixon. The principle virtue in Kissinger’s elaborate world-view on international politics was ‘stability’, a position he equated with the preservation and continued modernization of American hegemony in the post-WWII order. ‘Stability’ for America and its
industrialized allies, did not, of course, translate into stability for the world in general. In the Third World, more often than not, it meant the active intervention of the U.S. in bloody civil wars to prop up its friends and destabilize perceived enemies. The principle difficulty with U.S. foreign policy, in Kissinger’s scheme, was its inconsistency, the fact that it ‘oscillates’ between different ‘moods’ and ‘exaggerated feelings’ (KISSINGER, 1987, 1989a, b; KISSINGER and VANCE, 1988; KISSINGER et al., 1989). Behind Kissinger’s foreign policy philosophy was the image of a rational masculinized subject, one who could separate himself from transitory feelings and personal relationships, and consider only, in a passionless, ‘hard-headed’ way, the governing realities of international politics and the permanent interests of one’s state.

As an instance of this philosophy Kissinger had publicly criticized the foreign policy of the late Reagan administration towards the Soviet Union. This policy, he argued, was based on the personal relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev, and too given to reckless ‘euphoria’. The later description became a key marker in Kissinger’s scheme and those who used it usually drew the terms of their analysis from Kissinger. In an essay at the time of the Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Washington D.C. (7 December 1987) to sign the INF Treaty, Kissinger noted the “near ecstasy” of the American delegation and how “the mood of euphoria overwhelmed controversial subjects” (KISSINGER, 1987). Such were anathema to the self-controlled male geopolitician. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. “must reflect mutual interests, not the fate of transitory personalities”, he argued. The INF Treaty had little merit but was worth accepting because the damage to the Atlantic alliance of not ratifying it would be great (BLUMENTHAL, 1990, p. 251). There had to be a linkage between the strategic arms talks (START) and conventional force reductions in Europe (CFE) (KISSINGER, 1987; KISSINGER and VANCE, 1988). NATO itself needed to be modernized to give the Europeans a greater role but on U.S. terms (KISSINGER and VANCE, 1988, p. 908). As a means of ‘testing’ the Soviets, U.S. cooperation was supposed to be linked to a suspension of arms shipments by the U.S.S.R. to its allies in the Third World, particularly Nicaragua and Cuba. Finally, quiet negotiation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. on the fate of Eastern Europe was desirable (KISSINGER, 1989a, b).

Nixon articulated his views in an essay revealingly entitled ‘American foreign policy: the Bush agenda’, which was published in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1989. Repeating much of the Kissinger analysis using his familiar gaming metaphors Nixon derided those who thought the Cold War was over. Gorbachev had ‘star quality’ but he was still a Marxist–Leninist. The U.S., therefore, should provide no aid to the Soviet Union nor help Gorbachev until “he makes an irrevocable break with the Kremlin’s past policies”. What would actually constitute this was unclear but, given Nixon’s mixture of classic geopolitics and Cold War ideology, it was probably close to a logical impossibility. Gorbachev would have to cease being not only a Marxist–Leninist but also a Soviet leader for the Soviet Union was, by definition, an expanding empire [for details on the Cold War script of the Soviet Union as an inevitably expanding empire see DALBY (1990)]. The Soviet Union would have to cease being the Soviet Union. Even then Nixon’s geopolitics may rule out aid by Western states to various republics, especially a reconstituted Russia, for it, after all, occupied the ‘Eurasian heartland’ and any power that controlled this region was a threat to ‘maritime powers’ like the U.S. and its allies.

Nixon’s other policy proposals sharply criticized the START formula agreed by Reagan and Gorbachev. Western leaders needed to educate their publics on the nature and scope of the Soviet threat (NIXON, 1989, p. 208). Military aid to the Afghan rebels should continue while Bush must impose linkage between Soviet access to U.S. capital, credits and technology and Soviet military aid to Managua. In the long run “the goals of the two sides diverge dramatically. Gorbachev wants reform because he wants a stronger Soviet Union and an expanding Soviet empire” (NIXON, 1989, p. 218).

The profound influence of Kissinger and Nixon on the Bush administration was evident before Bush even took office. Bush’s campaign was a classic Nixonian campaign of racist law-and-order themes (Willie Horton), primitive Cold War rituals (the pledge of allegiance) and relentless negative campaigning. Gorbachev’s Russia was, at one stage,
clumsily compared to Hitler’s Germany by Bush (BLUMENTHAL, 1990, p. 74). The Bush campaign did not have a coherent foreign policy vision of its own (and neither did the Democrats). Its crude message was that there was chaos and danger in the world. These dangers must be confronted and contained by patriotic Americans like George Bush.

The initial statements of the new administration reflected the influence and access Kissinger and Nixon had to Bush. In an interview just before his inauguration Bush stated that “if we make the mistake of assessing our relationship with the Soviet Union in terms of a personality we’ll live to regret it. You’ve got to make a broader assessment of Soviet intentions that transcends any individual” (BUSH, 1989a). Scowcroft stated in a television interview that, as far as he was concerned, the Cold War was not over. Baker, in his confirmation hearings before the Senate, stated that the position of the U.S. as “both a continental and maritime power gave it a unique geopolitical perspective” on international affairs. The Soviet Union remained “a heavily armed superpower” and it was the U.S.‘s task to “arrange affairs so that whatever the outcome of perestroika, a more responsible, constructive Soviet foreign policy will remain in Moscow’s interest” (Department of State Bulletin, 1989a). After Cheney’s confirmation in May he stated that Gorbachev “would ultimately fail”. When that happens “he’s likely to be replaced by somebody who will be far more hostile” (BLUMENTHAL, 1990, p. 328; MOORE, 1989). America, in short, needed to keep its guard up. Containment could not end. This type of Cold War reasoning, like that of the Bush administration generally, nearly became a self-fulfilling prophecy in August 1991 because of a hardline-fulfilling prophecy by August 1991 because of a hardline

Putting Gorbachev on hold: chronopolitics and the Cold War

One of the first acts of the new Bush administration was to undertake a full strategic review of U.S. foreign policy, a review that was not completed until well into 1989. There were a number of reasons offered for such a review. First, the new circumstances of world politics necessitated such a review. Baker, in his confirmation hearings, identified five transformations in the world: the democratic revolu-

tion, the spread of free enterprise, change in the communist world, technological progress and new military trends (Department of State Bulletin, 1989a). Significantly Gorbachev’s perestroika had not been singled out for special attention. Second, Bush wanted to assert his own individual stamp on U.S. foreign policy priorities. Third, the long comprehensive policy review was seen as a means of slowing down the momentum of change in U.S.–Soviet relations. The policy review itself was an anti-euphoria strategy and its deliberate length, coming after Gorbachev’s dramatic UN unilateral cuts, soon began to irritate the Soviet government (REMICK and RANDAL, 1989; SHEVARDNADZE, 1991, p. 98).

The perceived need to underplay the significance of Gorbachev and put U.S.–Soviet relations on hold stemmed from the nature of the Gorbachev challenge. To state that interests not personalities should govern U.S. foreign policy was disingenuous. Interests are advanced though personalities and friends are interests, as Nixon and Kissinger knew well from their experiences in Iran and South Vietnam. Why the Bush administration took refuge in such a foreign policy ruse was because Gorbachev’s personality was not fitting their Cold War mould. Gorbachev was a master of chronopolitics. At that time he represented speed, dynamism and change, which translated into Cold War geopolitics as instability, unpredictability and uncertainty, all disquieting scenarios for deeply conservative geopoliticians whose very subjectivities were part of the Cold War order.

Attempts were made to inscribe Gorbachev within standard U.S. Cold War scripts of Soviet leaders. Embellishing Nixon’s position that Gorbachev was like other reforming Communists but with more ‘star quality’ the Center for Security Studies, a neoconservative think tank, together with others pushed the line that Gorbachev was really after peredysyka or ‘breathing space’ not genuine perestroika (BLUMENTHAL, 1990, p. 328). Gorbachev simply wanted a pause before resuming the familiar struggle.

What Gorbachev and his foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, wanted, however, was a transformation of the post-World War II world order (GORBACHEV, 1987; SHEVARDNADZE, 1991). To
seasoned politicians and 'hard-headed' strategic thinkers who had built their professional careers on Cold War ideology this was difficult to acknowledge. It was also unsettling since their position in power was due to the currency of Cold War discourse in U.S. domestic politics. Inscribing Gorbachev into existent Cold War understandings became increasingly difficult to sell as changes in Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union itself became global televisual images of a post-Cold War reality. Baker, in his confirmation hearings, noted how rapid advances in the technology of information and communication helped bring about a global economy, shrinking time and space, and transcending the traditional boundaries of the nation-state (Department of State Bulletin, 1989a, p. 10). What he did not note was that these changes were transforming the very possibility of maintaining the ideological hegemony of standard Cold War scripts, both within U.S. domestic politics and amongst the U.S.'s capitalist allies. Gorbachev's 'new thinking', however, was explicitly dedicated to undermining the standard Cold War script of the U.S.S.R. amongst Western national security elites (MEYER, 1988). GORBACHEV (1987, pp. 203–204) had written of the importance of moving beyond the 'enemy image' both superpowers had of each other. The West, in Gorbachev's new thinking, was going to be deprived of its image of the U.S.S.R. as its enemy.

Status quo plus

The result of the review of Soviet policy was National Security Review 3 (NSR 3), which was first described to the press on 8 April 1989. Using it and other reviews President Bush presented a series of four keynote foreign policy speeches in April and May 1989. NSR 3 was prepared by the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon and the staff of the National Security Council. In it a set of options on U.S. Soviet policy were outlined. The option chosen, according to press reports, was described as a middle course between a sceptical approach to the policies of Gorbachev and an actively responsive course which sought to match Gorbachev's new foreign policy initiatives with new ones from the U.S. (GORDON, 1989a). This middle-course option was termed 'status quo plus' and was said to involve a careful evolutionary approach to the U.S.S.R. which looked to joint efforts by the superpowers to address regional conflicts and questions of terrorism and arms proliferation.

On 9 March 1989 Baker met Shevardnadze in Vienna where the new CFE talks opened. Baker was reported to have discussed 'linkage' over arms to Nicaragua, terrorism and chemical weapons. Baker confirmed that START negotiations would have to wait until the administration finished its arms control policy review (Department of State Bulletin, 1989b). The classified review, NSR 14, was completed by mid-April. The Bush administration had signalled a tough new line on arms control by reappointing 72-year-old Army general Edward Rowny and retiring Paul Nitze as special arms control advisors (GORDON, 1989b;OTH, 1989). Rowny, like Nitze, was a former member of the Committee on the Present Danger (DALBY, 1990; BROWNSTEIN and EASTER, 1982, pp. 511–517). Though both men were right-wing Cold Warriors Nitze was considered closer to the Reagan administration's approach to Soviet affairs. Richard Burt was named chief negotiator at the START talks.

In the first of his four foreign policy speeches [Hamtramck, Michigan, 17 April 1989 (Department of State Bulletin, 1989c)] Bush stated that with “prudence, realism and patience, we seek to promote the evolution of freedom”. In the second speech [College Station, Texas, 12 May 1989 (Department of State Bulletin, 1989d)] Bush addressed change in the Soviet Union directly. Invoking the 'wise men' who crafted the strategy of containment he declared that “(c)ontainment worked because our democratic principles, institutions, and values are sound and always have been. It worked because our alliances were and are strong; and because the superiority of free societies and free markets over stagnant socialism is undeniable”. This triumphalism was then oddly followed by declarations that nothing really had changed:

A new relationship cannot be simply declared by Moscow or bestowed by others. It must be earned because promises are never enough. The Soviet Union has promised a more co-operative relationship before—only to reverse course and return to militarism. Soviet foreign policy has been almost seasonal—warmth before cold, thaw before freeze (Department of State Bulletin, 1989d, p. 16).

Considering the fact that Gorbachev had initiated
unprecedented changes in the Soviet Union and allowed radical changes in Eastern Europe (as evidenced in Poland at that time), the persistence of the standard Cold War script of the U.S.S.R. is remarkable. A month earlier (1 April) Gorbachev was reported as indicating to Hungarian General Secretary Karoly Grosz that safeguards must be provided to prevent a repetition of the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (KAMM, 1989). It is not credible that the U.S. diplomatic and intelligence community did not know what the Soviet attitude towards the Eastern European dictatorships was at this time. The Bush administration, it later emerged, had intelligence reports stating that NATO war plans were redundant, for a massive surprise attack by Warsaw Pact forces was no longer a credible possibility (TYLER and SMITH, 1989a). The Bush administration was also informed that Gorbachev’s military cuts reversed a 20-year pattern of growth in a secret report in May 1989. Bush, Quayle and Cheney, however, continued to cite rising Soviet defense spending in their foreign policy speeches until November 1989 (TYLER and SMITH, 1989b).

Bush’s only substantive proposal in his Michigan speech was a reiteration of Eisenhower's ‘Open Skies’ appeal made 34 years beforehand. The motivation for this (it was of no practical significance in the age of spy satellites) seemed to be that it symbolized ‘openness’. The logic of association was revealing for ‘openness’ was instantiated by reference to Cold War history. Bush’s intellectual horizon was the Cold War past not any potential future outside its terms.

At the time of Bush’s speech Baker was in Moscow where, in the Bush administration’s terms, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev played ‘public relations gambits’ by making proposals such as an offer to stop sending arms to Nicaragua. The Bush administration thought it a trick. In a Washington briefing Bush administration spokesperson, Marlin Fitzwater, called Gorbachev a “drugstore cowboy” a remark that was cleared within the administration beforehand.

Rhetoric such as this was provoking substantial disquiet amongst NATO elites in Europe and domestic criticism in the U.S. In his third speech [Boston University, 21 May 1989 (Department of State Bulletin, 1989d)] Bush, with President Mitterand by his side, addressed the rising popularity of Gorbachev in Europe. “While an ideological earthquake is shaking asunder the very communist foundation, the West is being tested by complacency.” This “growing complacency” was, according to Bush, a “major concern”. Never must Europe forget that the hopes of the future rest on keeping the peace and this rests on the “NATO shield”, a shield behind which Europe had enjoyed 40 years free of conflict.

Europe had experienced 40 years of militarized partition as a consequence of the ‘NATO shield’. Bush’s fourth speech [New London, Connecticut, 24 May 1989 (Department of State Bulletin, 1989d)] was a defense of American military power. In U.S.-Soviet relations the goals was now to move “beyond containment” and “integrate the Soviet Union into the community of nations”. Moving beyond containment, however, was in practice a slogan rather than a policy as was ‘a Europe whole and free’. What ‘status quo plus’ and ‘beyond containment’ really meant was left unclear. Status quo plus, BLUMENTHAL (1990, p. 330) remarks, was an oxymoronic admission of change yet simultaneous denial of change. Like the other concepts their inspiration came from the vocabulary of political campaigning not foreign policy formulation. Bush was now campaigning against Gorbachev.

The series of four keynote Bush speeches on foreign policy received poor reviews in U.S. civil society (HOUGH, 1989a; WALKER, 1989b). SCHLESSINGER (1989) started that one has the impression that the president “is the prisoner of a bunch of foreign policy hacks whose idea is to meet every new problem with old cliches”. The U.S. needs to stop “trivializing these historic transformations (in the U.S.S.R.) by running on about ‘public relations’ battles”. HOUGH (1989a) attacked the Kissinger premises of Bush administration policy directly. A new generation is needed, distinct from that of Kissinger. The one recipe for disaster, he concluded, was simply “to follow the old rules that worked in an era that has now passed into history”. These criticisms and Baker’s growing relationship with Shevardnadze provoked an increasingly clear division within the administration between a hard-line Kissinger camp around Scowcroft and a more pragmatic camp centred on Baker. Kissinger’s influence on the administration was noted by the Soviets themselves.
(REMNICK and RANDAL, 1989). While his proposal for a superpower deal on Eastern Europe appears to have been rejected (GORDON, 1989c), his influence on the Bush presidency was to persist.7

**NATO and the modernization imperative**

The Lance missile modernization dispute between the U.S. and Germany in the first half of 1989 was the first major foreign policy crisis provoked by the Bush administration’s reliance on Cold War scripts of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. What was remarkable is that the crisis occurred at all given the fact that it could so easily have been avoided. The fact that it became a ‘crisis’ within NATO necessitating a compromise at the 40th anniversary meeting of NATO in Brussels revealed a great deal about how the organization as a Cold War institution worked.

To state that NATO was a key structure in the Pax Americana world order established after World War II is hardly a controversial point. Establishment security intellectuals such as CALLEO (1987) have argued for years that NATO is part of a Pax Americana order that has now passed. The alliance, therefore, needs to radically restructure itself, with the U.S. taking a less dominant role and a Franco-German alliance becoming central to its operation. While such a general position is widely shared within the Atlanticist strategic community no concrete reforms were ever undertaken nor did a consensus ever emerge on the details of needed reforms. Such debates, in any case, tend to normalize the militarized security ideology of NATO and unproblematically accept it as an instrument of ‘Western’ modernity in the contemporary world. As KLEIN (1989, 1990) has argued, NATO and the whole Western alliance system (the OECD, GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank) are part of an attempt to construct a particular form of political identity. This identity is pervasively described as ‘Western’ with a putative unity and consensus ascribed to this mythical geographical space (which since 1945 has been reworked to include Japan). Discourses of modernization through growth, and progress through a corporate capitalist way of life, are deeply embedded in its ideological structure. The NATO face of this ideology is that security in the modern world, particularly in Europe, is ultimately guaranteed only by an extensive and elaborate system of nuclear weapons which need constant ‘modernization’.

The deployment and ‘modernization’ of nuclear weapons in Europe, however, has always posed legitimacy problems for the putatively consensus West. As a means of dealing with this NATO developed a ‘two-track’ strategy (as much an ideological as a military strategy) wherein the continued refined militarization of the system of extended deterrence in Europe would be accompanied (and hopefully overshadowed) by very public commitments to arms control negotiations. Such was how NATO worked to deploy the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early 1980s.

By the late 1980s the project of refining militarism within NATO was in difficult ideological circumstances. The INF Treaty has eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons from Europe leaving only short-range nuclear weapons (missiles and artillery shells) on the front line in Germany. More importantly, the manifestly clear leadership change in the Soviet Union had eroded the credibility of a military invasion of Western Europe from ‘the East’. Short-range nuclear forces (SNF) were particularly problematic for the German security establishment or, as was repeatedly noted in domestic debate, ‘the shorter the missiles the deader the Germans’. Under electoral pressure and facing severely declining popularity the Kohl government decided to publicly call for immediate SNF negotiations and to oppose the forthcoming ‘modernization’ of the Lance missiles in the Federal Republic. The Bush administration had decided that the Europeans were being ‘seduced’ by Gorbachev’s ‘charm offensive’, as the Soviet leader’s proposals on European disarmament were described. The rhetoric employed by the Bush administration was a throw-back to the early Cold War where, in Kennan and elsewhere in U.S. strategic discourse at the time, the U.S.–Soviet–European relations were understood by means of a realist–rapist intertext wherein a penetrating and desiring Soviet Union was seducing an exposed and weak willed Europe. Only a strong ‘hard-headed’ guardian like the U.S., armed with potent weapons, could contain the U.S.S.R. (Ó TUATHAIL and AGNEW, 1992). The medical intertext of the early Cold War, where Europe was described as needing ‘inoculations’ of aid in the late 1940s, was also recycled in the form of concerns about
how ‘Gorby fever’ was sweeping across Western Europe (ROSS, 1989; CHOMSKY, 1991).

The British government, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, sided with the Bush administration in the emergent dispute with Kohl and his foreign minister Genscher. Foreign minister Geoffrey Howe had opened the CFE meetings in March by noting that NATO does not want to be drawn into “a competitive striptease” with the Warsaw Pact over conventional weapons in Europe. The potential ‘nakedness’ of the West if SNF negotiations led to a ‘third zero’, the preference of both the Kohl administration and Gorbachev, concerned John Galvin, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander (this post is always held by an American). In an interview General Galvin declared that “I don’t want to see us ever do away with our nuclear capability in Europe” (GALVIN, 1989).

The Kohl–Genscher line on Lance was a fundamental challenge to the Bush administration’s Soviet policy. Genscher had recognized in 1987 that Gorbachev was a new type of Soviet leader and urged that the West should take Gorbachev at his word. Bush’s initial foreign policy pronouncements together with the publication of a leaked NATO war game (WINTEX–CIMEX) in which NATO ‘fired’ 20 nuclear warheads only one of which was at the territory of the U.S.S.R., were reportedly the reasons why an initial compromise over Lance fell apart. After considerable public diplomacy a compromise was fashioned at the NATO meeting in Brussels. Bush, in response to the bad reviews of his initial foreign policy speeches, reportedly ordered a change of tone. In Kennebunkport, in late May, Bush’s aides put together a conventional forces proposal that was announced by Bush in Mainz on 31 May (Department of State Bulletin, 1989c). At the NATO meeting it was agreed that Lance modernization be postponed and that SNF negotiations be held but not until conventional arms reductions were under way. Such talks would only aim at the partial reduction of the U.S. and Soviet warheads. There was to be no ‘third zero’.

The NATO compromise of June 1989 would soon be superseded by events in Eastern Europe. In itself, however, it was a revealing instance of how America’s geopolitical order worked in Europe. First, while the Kohl government could protest in public about NATO policy, it could not decide itself about the fate of nuclear weapons on its soil pointed at parts of eastern Germany. These weapons were permanently controlled by NATO which was always headed by an American general. Although negotiations and diplomacy were possible the heart of decision-making ultimately lay with the men in Kennebunkport, Maine. It was they who decided to change the tone of Soviet policy and they who decided what form that change would take. This decision was then taken to the allies for consultations. NATO’s standard operation procedure was consensus building but power, in the last instance, lay with the U.S. commanders. Second, the NATO meeting of June 1989 was not a forum for ending the Cold War but a celebration of it. The 40th anniversary was used as the occasion to reaffirm the discourse of Cold War militarism and the ideology of ‘Western’ modernity that went along with it. The institution that had undertaken the militarization of Europe and placed a Cold War stamp on the landscape and domestic politics of member states was being lauded not questioned. In Western Europe, in the summer of 1989, the Cold War was certainly not over.

**Mutual advantages**

The foreign policy disposition of the Bush administration towards the changes in Eastern Europe in 1989 was moulded by a working sense of geopolitics and an unquestioned sense of Western superiority. On the one hand, the Bush administration adhered to the anti-euphoria strategy described as necessary by Kissinger. During the tumultuous revolts from Tiananmen Square to Timisoara the Bush administration were at pains to stress the need for stability and slow graduated change. ‘Prudence’ and ‘cautiousness’ became Bush’s favourite words, to such an extent in fact that they became the subject of parody and amusement amongst the White House press corp. After the Tiananmen Square massacre secret trips to China by Scowcroft and Eagleburger, facilitated by Nixon and Kissinger, were undertaken to maintain the Nixonian sense of Cold War geopolitics.

Within the administration the external face of foreign policy pragmatism was James Baker. After Moscow Baker met Shevardnadze again in Paris (29 July) and in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (22–23 September),
where both men and their aides had long substantive negotiations. The results of these negotiations was significant progress on regional conflicts and the details of arms control (Department of State Bulletin, 1989). After the extent of the changes in Eastern Europe became clear Bush met with Gorbachev in Malta and built further on the progress already made by Baker and Shevardnadze, who had developed an excellent working relationship.

The position of the Baker camp on the Soviet Union was outlined in a series of speeches in October after the Jackson Hole meeting [4 October statement for the Senate Finance Committee, 16 October before the Foreign Policy Association and 23 October before the Commonwealth Club (Department of State Bulletin, 1989)]. Baker characterized U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union as a “prudent search for points of mutual advantage”. The first of these concerned Europe, where Baker stated that “(n)ormalization must occur on the basis of Western values with the end result being a people integrated into the community of democratic European nations”. The U.S. and its allies were prepared to help Eastern Europe with short-term food aid, medium-term IMF packages and long-term encouragement to the private sector. While the Bush administration wanted perestroika to succeed, because it promised a less aggressive Soviet Union, Baker did not believe it could succeed without “increasing measures of free markets, free speech and institutions more accountable to the people—in short, without more freedom”. Reform, in other words, could only be achieved by Western-style modernization.

Baker’s pragmatic approach, however, seemed to triumph over the more reconstructed Cold Warriors. On 26 October Baker had a speech by Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Assistant, squashed because he reportedly regarded the address as excessively pessimistic about Gorbachev (FRIEDMAN, 1989d). Often described as the Bush administration’s ‘Soviet expert’ (even though he had never visited the Soviet Union until May 1989), Gates took Nixon’s view that the Soviets should not be trusted (FRIEDMAN, 1989B; SEIB, 1989). Despite the apparent dominance of the Baker line the unreconstructed Cold War reflex in the administration continued. BLUMENTHAL (1990, p. 339) notes that when Baker sent a draft of his ‘mutual advantages’ speech to Scowcroft he returned it with a notation at the top: “It is euphoric in tone”. Even after all the dramatic events of November and the goodwill of the Malta summit Vice President Quayle gave a speech in which he reminded everyone that the Soviet Union was still a totalitarian power (WALKER, 1989c).

In concrete diplomatic terms the pragmatic foreign policy bargaining of Baker and Shevardnadze did produce some results. In June 1989 the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed an accord to reduce the risk of inadvertent military confrontations. Progress was made towards START and CFE treaties. A Memorandum of Understanding on chemical weapons data exchange and verification tests was signed at Jackson Hole. Overall, however, the Bush administration’s position on arms control was a conventional Cold
War one. Arms control was a means to regulate not reverse or dismantle the Cold War’s militarization of the planet. SNF negotiations, which Kohl and Gorbachev had called for on a number of occasions, were firmly ruled out by the Bush administration. There was no explicit linkage of START and CFE, but implicitly they were linked considering the slow progress on START and movement away from the more extensive cuts envisaged by the Reagan administration. At Malta Bush was cool towards a proposal for radically deep cuts in conventional forces proposed by Gorbachev. The Bush administration refused to consider cuts in SLCMs (submarinelunched cruise missiles) declaring that verification was too difficult to guarantee a treaty. THOMAS (1989) pointed out that verification was not the problem. The U.S. was not really interested in SLCM cuts since it had greater numbers of longer-range SLCMs than the Soviets. Similarly the U.S. did not show any great interest in the Soviet desires for cuts in naval forces. Nor would the U.S. accept any SDI restraints (the Soviets delinked START from the SDI at Jackson Hole). On the material evidence of U.S. arms control strategy and the U.S. defense budget of fiscal 1990 American Cold War militarism was operating as normal.

European politics, however, were not operating as normal. U.S. reaction to the collapse of the Eastern European dictatorships in late 1989 was, first, to ‘dampen euphoric expectations’. Events released forms of ‘euphoria’ and ‘emotion’ that were dangers to be guarded against. When the Berlin Wall fell Bush stated that he was pleased but that he “was not an emotional kind of guy” (BLUMENTHAL, 1990, p. 341). At the Malta summit in December 1989 Bush told Gorbachev that the West would not “go demonstrating on top of the Berlin Wall to show how happy we are”. ‘Instability’ now became the enemy. Second, the Bush administration read the changes as a vindication of ‘Western values’. Bush’s trip to Poland and Hungary in July 1989 provided the occasion for speeches on the natural virtues of democracy and capitalism. At Malta he remarked: “You see, I think there’s an objectivity to all—I don’t want to be too philosophical—but I think there’s an objectivity to this. Freedom works” (BUSH, 1989c). Events were interpreted as a victory for NATO, for 40 years of perseverance and patience (BUSH, 1989d). The European changes made possible not the eventual dissolution of NATO but an enhancement of its political role. Again in Malta Bush stated that “the alliance must remain a reliable guarantor of peace in Europe, as it has been for 40 years” (BUSH, 1989e).

In Brussels on 4 December 1989, when asked whether there will always have to be a NATO, he replied: “Well, if you want to project out 100 years or take some years off that, you can look to a utopia day when there might not be” (BUSH, 1989f). Conceiving of a world without the U.S.’s Cold War military alliance in Europe was to enter the realm of the utopian. In Berlin, Baker’s 12 December speech on security ‘architecture for a new era’ was actually a reiteration of the old American security architecture—NATO, nuclear weapons, and capitalist structures—for a transformed European continent (BAKER, 1990). The Soviet geopolitical order in Eastern Europe had collapsed. The substance of America’s military hegemony in Western Europe remained. After 1989, however, its ideological justification would have to change.

From the End of the Cold War to the New World Disorder

The end of the Cold War was an unforeseen consequence of the crisis of Communism in the Soviet Union. U.S. national security elites, like most others, were taken aback by the rapidity and profundity of change in Eastern Europe in 1989, and were left reiterating scripts that were being rendered redundant by events. In general, the U.S. demonstrated a marked reluctance to recognize the changed geopolitical environment. The year 1989 ended with 24,000 U.S. troops invading Panama. Throughout 1990, DEIBEL (1991, p. 12) notes, the Bush administration seemed unable to decide whether it wished to support perestroika or continue the old policy of weakening the Soviet economy. WALKER (1991, p. 132) concurs, noting that “American thinking still has not comprehended how fundamentally the European situation has changed”. CUMINGS (1991, p. 196) describes the end of the Cold War as akin to a race where two horses were running around a track, one (the U.S.S.R.) broke its leg, and the other (the U.S.) kept on running anyway.

Yet the collapse of the Soviet geopolitical order in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union itself effectively ended the Cold War as a geopolitical system. The Cold War institutions, alliance structures and ideological proclivities of the American geopolitical order remained intact but they had lost their raison d'être. This posed a serious dilemma for U.S. national security elites, for the spectacle of a Soviet threat had historically served to reinforce the ideological hegemony of the U.S. amongst its capitalist allies. The Cold War alliances established by the U.S. were designed not only to contain the Soviet Union but also to contain its allies, particularly West Germany and Japan (CUMINGS, 1991). The U.S. system of extended deterrence also became a means from the 1970s by which the U.S. was able to extract economic concessions from allies such as Germany and Japan (PARBONI, 1981). Cold War reasoning was a means of disciplining their national security élites into an American conception of world order.

The growing realization within the Bush administration that the Cold War was effectively over prompted a new emphasis on the dangers of 'instability' in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But it was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 that offered both concrete evidence of the end of the Cold War (with U.S.-Soviet co-operation in the UN) and the occasion for a comprehensive realignment of the old Cold War structures of the U.S. geopolitical order. The Gulf crisis and subsequent war were represented as a crusade for a 'new world order' with the U.S. as the uniquely chosen guardian of this order. President Bush in his State of the Union address of 29 January 1991 declared that:

For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens, and requires sacrifice. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom (BUSH, 1991, p. 259).

Rhetorically at least, U.S. national security élites seemed to imagine the world at the end of World War II once again with great powers co-operating and the UN working as it should (i.e. for them). Echoing Henry Luce, Bush ended his address with a call for U.S. citizens to "prepare for the next American century". In switching from the Cold War to promoting a 'new world order' the Bush administration sought to preserve the basic ideological orientation and Cold War structures of the U.S., to recast Cold War alliances in new 'out-of-area' terms, and continue the long-standing war against non-compliant regimes in the Third World. 'Western' security would continue to be run by a small white male internationalist élite.

The viability of this strategy beyond the particular conjuncture of the Gulf War is questionable. Behind the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the end of the Cold War and the triumphalism of the Gulf War is a serious disjunction between economic realities and geopolitical authority in the post-Cold War world which is contributing to an actual 'new world disorder' (CARPENTER, 1991; COX, 1991). First, the U.S. does not enjoy anything like the position, power and influence it did after World War II. Budget and gross federal debt are at record levels. Estimates in 1991 are for a $348 million budget deficit in 1992 with a gross federal debt approaching $3 trillion dollars (Economist, 1991). The 1980s saw the U.S. become the largest debtor nation in the world with a government reliant on huge influxes of foreign capital to finance its ever expanding deficits (CORBRIDGE and AGNEW, 1991). 'Victory' in the Cold War came with a widely recognized sense of irony.

Second, there is now a manifest imbalance between the economic power of states like Japan and Germany and their corresponding diplomatic and military standing. Both states are prisoners of geopolitical structures established by the U.S. in the early Cold War that are now provoking increasing resentment within both states. Neither state has a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Both are likely to be more assertive and independent in their foreign policies. Both may also move to independently acquire nuclear weapons. A more assertive Japan and Germany will have reverberations in the U.S., where the financial and other burdens of military hegemony are provoking increasing disquiet especially since hegemony “no longer translates into an automatic enhancement of economic performance and improved material conditions of life within the territorial boundaries of the United States” (AGNEW, 1992, p. 8). Anti-Japanese and 'America First' sentiments are already vocal features of U.S. political life (Ó TUATHAIL, 1993).
The disjuncture between economic power and geopolitical authority is one, albeit crucial, dimension of the ‘new world disorder’. A second is the uncertain transition to market capitalism in Eastern Europe and the new Commonwealth of Independent States, which promises further upheaval in regions which have thin democratic traditions. A third is the new wave of ethnic and national rivalries in Eurasia that have been released by the thaw in the Cold War. Added to these are the persistent scandals of global income inequalities, unabated militarism (especially in the Middle East), and widespread environmental degradation. Taken together these problems leave the contemporary geopolitical landscape in a very fluid, unstable and disorderly state.

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Notes

1. Kissinger Associates had an estimated turnover of over $6 million a year in 1988. Annual fees to corporate clients, such as Volvo, Union Carbide, Coca-Cola, and American Express, were reported to start at $100,000 and rise to more than $450,000, for which clients would get briefings and advise from Kissinger and his staff of well-connected former government officials. The main commodity Kissinger Associates sold, however, was introductions and access to the power elites of the world (WARNER, 1989; WALKER, 1989a).

2. The notion of ‘testing’ the Soviets was a product of a Cold War script wherein America’s position in the world was considered natural and beyond reproach. Recognition that the U.S. may itself have a Cold War empire was a logical impossibility. Michael Dukakis, in his campaign for president, picked up on this idea, which was elaborated by Graham Allison, one of his foreign policy advisors, in Foreign Affairs [see BLUMENTHAL (1990, Chap. 13) and ALLISON (1988)]. Bush himself also fell back on the notion both in the campaign and during the first year of his administration. Allison later became an advocate of the so-called ‘Grand Bargain’ (along with Soviet economist Gregory Yavlinsky) to provide substantial financial aid to the Soviet Union. Their proposals were rejected at the London Group of Seven meeting in July 1991, with the Bush administration being particularly sceptical. After the August coup attempt, however, the proposals were revitalized.

3. Nixon’s favourite gaming metaphors concern gambling, especially poker. “Making loans to the Kremlin is like laying down chips on the dice table; some bets may pay off but the odds are that in the long run the money will be wasted” (NIXON, 1989, p. 203). See WILLS (1971) for a detailed discussion of Nixon’s discourse.

4. Nixon was firmly opposed to the Grand Bargain proposals in the summer of 1991. The West should provide no aid until the Soviet Union experienced its ‘moment of truth’ (NIXON, 1991). This reasoning, of course, nearly doomed Gorbachev and made Nixon’s analysis a self-fulfilling prophecy.

5. For a comprehensive discussion of chronopolitics see VIRILO (1986).

6. Gorbachev’s major speech on Europe in 1989 was at Strasbourg on 7 July where he reiterated the position he outlined in his book Perestroika: “change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice”. Foreign Ministry spokesman Gershmov first spoke of a ‘Sinatra doctrine’ in Eastern Europe during Gorbachev’s visit to Bonn in June 1989 and during his visit to Finland on 25 October (KELLER, 1989). By this he meant Eastern European countries could go their own way (‘My Way’) according to their own internal dynamics. SHEVARDNAZDE (1991, p. 121) states that the possibility of military intervention in Eastern Europe was ‘completely ruled out’ after April 1985 when Gorbachev came to power. He also notes that it was 1986 when he first realized that German reunification was necessary (p. 131). Interestingly, he describes Soviet thinking as arriving at the conclusion that “sooner or later a new time would arrive in Europe, and that East and West would recover their original geographical meaning, taken from them by postwar politics” (p. 112). The rejection of Cold War geopolitics (‘the old mentality’) involved a reaffirmation of geographical difference.

7. Secretary of State Baker indicated on 27 March that the Bush administration was cautiously considering Kissinger’s proposal for a “second Yalta” conference on Eastern Europe (FRIEDMAN, 1989a). The proposal was later publicly rejected by the administration “[I do not like that kind of geopolitics” (BUSH, 1989b)]. It is possible, given that Bush, like Nixon, had a penchant for secrecy, that some clandestine form of understanding with the Soviets was reached over Eastern Europe some time in 1989.

8. Some within the Western strategic community have argued that the reason why the Soviet Union made such enormous concessions to the West was because of the Reagan build-up which forced the Kremlin to keep pace, thus ruining its economy. CHERNOFF (1991) attempts to test this proposition empirically using levels of defence expenditure. He concludes that the available data provide no support for any connection between the U.S. defence build-up and Soviet policy reversals.

9. In a review of U.S. defence spending and strategic doctrine towards the Third World LUCKHAN (1990, p. 1) concludes that the “United States” imperial vision and preparedness to ‘project power’ globally have not been significantly altered by the demise of the Cold War.”

10. There is some evidence to suggest that the zero-sum
view of security found amongst Cold Warriors is now being used by them and others in discourses concerning economic security. In his recent testimony before Congress to be Director of the CIA, Robert Gates suggested that now the Cold War is over the agency should have a "very aggressive program" to thwart foreign spy services’ attempts to steal secrets from U.S. high-technology companies (Business Week International, 1991). The Gates’s nomination was delayed because of charges that he deliberately slanted intelligence on the Soviet Union to suit the Cold War proclivities of the Bush administration in 1989.

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