WRITING WORLDS

Discourse, text and metaphor in the representation of landscape

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need, not its dismissal. Unfortunately alternative theoretical perspectives on the state, such as Marxism and neoclassical liberalism, deal very inadequately, if at all, with these spatial and territorial issues.

Wider debate of geopolitical issues, with a new range of metaphors linked into other contemporary debates on the relation of space and society, is needed. The form will, however, have to change. Perhaps General Golbery himself identified the crucial issue. In his *Geopolítica do Brasil* (1967) he cites Isaiah Berlin’s (1957) essay on interpretations of history. In this essay Berlin uses the aphorism of Archilochus, ‘The fox knows many things – the hedgehog one big one,’ to compare limited, localized historical interpretations with overarching grand theories. Applying this to geopolitics, Golbery writes:

Geopolitical truth is like a porcupine. [Golbery refers to porcupine rather than hedgehog, presumably to aid familiarity to the Brazilian reader.] It doesn’t know much, but it knows one big thing. And here is the power of geopolitics properly applied. It is robust in perspective, admitted partial, always incomplete, schematic even, and at times fanatic. In the end it unifies and clarifies, and imposes on complex reality its imperative, to plan and to act.

(Golbery 1967; as translated by Hecht and Cockburn 1989)

It is a perceptive observation, revealing many of the strengths of geopolitics, but also qualifying those strengths, qualifications rarely observed in practice. Today, however, perhaps what South America needs are geopolitical truths and analyses like the fox rather than the hedgehog. Political discussions of frontier issues, territorial development, the major objectives of the state, and the form of both internal and external security policy, are all legitimate and necessary, but to try to link them all together into one overarching framework, as the state organism metaphor has done, does a disservice to political debate. We need more limited, fox-like geopolitical studies, and in this the use of various metaphors will remain unavoidable.

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FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE HYPERREAL

The Reagan administration and the scripting of ‘South Africa’

*Gearóid Ó Tuathail*

Many Americans, understandably, ask: given the racial violence, the hatred, why not wash our hands and walk away from that tragic continent and bleeding country? Well, the answer is: we cannot.

In southern Africa, our national ideals and strategic interests come together. South Africa matters because we believe that all men are created equal and are endowed by their creator with unalienable rights. South Africa matters because of who we are. One in eight Americans can trace his ancestry to Africa.

Strategically, this is one of the most vital regions in the world. Around the Cape of Good Hope passes the oil of the Persian Gulf, which is indispensable to the industrial economies of Western Europe. Southern Africa and South Africa are repositories of many of the vital minerals – vanadium, manganese, chromium, platinum – for which the West has no other secure source of supply.

The Soviet Union is not unaware of the stakes… If this rising hostility in southern Africa – between Pretoria and the front-line states – explodes, the Soviet Union will be the main beneficiary. And the critical ocean corridor of South Africa and the strategic minerals of the region would be at risk. Thus, it would be a historic act of folly for the United States and the West – out of anguish and frustration and anger – to write off South Africa.

(President Reagan, ‘Ending Apartheid in South Africa’, address before members of the World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association, 22 July 1986)

The formulation and practice of United States foreign policy towards South Africa has, it is generally agreed, been characterized by greater degrees of continuity than discontinuity during the last two decades (Noer 1985; Bender *et al.* 1985; Minter 1986). Perhaps the most significant contributing factor to that
continuity derives from the remarkably durable representation of ‘South Africa’ as a particular type of place in US foreign policy discourse. United States foreign policy is characterized by a structured way of seeing South Africa which involves, as the quotation from Reagan makes clear, two essential moves. The first is an obligatory act of disavowal. South Africa is a morally repugnant place. The very name ‘South Africa’ offends the moral sensibility of Western society. Few foreign-policy issues demand such a grand gesture of moral rebuke on the part of public leaders – using standard locutions such as ‘abhorrence’ and ‘repugnance’ – as that of apartheid, a situation pervasively represented, in both political and civil society in the West, as a ‘system’ of ‘legalized discrimination’ and ‘racial segregation’ found uniquely in South Africa. Such a set of representations, complete with standardized descriptions and often colourful imagery such as the ‘tragic continent and bleeding country’ impels policy in the direction of moral clarity and unambiguous non-involvement with the government of the Republic of South Africa.

The second move that is characteristic of US foreign policy discourse is one of reinscription. Whereas the first move represents South Africa as a morally repugnant place the second represents the same place as ‘one of the most vital regions in the world’. Within this second set of representations South Africa is a place of ‘strategic interests’, ‘vital minerals’ and some vulnerability to a savvy, preying enemy. Accompanying this set of representations is the scenario that abandoning South Africa would put the ‘critical ocean corridor’ and ‘the strategic minerals of the region at risk’. The United States, by such logic, must be unambiguously involved in safeguarding the security of South Africa. Even though dealing with South Africa involves ‘anguish, frustration and anger’ it would be ‘folly’ on the part of the United States to ‘write off’ that state.

This chapter is an investigation of the structured way of seeing and writing about ‘South Africa’ in US foreign-policy discourse. It seeks to make a case for the following four arguments.

1. United States foreign policy towards the government of the republic has been framed or scoped by two coexistent but often conflictual scripts of South Africa as a place. The term ‘script’, as used here, is meant to describe a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes which are deemed relevant and appropriate to defining a place in foreign policy. The first of these scripts represents ‘South Africa’ as tragedy, whereas the second represents the place as a valuable prize in a global strategic game.

2. These scripts structure the very reality of South Africa for US foreign policy and for Western political and civil society more generally. It is by means of these dominant scripts that the complexities of South Africa – its histories, peoples, places and struggles – are disciplined and rendered broadly meaningful to Western society. Scripts participate in the very constitution of the real, and one can argue, as Baudrillard (1987: 22) does, that events no longer have any meaning because they are preceded by scripts or ‘models with which their own

process can only coincide’. A riot in a township or a mass strike by coal miners, for example, is immediately read as an element in the drama of apartheid and the tragedy of South Africa. A similar strike in a place such as Poland, for example, becomes a scene in a different script, the popular contemporary script concerning the ‘historical failure’ of communism. In both cases one has a script which precedes actual events and appropriates those events as part of itself. The consequence is the marginalization of alternative meanings and alternative scripts (the struggle between capital and labour, for example), even to the extent of ignoring the meanings of the participants themselves. Reality is made by scripts, not by raw events, which are never immanently and univocally meaningful.

3. The operation of scripts in the practice of foreign policy is a useful example of what Jean Baudrillard has described as the ‘hyperreal’. For Baudrillard (1983, 1987) hyperreality is a condition where reality has lost its referent, and models, simulations or scripts of the real become more real than the real itself. Usually identified as a characteristic of late capitalist development or the contemporary era of postmodernity, the condition is closely associated with the development of media technologies, particularly film and television. The blurring of fact and fiction or the real and the imaginary that is said to be characteristic of the hyperreal, however, is hardly a new phenomenon. The very shape of the post-war world was determined, in large part, on the basis of a fantastic reality organized around an immanent Soviet ‘threat’ to the West and an idealized vision of ‘modernization’ in what became known as the ‘Third World’. The principle of hyperreality merely reached a grand apotheosis in the Reagan years with, on one hand, hyperreal threats from Nicaragua (a nation of 3 million), the window of vulnerability (a non-existent nuclear Achilles heel) and terrorism (which claimed fewer US deaths than lightning in 1985; Pringle 1986: 60) and, following on from these, the hyperreal solutions from the contra ‘freedom-fighting founding fathers’, the MX ‘peace keeper’, ‘Star Wars’ and spectacular ‘surgical strikes’ (as if bombing were clean). The case of ‘constructive engagement’, the name given to the Reagan administration’s policy of accommodation with the white racist government in southern Africa, is, I wish to argue, a lesser appreciated example of hyperrealism in US foreign policy.

4. The means by which one is given a ‘South Africa’ to be seen in the contemporary period should be placed within a global political economy context. Scripts, and the metaphors and genres that organize them, are never politically innocent. The dominance of one script over another – why ‘South Africa’ is a ‘tragedy’, for example, and not ‘racial capitalism’ – and the appropriateness of a certain set of predicates and not others to particular situations have tremendous political significance. In helping to constitute a ‘reality’ scripts structure ways of seeing and admit only certain political possibilities as ways of responding to that ‘reality’. They are propagandistic not because they manipulate some supposedly non-discursive real but because they constitute it and attempt to tie it into a persuasive story designed to explain the messy complexity of events in a simple
fashion. Scripts are not screens behind which omnipotent elites work to preserve racism or reproduce capitalism, but they do have a materiality and participate complexly in economic, political and ideological relations of power. One can understand scripts, in a Gramscian fashion, as particular productions of ‘common sense’ upon which a consensual political mythology can be constructed. Elements of that consensual political mythology such as the conjuring up of the Soviet Union as an ‘Other’ and omnipresent threat, the affirmation of the United States as world guardian and exemplary non-racist state, and the pedagogy of capitalism and laissez-faire economics as liberative forces – ‘capitalism will destroy apartheid’ – have been crucial to the functioning of the post-war global political economy, a political economy constructed around the now fading political, economic and ideological hegemony of the United States.

In order to make the investigation manageable and relatively concise this chapter concentrates largely on US foreign policy during the Reagan years from 1981 to 1986, although other material is used. It is divided into two parts, the first documenting the fantasies involved in the strategic representation of South Africa and the second documenting and commenting on the attempt to portray South Africa as a tragedy. The source material is drawn largely from the US Department of State Bulletin (hereafter SDB), a former weekly and now a monthly publication of the US Department of State which provides a record of the public speeches and policies of the US government towards various regions of the world. All the policy statements and speeches recorded in the journal dealing with South and southern Africa from 1981 to 1988 were examined. These include statements by the President, the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the Under-Secretary for Political Affairs and the members of the US delegation to the United Nations. Because such statements are public and designed for wide circulation it is sometimes implied that they are of superficial and not substantive value in understanding how foreign policy really works. Such a naive view relies on a popular and rather simplistic prejudice against rhetoric. The public exposition of foreign policy is never simply a screen, tool or ornament to the actual practice of foreign policy. The public exposition of foreign policy is the practice of foreign policy, for it gives meaning to the variety of concrete practices involved in carrying out a policy. A rhetoric that ignores or refuses to participate in the prevailing norms of political discourse, particularly those concerning what constitutes inconsistency and misrepresentation (i.e. the popular public criteria for defining something as “lies”) will marginalize itself and never be credible and persuasive. It is absolutely crucial to the power of political leaders that their rhetoric is seen to make common sense and appears reasonable to political and civil society. It need not, of course, be an accurate or adequate representation of its object, as is the case with our subject of investigation.

In volume one of Male Fantasies Klaus Theweleit explores the multitude of fantasies clustering around women, floods, bodies and history in the writings and practices of the men of the Freikorps, the proto-fascist volunteer armies in the early Weimar Republic that were later to make up the core of Hitler’s SA (Sturm Abteilung, Storm Troops). The fantasies Theweleit explores were not specific to the Freikorps nor to Weimar but part of what can be described as the collective unconscious of Western civilization for at least 200 years. Much of the basic form of the fantasies concerning women, the body and floods were crucial in giving shape and character to the post-World War 1 political landscape in Europe and elsewhere. George Kennan, one of the key policy-makers involved in the creation of the post-war world, represented the Soviet Union in his famous X article (first published anonymously in Foreign Affairs in July 1947) in the following manner:

Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, towards a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, towards the desired goal.

The image of the Red tide being appealed to here was central to earlier Nazi ideology (‘the Red flood’). The flood was a threat because it represented the transgression of boundaries: it was soft, gushing, unrestrained, anarchic and dangerous. In tandem with this was the representation of the Soviet Union as a desiring ‘Other’ (‘unceasing constant pressure, towards the desired goal’), a role previously historically occupied by the Turks (Said 1979). The predicate field or set of representations constructed around the Soviet Union was that appropriate to the potential rapist. The Soviet Union was aggressive; it was determinedly thrusting outwards; it had long-standing designs on certain vulnerable areas and it cleverly adopted a number of different policies (disguises, e.g. peaceful coexistence) to further its base desire. Given such an historically pre-ordained object – the Soviet Union was this way and there was nothing one could do about it – serious dialogue and diplomacy with the Soviet Union was deemed impossible. The policy of the United States, therefore, must be ‘that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment [of Russian expansive tendencies]’ (Kennan 1947: 575). The consequences of this strategy of containment, as we know, were the unprecedented militarization of the global political economy and the pervasive disciplining of international politics and regional conflicts in terms of its logic. Such a disciplining, in the case of Western Europe, could still be found in the early Bush administration, wherein increasingly anachronistic geopoliticians insisted on representing the Soviet Union and
Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking in foreign policy as a ‘charm offensive’ aimed at the ‘seduction’ of Western Europe.

The hyperreal fantasies of the Cold War were projected on to South and southern Africa like many other regions in the post-World War II period. Appraisals of the strategic significance of the region involved, according to Bowman (1982), ‘four central arguments’. Each is briefly examined in turn.

The Cape route scenario

The commonsense basis of the Cape route fantasy is that there are certain features of the physical geography of the world which, because of their configuration and location, are of great military significance yet extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. Such places are written as ‘choke points’ or, in contemporary strategic parlance, ‘strategic lines of communication’ (SLOCs). The scenario simulated around these choke points involves the premise that it is important for the West to maintain control of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope because this route has become a ‘vital lifeline’ of commercial (freight and oil) and military shipping. In June 1981 Chester Crocker argued that ‘Southern African states form the littoral to one of the most vital lifelines of the industrial democracies’ (SDB, August 1981). The ‘strategic Cape sea route’ was a ‘lifeline of Western commerce’ (Crocker, SDB, June 1982). This fetish with ‘lifelines’, a consequence of geopolitical discourse’s historical representation of space as organic, leads policy planning and scenario construction into sado-masochistic themes. What if a sadistic Other began to choke this ‘lifeline’ of the West or succeeded in slashing this exposed ‘jugular vein’, as the retired General Walker (1980) graphically portrays it on a minimalist map in his book? The use of ‘lifeline’ maps, which represent the flow of oil from the Middle East to Western Europe and North America in terms of a thick line, lends such reasoning qua fantasies a cachet of objectivity, for maps are held to be touchstone documents of objectivity and clarity. Maps are considered uncluttered forms of representation which supposedly provide magical powers of insight (an exhortation to ‘look at the map’) is a common triumphant move in strategic discourse, for ‘reality’ is supposedly mapped on to the page without the distortion of words. Maps, however, as every good cartographer knows, are arbitrary interpretive documents which are not outside or external to discursive reasoning: rather they are part of it (see chapter 13 of this volume).

The ‘South Africa as bulwark’ scenario

Perhaps the most common paranoia of intellectuals of statecraft concerns disease, contamination and the penetration of vital areas by the Other. The paranoia is spatial, for diseases (cancer is a favourite trope of the Cold War because its origins are mysterious and inexplicable; see Sontag 1978) ‘spread’, ‘proliferate’ and ‘diffuse’. Space is also a container which either penetrates or is penetrated, is dominated or contaminated. The self-proclaimed task of the superpower to protect the region threatened by the aggressive Other necessitates the use of, on the one hand, buffers, bulwarks and a cordon sanitaire and, on the other hand, techniques for ‘stripping’ the aggressor and showing his or her true designs. In southern Africa, it is argued, both the Soviet Union and Cuba have made important strategic gains in the last decade by penetrating Angola and Mozambique. Richard Bissell (1979: 220), a former CIA operative, argues that:

the Soviet Union has been in the role of the aggressor, taking up power positions in areas vacated by the West... to the extent that South Africa is seen as detrimental to more extensive Soviet influence in Africa, it has a strategic importance.

The Soviet Union has a ‘desire to disrupt the political and economic system established by the European powers in Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (Bissell 1980: 200), ‘[T]he main thrust,’ according to Roy (1980: 193), of Soviet efforts to attain political influence in ex-colonial territories beyond the borders of the USSR has been in Africa.’ Soviet objectives in southern Africa, according to Crocker in March 1982 (SDB, June 1982), are ‘objectives which would push the people of that area deeper into an environment of chaos, violence, and disorder’. The US, by working for evolutionary change in Namibia and South Africa, will ‘strip the Soviet Union and its surrogates of any excuse they have to continue to fuel violence in southern Africa’ and

strip the Soviet Union not only of any justification that it may put forth to justify its efforts to fan tensions within South Africa itself into a racial war, but we also make it very clear to the people of other African nations and to the world the gravity with which we view developments in southern Africa and the strength of our own policy.

(SDB, June 1982)

The hard, firm strength of US policy has an equivalent in the hard, firm brutality of the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) murderous raids into the front-line states: in the 1980s. Reagan, in July 1986, condemns the South African raids but notes that ‘In defending their society and people, the South African Government has a right and responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists.’ The terrorists, for Reagan, were not the SADF but the ‘Soviet-armed guerillas of the African National Congress’. Such a script of Soviet aggression, terrorism and strength is assembled from the same material as Prime Minister (later President) Botha’s ‘total onslaught’ scenario (address of 21 March 1980). It had the forces of international communism ‘encircling the Republic of South Africa’ under the guidance of the planners in the Kremlin’, whose goal it is to ‘overthrow the republic and create chaos in its stead, so that the Kremlin can establish hegemony here’ (Botha, quoted in Bowman 1982: 164). The similarity (some would argue, collusion) of scripts was further evidenced in the United States’ championing of the original South African argument that Namibian inde-
pendence must be linked with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Such a formal linkage between the two issues put, as Minter (1986: 316) correctly notes, Namibian independence — a cause with virtually universal international and legal legitimacy — on the same level as Angola’s sovereign decisions on self-defence against South Africa.

Arguments supporting the value of South Africa point to the fact that it can monitor Soviet traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, its military strength deters the ‘spread’ of conventional Soviet forces in the southern African region and it co-operates with a number of US allies around the world, in particular Taiwan and Israel. For Bissell (1979: 227) it was ‘an outpost of orderliness and well-managed enterprises in a region of disorder and highly uncertain political futures’. For Reagan, in response to a question from Walter Cronkite in 1981, it was a country that ‘has stood by us in every war we’ve ever fought, a country that is strategically essential to the free world’ (Minter 1986: 315).

The ‘South Africa as a regional power’ scenario

The construction of certain actors as regionally dominant powers has been an important element in post-war US defence strategy. Dulles’s ring of regional alliances in the 1950s was given a new codification in the 1970s in what became known as the ‘Nixon doctrine’. This envisaged a number of regional powers who would be responsible for their own and Western security interests in their respective areas. Instead of direct US military intervention the US government would supply certain chosen ‘local Leviathans’ or regional policemen with adequate military hardware.2 South Africa was conceptualized as one such regional policeman in National Security Study memorandum No. 39, written in 1969 and leaked to the press in 1974. Option two, the favoured track of the Nixon administration and regarded by Coker (1986) as the first formal articulation of ‘constructive engagement’, was premised on the assumption that ‘The whites are here to stay [in power] and the only way the constructive change can come about is through them’ (El-Khawas and Cohen 1976: 105). This assumption later proved to be disastrously flawed in the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, but the Reagan administration continued the pursuit of ‘constructive change’ through a white racist minority in the case of the republic.

The position of the Reagan administration with regard to regional powers is replete with tensions, paradoxes and ironies. It has been the stated position of US administrations that Africa should not be a theatre of East–West conflict or competition (see, for example, Crocker, in SDB, January 1984). This itself presents a contradiction, for it is the US, the leading Western power, that has determined it. Crocker adds that ‘our strategic goal in Africa is to limit and thwart the application of outside force in African conflicts and thereby to permit Africans to shape their own futures’. In October 1981 (SDB January 1982) and in 1982 (SDB, December 1982) he states that it is the United States’ policy to establish the ‘rules of the game among the most powerful nations that will limit the application of external force’ (SDB, January 1982) in African conflicts. The US has the strategic goal of not letting anyone have strategic goals; it wants to establish the rules so that Africans can establish the rules; it engages in intervention so that there can be no interventionism! Once again one finds disavowal and reinscription.

The criteria for determining outsiders and interventionism from genuine Africans and mutual co-operation is even more ironic. Libyans and people who carry Soviet weapons are outsiders, aggressors and adventurists, as are the Cubans. Violence for these outsiders is not a means to achieve national self-determination or to end apartheid but ‘an end in itself, a political vehicle to enhance external influence and permit the political and ideological subjugation of independent Africa’ (Lawrence Eagleburger, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, 23 June 1983, SDB, August 1983). The purpose of this violence is to turn the landscape of southern Africa into ‘an enlarged version of Lebanon’. The people trained by the US military assistance personnel in Zaire, Kenya, Somalia, Morocco, the Sudan and Egypt are, by contrast, Africans who are dedicated to a non-aligned and independent (i.e. westernized and anti-communist) Africa. There are two types of involvement in southern Africa: legitimate ‘aid’ and mutual co-operation, and interventionism and opportunism. United States military aid, Western capital and transnational profit-seeking are non-interventionist, constructive, mutually beneficial and enlightened. Soviet and Cuban activities are exploitative, cynical and a distortion of the natural order:

In this environment [of economic crisis], outside powers are tempted to exploit instability. There is no excuse for some 35,000 Cuban troops in Africa — trained, equipped, financed, and transported by the Soviet Union — inserting themselves into local conflicts, and thereby internationalizing local problems. This Soviet/Cuban meddling has no precedent; it distorts African nonalignment; it injects an East–West dimension where none should be, making fair solutions harder to achieve.

(George Shultz, February 1984, SDB, April 1984)

The power of such an example of scripting is in its scopeing of a world wherein US values and principles are the horizon from which all else is judged. Order, moderation, balance, communication and the constructive are, by definition, equivalent with the United States. These are self-evident truths.

The ‘strategic minerals’ scenario

The ‘strategic minerals’ argument in relation to South and southern Africa is premised on the rather dubious assumption that Western industrialized consumers, not underdeveloped Third World producers, are becoming increasingly dependent on the international trade in certain key ‘strategic’ minerals. Energy and strategic minerals are the equivalent of food in the language of Western strategic discourse. A ready and plentiful supply of these minerals is
necessary, it is argued, for the maintenance of national defence capacity and the smooth functioning of industrial economies. The pervasive concern of strategic planners and other intellectuals of statecraft is with the geographically defined concentration of these minerals in only a few places. Southern Africa, it is claimed, is a Persian Gulf of minerals. The Republic of South Africa is the world’s leading producer of chromium, vanadium and antimony. It possesses a major share of the known world reserves of these minerals and produces significant proportions of the world’s supply. The only major reserves of these minerals outside southern Africa are to be found in the USSR and China. The scenario simulated from these ‘realities’ is that any radical transformation in southern Africa will jeopardize the West’s access to essential minerals (SDB, January and December 1982). The West cannot let the Soviets take control of these resources. A long-term rise in the price of minerals ‘would bleed the West of its economic vitality and raise defence costs prohibitively’ (Bissell 1979: 218).

Ortona (1980: 206) argues that the ‘master plan’ of the Soviets in this ‘era of the resource war’ ‘is the gradual cutting of the jugular vein of the flux of energy supplies to the Western side’.

A number of commentators in the United States have taken issue with the scenarios simulated from the given facts of mineral demand and mineral production. Price (1978, 1981, 1982) argues quite persuasively – it is not difficult, given the hyperrealism – that the notion of a resource war in southern Africa is ‘a fantasy’ and ‘any government in power [in South Africa], whatever its ideological slant, would be locked into selling its industrial raw materials to the West just as the West is locked into buying them’ (Price 1982: 64). What such arguments do not question is the very wording of the issue from the outset, for the supposed ‘realities’ or ‘facts’ concerning ‘strategic minerals’ are themselves questionable. Many so-called ‘strategic minerals’ are arbitrarily such, with greater significance for private capital accumulation than for national security. A significant proportion of the United States’ imported chrome is used in the automobile industry. Cobalt is an important raw material for the aero-space industry. It is ironic, given the concern with concentration, that the economic concentration of extraction and distribution in the hands of a few transnationals is never a matter of concern. Even more ironic is the adherence of most strategic thinkers to neoclassical economic philosophies wherein scarcity is not conceivable because of the ‘magic of the market place’. The fact that South Africa relies on Western markets for 89 per cent of its mineral production (Coker 1986: 22) would seem to indicate that it is South Africa, not the West, which is the dependent party. The ‘facts of geography’, whether they concern the Cape route or the location of certain minerals, have more to do with choices made by industry than with constraints imposed by the earth.

The ‘realities’ of strategy in the post-war period have a peculiar unreality to them. The proud ‘realism’ of the Western strategic community is a realism which in its very operation has produced some of the wildest, most exaggerated strategic fantasies of the post-war period. The strategic real, in the post-war period, has consistently been a hyperreal, a condition wherein the model of the real – in this case, strategic scenarios – has become more real than the real itself. The boundary between fact and fiction, realism and fantasy, blurs into indistinguishability, and places like Vietnam, El Salvador and South Africa become the scenes of fantastic hyperreal threats to Western civilization. The proliferation of threats is an integral part of the post-war global political economy and a very effective means of disciplining people and politics. The hyperreal threat from communism, both within and outside the Western community, provided a justification for the permanent development of an enormous peacetime military establishment supplied, supported and serviced by a burgeoning military industrial complex. Whether it be ‘South Africa’ or ‘Star Wars’, the fantasies of strategy are what keeps this configuration of power and political economy in business.

THE TRAGEDY OF ‘SOUTH AFRICA’

We Americans are witness to a mounting tragedy in South Africa that stirs our emotions and prompts us to ask ourselves those very American questions: what can we do about apartheid? What can we do about the violence and destruction it generates and about the spillover effects of South Africa’s trauma on its many neighbors? ... We have concluded that, despite narrowing odds, we should be doing all we can to reverse an impending tragedy ... (‘The US Approach to South Africa’, statement by Secretary of State George Shultz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July 1986, reprinted in SDB, September 1986)

The appeal to ‘realism’ and ‘strategic interests’ has, historically, proved to be a standard effective means of generating attention, support and legitimacy for the conduct of US foreign policy. An even more effective means of generating support and spontaneous consent for foreign policy, historically, has been the use of what the strategic community understands as ‘idealistic’ themes. Within the United States at least, a foreign policy that is explained and understood in universalist terms (e.g. safeguarding freedom and promoting democracy throughout the world) has a greater positive force and constituency than a foreign policy principally articulated and understood in narrow strategic terms, terms that can be popularly stigmatized as amoral, detached and even un-American. United States foreign policy is typically a mix of both ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, with strategic simulations and fantasies (e.g. tumbling dominoes in South East Asia or Central America) and idealist simulations and fantasies (e.g. South Vietnam or El Salvador as ‘democratic’) existing side by side. In the case of the Republic of South Africa the idealist simulations and fantasies that coexist with the strategic ones revolve around what Shultz and others demarcate as the
Impending tragedy of South Africa and the heroic role (‘despite narrowing odds’) of the United States.

Tragedy is a genre with its own particular set of structures and rules. While there are many different types of tragedy one can, nevertheless, identify how a certain set of literary conventions work to produce that which is recognizably tragic. Tragedy involves the violation of a just and natural moral order. It usually concerns a sickness or madness that infects a person or place considered rich and full of promise. Unnatural conditions and abnormal affairs result. The leading protagonist is caught in the vortex of a tragic movement brought on by the existence of a fatal flaw. This flaw is a human flaw, something recognizably corrupt yet something to which all people, at one time or another, are vulnerable. Its presence provokes an anguish conflict of emotions within the leading protagonist between the moral and the immoral, the light and the dark. Throughout the unfolding of tragedy one feels empathy – the key tragic emotion – for those caught up in its movement. One identifies with the torn protagonist while simultaneously recognizing the evil brought about by the fatal flaw. Inevitability is a key element in tragedy, for the fatal flaw not only brings abnormality and convulsion but carries its protagonists forward to what is a foreseen cataclysmic end. With the abnormality cleansed, the social order returns to its natural state.

The ‘South Africa’ scripted in US foreign policy discourse is not a complete but a ‘mounting’ or ‘impending’ tragedy. Its representation as such is bitterly ironic, given the strategic fantasies just examined. There conspiracy was the organizing narrative: every move of the Soviet Union, Cuba and their ‘surrogates’ was imbued with significance and malicious, cynical intent. Competitive gaming metaphors predominated – moves, stakes, blueprints, prizes, hands, pawns, – while exhortations to awaken from slumber (a favourite strategic metaphor) and remain vigilant framed policy discussions. The 400-year-old history of white domination, exploitation and control of the black community in southern Africa, by contrast, is a ‘tragedy’. The consciously created and systematically constructed system of apartheid is presented as the consequence of a moral failing, not a cynical racial plot. Apartheid is a fatal flaw, not the latest in a long history of schemes violently to suppress black power and ensure white supremacy. The white minority government is a locus of empathy, not an implacable enemy. Its intentionality is ambivalent (it too wants to be rid of apartheid), not cynical and hard-boiled. The situation is a tragic flow of events, not a brutal and violent game of power. As a means of understanding some of the details of how such a script is written and held in place analysis of the US foreign policy discourse is organized under three different dramaturgic headings.

Background and immediate setting

There is a remarkable consistency in the way in which the setting of South and southern Africa is described in US foreign-policy documents. The State Depart-
of less developed peoples and help lead them to the promised land. Africa can become a variant of the American story, which itself is a variant of biblical themes. Africa, like America, is a chosen land: it has been richly endowed with talents and resources but it faces a challenge in the form of ‘racial strife’ that it must overcome before it reaches the light (‘bright prospects for all its peoples’).

The representation of Africa as ‘a continent of great promise’ (Shultz, SDB, December 1988) and southern Africa as a region of great potential contrasts sharply with the stark reality of the continent. The 1980s, Marum (1989: 159) remarks, have been a period of ominous economic, social and environmental decline, with depressed world commodity prices, declining agricultural production, increasing desertification, crippling drought, rising external debt and endemic civil and inter-state warfare. It is the mythological background of great promise, however, that helps drive the tragedy story line.

The immediate setting of the drama is in a troubled and controversial land. Shultz’s portrait of ‘South Africa’ before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 July 1986 is of a country not at ease with itself. Certain actions beget others and the consequences accumulate until a series of interconnected deeds roll towards what seems an inevitable calamity:

Politics in South Africa is increasingly polarized and shrill; suspicion and mistrust abound. The youth, black and white, are being schooled in a style of politics that sees violent retribution, rather than open debate, as the natural reaction to any expression of views different from their own. The rising violence provokes terrorism from extremists on all sides... Soviet-armed ANC guerrillas have embarked upon expanded terrorist violence inside South Africa, dragging neighboring states inexorably into a cauldron of conflict with the South African Government increasingly eager to shift the blame for its internal woes to its neighbors. The MPLA regime in Angola, encouraged by massive Soviet arms shipments, has used South African attacks and internal problems as an excuse to suspend negotiations and pursue an illusory military option against UNITA... The fundamental cause of all this damage is the system of apartheid and the mounting and inevitable reaction to it.

(SDB September 1986)

South Africa, a place of ‘extraordinary resources and talent’, is not as it should be: politics is polarized and shrill, suspicion and mistrust abound and the young are learning the opposite of that which they should be naturally taught. Like Denmark in Hamlet or Scotland after the murder of the king in Macbeth, the country is seized by an unnatural sickness: one has tremendous social upheaval, riots, states of emergency, boycotts, disruptions of trade, sanctions and the subversion of the democratic process. Violence and destruction abound. The region is a ‘cauldron of conflict’, things are illusory and protagonists are eager to deceive. The root cause of this unnatural state of affairs is the ‘system of apartheid’, the great fatal flaw that has provoked a mounting and inevitable reaction.

The United States condemns unequivocally the system of apartheid. The Administration of President Reagan holds apartheid directly responsible for the tragic events occurring at this time in South Africa.


The factor that defines the drama of ‘South Africa’ more than any other is apartheid. The word, an Afrikaans one meaning ‘apart-ness’, has become an infamous, untranslatable idiom for a universally condemned system of racial oppression. The very definition of ‘South Africa’ by means of this singular infamous idiom and the set of descriptions by which apartheid is known are highly significant. Apartheid has its own script: it is held to have begun in 1948 after the electoral victory of the Nationalist Party, to be a unique phenomenon found only in the republic and Namibia, to be a system which has an institutionalized basis in law, and to be a mechanism of racial separation and discrimination. Among the many definitions one can find in the Bulletin are: ‘a system of institutionalized discrimination’ (Richard Moose, Carter’s first Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, SDB, 19 December 1977), ‘institutionalized racial domination’ (Donald McHenry, US Ambassador to the United Nations, 13 June 1980, SDB, September 1980), a ‘system of legalized racism’ (Patricia Dierian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 13 May 1980, SDB, October 1980) and a ‘rigid system of racial segregation’... (President Reagan, 22 July 1986, SDB, September 1986). ‘Our own history,’ Reagan states, ‘teaches us that capitalism is the natural enemy of such feudal institutions as apartheid.’ ‘Apartheid, South Africa’s system of legally enshrined racism,’ a statement from the Working Group on South and Southern Africa (SDB, September 1986) declared, ‘is contrary to the principles of liberty and equality of opportunity on which the United States was founded.’

The commonsense quality of these descriptions belies their significance. What they scope is a simplified world wherein (in contrast to earlier) the United States is the opposite of South Africa and a mythological world of capitalism the opposite of a mythological world of apartheid. In South Africa one has apartheid, feudalism, legalized racism, a rigid system and racial domination. In the United States one has no apartheid, capitalism, equality of opportunity, liberty, flexibility and freedom. The policy implications, crudely put, are that the solution to apartheid — an unnatural phenomenon — is the Americanization of South Africa. South Africa needs the revolutionizing power of capitalism and American industry. The creation of a supposed ‘New South’ in the southern states of the USA since the 1960s is sometimes evoked as a model for South Africa. Andrew Young, the Carter administration’s first ambassador to the UN,
The waste of the good

It is the white racist government that is the ultimate locus of empyrean in US foreign policy discourse. Chester Crocker, in the article which won him the post of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the Reagan administration (1980), portrays Botha as a potentially tragic figure 'trapped between reform and the need for repression between right and left'. It is an ordered world, a Christian world and a prospering South Africa (the mythologised 'white' state) is a free part of the West, with recognizably white features. It is the world, after all, much more familiar that of the white community. It is an ordered world, a free press a loyal military subordinate, a credible democracy, a recognisable order which violates the moral order. South Africa is part of the West yet in its violent
maintenance of apartheid it is untrue to its soul of goodness." It thus suffers and lives uncomfortably. There is no tragedy in the destruction of evil; the tragedy is that it involves the 'waste of the good' (Bradley 1949: 37).

The potential waste of the good involves not only South African whites but the South African economy. The tremendous effort the Reagan administration put into the task of warding off substantive Congressional sanctions was revealing. Not only did it demonstrate a double standard — sanctions were a legitimate means of policy towards Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union but not South Africa — but the issue touched a real sensitivity (it was something worth fighting about). The terms used to describe those who sincerely held that sanctions (something leaders in the black community, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions requested) could be an effective instrument of policy were reminiscent of earlier descriptions of Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. Those who supported sanctions were frustrated primitives who wanted hot emotional satisfaction. Speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Vernon Walters declared that

apartheid will not be undone by demagogic posturing and sloganeering. Exhortations to bloody revolution, calls for mandatory sanctions and hypocritical talk about liberation ... will not bring peace. Ending apartheid is a task that demands more than hot rhetoric, no matter how emotionally satisfying it may be.

(SDB, January 1986)

Sanctions were supposedly self-evidently negative, 'a "cop-out,"' cloaked in a fastidious false piety' (Crocker, SDB, January 1984). They represented an ‘“ostrich” policy’, a turning of one’s back on South Africa, a washing of one’s hands, a rejection of influence. Americans were builders, not destroyers. Indignation alone was not a policy. The frequent repetition of this stock set of descriptions was accompanied by the argument that critics of Reagan administration policy are ‘misguided’ and ‘distort’ that policy. In the wake of Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Tutu’s criticism of ‘constructive engagement’ and call for sanctions Crocker argued that “Bishop Tutu has a considerable degree of lack of information and misunderstanding as to what it is that we stand for.” The statement, which is potentially racist and certainly paternalistic, is indicative of the fundamental failure of US policy to appreciate the black experience of apartheid. The world of US foreign policy and the world of the South African black community are not the same. If the Reagan administration was close to any South African world it was to that of the white population, for it spoke their language on sanctions and reproduced their paternalism — ‘we know what is best’ — in its foreign policy.

Despite the Reagan administration’s protestations to the contrary the debates surrounding sanctions represented a case where the US was, for the first time in years, directly facing up to its participation in the maintenance of apartheid. The South African situation was being confronted, not avoided, and the exercise of influence was being considered, not rejected. In late 1986 the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 and overrode a subsequent presidential veto. It instituted a set of limited and inexpensive sanctions against the republic, including a ban on certain imports (excluding strategic minerals), a termination of South African Airways’ landing rights in the USA and a ban on new investments. The phrase ‘constructive engagement’, which had been effectively rendered unacceptable in political and civil society (by virtue of the divestment movement and projects such as the Sun City record and music video). The passing of sanctions did not debunk but recast the heroic US role. Interviews with pro- and anti-sanctions advocates were said to reveal more concern for being on the ‘right side’ of the issue than for strategic or realistic thinking about how best to facilitate fundamental reform (Marcum 1989: 172). How US political and civil society sees and understands the issue, however, is not necessarily how it is seen and understood among the black community of southern Africa. United States foreign policy has not moved to aid such established liberation organizations as the African National Congress, nor has it even explicitly called for one person, one vote. Coexisting with a certain fascination with the black community in the social unconscious of Western society is a dark fear of black power and difference. Stories of communism and scenarios of anarchy and crazed violence still find their way into discussions of the ANC. The ANC, according to Shultz after his meeting with Oliver Tambo in January 1987, needed to ‘think seriously’ about its strategy (‘violence’ to Shultz but ‘justice’ to others). Much has been made of the practice of ‘necklacing’, whereby black collaborators with apartheid are draped with a petrol-filled tyre and set alight. Although the ANC has condemned the practice Senator Jesse Helms, President Reagan and others would frequently use it to stir the social unconscious of the white population (black violence as crazed, irrational and demonic). The preferred solution of US foreign policy is probably ‘a good multiracial oligarchy’ (the phrase is Gavin Kelly’s, chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation: Lelyveld 1985: 234) where apartheid would survive, an apartheid with a human face, a face that could be brown or black. In this collective dream of transnational capital apartheid would still exist on the ground but be no more in reality, their reality.

CONCLUSION

The contemporary practitioners of foreign policy, whether they be hardheaded strategic thinkers or teleprompted great communicators, like to think of themselves and their activity as ‘realist’. By this they understand themselves to be incisive, unsentimental and non-ideological readers of world politics — the kind of people who resist giving into ‘anguish and frustration and anger’ and thereby committing acts of ‘folly’ like writing off South Africa. But isn’t this move part of the ideology of foreign policy? The making of foreign policy is a cultural practice like any other, and proclamations of ‘realism’ are one of its rituals. So is the
evocation of tribal enemies (the cynical or emotionally hot Other who glories in violence and destruction), the celebration of tribal mythology (America as frontier, progress, future), the reaffirmation of a moral centre (avoiding the 'extremism' on both sides) and the investment of faith in tribal remedies (enlightened business practices, the revolutionary power of capitalism). The proud realists are proud mythologists, the skilled story-tellers of their tribal community. Their scripts are hyperreal artefacts of genuine power, stories which, while illusory, are simultaneously real. They drive much of the accumulation process in the US and have, historically, enabled regularized contract and cooperation between Western governments, transnational capital and white South African racists while, at the same time, preserving - though at times with difficulty - the legitimacy and reasonableness of this contract.12

What, then, is the task of the critical intellectual, given this situation? One response, a common one, is to insist on an alternative script, a different real, a repressed reality that is systematically distorted or misrepresented by official policy discourse. The strategy is problematic not only because of the attribution of omniscient intentionality to official policy (people are being duped by scurrilous politicians) but because it too relies on the assumption of an immanently real South Africa, a truth uncontaminated by ideology, language or discourse. A different response is to play with the illusion of the real and the power it exerts. Irony and paradox become one's allies in a skirmish war against official conceptualizations of the real (stories, for example, of Cuban troops guarding US enterprise – Gulf Oil – in Cabinda). One issues a challenge, in Baudrillard's (1987: 46) terms, to the 'real' – the attempt is to put the real, quite simply, on the spot. To the extent that this latter practice refuses to grant an objectivity to the world or put a closure on meaning, such would seem to make it different from the former. But can it proceed without some notion of the former, without some conception of a real South Africa which is different from the scripts we are given? I think not. The strategy of critical intellectual practice should never involve abandoning the 'real': what it does involve is a refusal to let the powerful in our global political economy represent it without contestation.

NOTES

1 One of the best documentations and critiques of the fantasy world of development and modernization is Dorfman and Martelart (1975). Representations of the Soviet threat too had a cartoon-like, 'larger than life' quality to them.

2 For examples of such 'lifeline' maps and such reasoning see Kemp (1977: 51, 1978), Lewis (1976), Hanks (1981: 21, 1983: 11) and the recent editions of Goode's School Atlas. It is worth noting that the original Goode's School Atlas (first edition 1932: 39) represents the production of petroleum by green circles, with areas in proportion to the output of various countries. 'Lifelines' of petroleum, given ample US domestic production, were not a concern then.

3 It is noteworthy that 'South Africa' for the white racist regime is a mythical predominantly white state which is periodically spoken of as if it were not even located in Africa! See Lelyveld (1983).

4 The Carter administration moved away from sole reliance on this strategy to develop a US-based mobile combat unit which could be flown to 'hot spots' in a matter of hours. The unit subsequently became known as the Rapid Deployment Force.

5 Why there was a dramatic increase in oil traffic around the Cape in the 1970s, for example, was due to a cost-minimization, profit-maximization decision by oil companies to build supertankers. Supertankers are too big for the Suez Canal.

6 The distinction between totalitarian (not open to reform) and authoritarian (potentially open to movement towards democracy) governments was popularized in the Reagan administration by Jeane Kirkpatrick, the Reagan administration's pugnacious first Ambassador to the UN.

7 The equally conflictual emotions of Nelson Mandela and Bishop Tutu – can the use of violence be justified to combat the daily structural violence of apartheid? – do not resonate with Western intellectuals of statecraft in the same way the governance dilemmas of the South African state do.

8 The Guardian greeted the drastic press clamp-down of December 1986 with the headline 'South Africa turns its back on the West.'

9 Senator Christopher Dodd, who questioned Crocker on his statement in Senate hearings, noted that Tutu was 'not just any black leader from South Africa' but to 'many people in this country, indeed, around the world he is the most prominent' ('US Policy towards South Africa', hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, 24 April, 2 and 22 May 1985, p. 129).

10 Winnie Mandela's apparent glorification of revolutionary violence ('By our necklaces we will set ourself free') has similarities not only with Franz Fanon but also Thomas Jefferson, who wished the tree of liberty to be periodically watered with blood.

11 Like a law, it would be 'abolished'. Like a machine, it would be 'dismantled'. Like the form of capitalism it is, it will restructure.

12 The extent to which capitalism runs on fantasies and illusions is not always appreciated. One cannot avoid confronting the question in the contemporary period, for global financial markets, state budgets, capital restructuring and defence spending all run on an increasingly fantastic economics.

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