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Present at the (Dis)integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order

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Twenty Questions: The New Foreign Policy Game

It is the 1990s, and everything is changing. The Cold War order of superpower rivalry, East/West bloc formation, ideological competition, and North/South economic friction has imploded, giving way to that which President Bush once prematurely and optimistically labeled “the New World Order.” In this new world order, strange tendencies are emerging. Previously stable territorial formations—nation-states, ideological blocs, global markets, or ethnonational communities—are devolving into unsettling convulsive chaos, while typically unstable extraterritorial flows—communication networks, trade arrangements, cultural codes, or capital reserves—are evolving into new coherent cohesions.

Politically, for example, things are falling apart. The Soviet Union has collapsed. Germany reunified, but the new European Union, after the effective collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the limp endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty, is striving to stay unified. The Warsaw Pact has disappeared, and now some of its ex-members want to join NATO. The governments of Italy, Japan, Brazil, and France are rife with scandalous corruption. Czechoslovakia has split up. The U.S. maintains security in Kuwait, Panama, Kurdistan, Macedonia, and Somalia, but its inner city schools, neighborhoods, and parks resemble Beirut or Sarajevo (Davis 1993). Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims are at war on the Indian subcontinent. Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece again are becoming the Balkans. South Africa is becoming Yugoslavia. Israel is becoming like South Africa, while the PLO is acquiring real estate in Gaza and Jericho. Families in America’s inner cities are enticed to turn over their semiautomatic pistols for gift certificates at Toys ‘R’ Us, while State Department delegations fly to Minsk, Kiev, and Alma Ata with millions in aid trying to induce Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to dispose of their nuclear weapons. Islamic fundamentalists are shooting up buses and tourists in world trade peripheries, like Egypt, while blowing up janitors and garages in World Trade Centers, like Manhattan. Former Communist Russian ultra-nationalists are becoming comradely with German neo-Nazis and Serbian ethnic cleansers. Once again, as in 1914, events in Sarajevo seem to define a world of chaotic fragmentation.

Economically, systems are running wild. McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and American dollars are everywhere. Overnight jet flights and international direct dialing to North America afford the basic infrastructure for South American narccapitalism. Nissan and other Japanese firms are firing workers and closing plants in Japan. Ford is manufacturing vehicles badged and sold as Mazdas. Parts of Africa are returning to a hunting and gathering economy. Russia’s markets are often empty and its factories are idle, but billions in oil, metals, lumber, and weapons are smuggled, like dope from Bolivia or Burma, to foreign markets through Kaliningrad. Moscow’s GUM department store has a Benetton, while the city’s nouveau riche mafia

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"entrepreneurs" ostentatiously zoom around in German BMW's and Mercedes Benz's, courtesy, in many cases, of lucrative car theft rings operating in Western Europe. Bloomingdale's sells Red Army watches at the costume jewelry counter. Cold War surplus weapons are selling like hotcakes in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. Communist China's "military" industries are making millions selling knock-off running shoes to Singapore traders and reverse-engineered strategic rockets to Saudi princes. And, capitalist California's "civilian" businesses are soaking in red ink unable to sell B-2s, battleship berths, or ballistic missiles to Foggy Bottom bureaucrats, who are keeping the U.S. government "sovent" by borrowing over a billion dollars a day more than they collect in public revenues.

Culturally, unities are dissolving and centers are not holding. Karaoke machines offer ancient Motown hits to American corporate managers, Hong Kong entrepreneurs, and German sex tourists in Thailand. Croatian-Canadian teenagers in Ontario hold car washes to buy weapons in South Africa for Zagreb's war efforts. Meech Lake and Charlottetown are Balkanizing Canada. Global superband U2 entertains stadium audiences in Europe with channel surfing spectacles and live phone calls to the White House and trapped victims in Sarajevo. Meanwhile Croatian, Moslem, and Serbian snipers listen to heavy metal on Sony Walkmans as they shoot up each other's families. Some of Iran's, Pakistan's, Libya's, and Mexico's largest urban populations are located in Paris, London, Milan, and Los Angeles. Disneyland now claims territory in Europe, Asia, and North America. On twenty-four hour cable news broadcasts, media fascination with Nancy Kerrigan's wounded knee and John Bobbitt's severed penis eclipse the purge of pro-Western reformers in Russia and the paralysis of United Nations' peacekeepers in Bosnia.

The drift of these events is complex and contradictory. Nonetheless, there are shifts that can be seen as moving towards deterritorialization and reterritorialization at the same time and in the same spaces. The comfortable division of ideological blocs and nation-states set down territorially by the Cold War is being shredded, but also rewoven, in the uncomfortable reterritorialization of old ethnicities and new economies (Taylor 1993). All of these tendencies, in turn, reconfirm Harvey's (1989:238) observation that "time and space both get defined through the organization of social practices fundamental to commodity production," and that the dynamic relations of capital accumulation coupled with social resistance to commodification "renders the relations unstable." Since any struggle to reorganize power relations must reconstitute their spatial expression, the territorial containment of power finds capital accumulation strategies—whether they are deployed by individuals, firms, or states—continuously "deconstructing that social power by re-shaping its geographical bases" (Harvey 1989:238). Out of the disintegrating certainties of the Cold War, then, comes both expressions of deterritorialization and projects of reterritorialization as the old world maps that guaranteed meaning and direction in the Cold War give way to emergent new word orders that seek to reweave the unraveling threads of the familiar into new maps of meaning. President Clinton very consciously compares the early 1990s to the late 1940s, when President Truman took office and, together with his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, spent two or three years defining the institutions and ideas that would become the contours of the Cold War map of meaning in global politics (Acheson 1969). No longer facing a single, overwhelmingly powerful adversary, the U.S. today lacks both a map of its own identity in global affairs and a workable image of gamesmanship to define its current role. Asked whether or not the game of chess or poker best typifies American foreign policy today, President Clinton recently claimed, "Poker is closer than chess. You could play poker with quite a number of actors. We live in a world where there are still an enormous number of problems that still threaten our interests and our values. . . . Sometimes I almost feel instead of poker or chess, it is Twenty Questions" (Hoagland 1993:A21).

This paper seeks to present a critical survey of the cross-cutting double dynamic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in the new wor(l)d (dis)order. It cannot provide the final word on these matters, but it will give a provisional reading of still inchoate flows. Our focus is on the shifting contours of American political discourse, both within official policy circles and within public discourse as a whole, the former being inevitably shaped, refined, and eroded.
by the permanent institutions (mass media, think tanks, and educational centers) that produce the latter. We have divided the paper into two parts. Part one addresses the dynamic of deterritorialization, the unraveling of world order, and makes particular reference to the presidential campaign of 1992. Part two addresses the emergent attempts within American political discourse to re-inscribe a new geography of meaning to global affairs and to find the place of the United States within it. In each part, we begin from the traditional understandings of the geopolitical and geoeconomic as rough organizational devices; in part two, however, we speculate on a third emergent locus of governmentality: the geoecological. As we shall see, these very analytic categories are themselves dissolving in the chaotic discursive/material transformations that both are disintegrating old geopolitical formations and building new geographic blocs in global affairs.

A Deterritorializing World Order

Geopolitical Vertigo

For nearly four decades, capital accumulation and state power were contained in a Cold War territoriality defined by two ideologically defined and superpower-policed blocs—the U.S./NATO/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bloc against the U.S.S.R./Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)/Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) bloc (Luke 1989a:229–236). If territoriality expresses the workings of sovereignty, property, discipline, surveillance, and jurisdiction (Soja 1989:150), then these two blocs clearly fit. From Greece, Korea, and China to Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan, an American-led ensemble of discipline/surveillance/sovereignty claimed jurisdiction over the West’s property as it faced a Soviet-guided bloc of sovereignty/surveillance/discipline seeking property over the East’s jurisdiction.

The Bush administration was slow to acknowledge the end of this Cold War territoriality in 1989 (O Tuathail 1992; Luke 1989b). As the historian Bruce Cummings (1992:91) has noted, “[a]t the precise moment when Gor-bachev was dismantling his empire and calling for a new world order, and when the last of the East European Stalinist systems were crumbling, George Bush decided to invade Panama.” The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 provided the occasion for the eventual acknowledgment by the Bush administration that the rules of global politics had indeed changed. However, the Bush administration’s New World Order was made out of the very same rhetorical material as the Cold War, and it was designed to re-charge its institutions with a new mandate (Luke 1991). The President spoke of America’s unique responsibility to bring freedom to the rest of the world (Bush 1991), and, once again, a permanent state of alert was seen as imperative for the U.S. as leader of the free world. The old Cold War military-industrial complex seemed as necessary as ever as “instability” became the new discourse of danger. Although the New World Order suggested a recognition of one deterritorialization of world politics in the wake of the disappearance of the Soviet threat, as the blocs formed by East/West or capitalist/communist struggle collapsed, it attempted to reterritorialize world politics by keeping familiar Western geopolitical structures intact albeit with the United States as “the sole remaining superpower”—a phrase that comfortably defined the new situation for many American foreign-policy makers. The United States was still “bound to lead,” and Germany and Japan were summoned to follow (Nye 1990).

Even before the summer of 1991, however, the Bush administration was backing away from its own vision of a New World Order. Brent Scowcroft, the policy hand behind the concept, reportedly grew increasingly uncomfortable with the reception of the concept in diplomatic circles (being criticized by, among others, Scowcroft’s mentor and former boss Henry Kissinger) (Kissinger 1991). Consequently, he persuaded Bush to back off the concept and his plan to sell it in three scheduled speeches (Gergen 1991). Though the phrase never disappeared from Bush administration discourse on international affairs, it did not become the center of a new grand strategy projection for the U.S. in world affairs. “Cautionous pragmatism” or, less charitably, “pasted-together diplomacy” to use the words of Bush’s last Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (Clarke 1993:55) became the operative phi-
losophy of statecraft in the last year and a half of the Bush administration. In a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on January 7, 1993, Eagleburger confessed that he is "now truly nostalgic for the Cold War," adding that his good friend and former critic, Peter Tarnoff, then president of the Council and future Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Clinton administration, would soon embrace this feeling himself. Eagleburger's nostalgia sprang from the tumultuous, unstable, and unpredictable nature of global politics after the Cold War. While conceding that Bush administration foreign policy was guilty of a certain degree of "ad hocery," he regarded pragmatism as a virtue when dealing with a world in crisis and chaos (Eagleburger 1993). During the Bush administration, then, there was to be no sustained effort to re-map the meaning and conceptual geography of the post-Cold War world for the United States.

Though the Bush administration did acknowledge that the Cold War was over, President Bush never fully broke the hold of its imaginative geography. Before the presidential campaign of 1992, veteran Republican strategist Edward Rollins, White House political director from 1981–1985 and Ronald Reagan's campaign manager in 1984, described the coming campaign as one which "takes place in politically uncharted territory. . . . World events have irrevocably reshaped America's political landscape." Rollins' advice to the Bush campaign was to manufacture a new presidential agenda, to work on the "vision thing" (Rollins 1992). The Bush campaign, however, proved incapable of transcending the now deterritorialized Cold War world. Once impermeable socialist economies in the old WTO/CMEA ideological bloc now were open for business, and becoming sales territories, production platforms, and service areas for transnational capital as their states and peoples entered the world space of flexible accumulation. During the campaign, however, Bush evoked a series of threat narratives which featured many of the same old Cold War locations and players. First, Bush questioned Clinton's patriotism which was defined in terms of support for the Vietnam war and a willingness to be drafted to fight in the U.S. military. Second, Bush rather clumsily tried to make an issue out of Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow as a student in 1969, challenging him to "level with the American people" (Cockburn 1992). Third, Bush attacked Clinton's health-care proposals stating that they would be "administered with the compassion of the KGB." The disappearance of the Cold War clearly deprived Bush of a role he not only enjoyed but one which defined his very identity.

Bill Clinton's campaign largely downplayed the issue of geopolitics and focused instead on geo-economic questions. When addressing the U.S. role in a post-Cold War world, Clinton did, however, take a hawkish Cold War stance on a number of issues. He criticized Bush, for example, for being too cozy with Communist leaders (the Chinese), endorsed legislation expanding the embargo against Castro's Cuba, berated Bush for his August 1991 "Chicken Kiev" speech to the Ukrainian parliament, and argued for the use of U.S. airstrikes in Bosnia. He also endorsed weapons programs that even the Bush administration tried to cancel, like the Seawolf submarine, the M1-A1 tank, and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor helicopter. But the implosion of Cold War discourse and the lack of an agreed upon narrative which gave meaning to the American role in world politics undoubtedly helped the Clinton campaign. As Sigal (1992/93) noted after the election, "the end of the Cold War so rearranged the map of American interests that geopolitics no longer provides the clearest clues informing foreign policy." This made it difficult for Bush's neo-Cold War rhetoric to strike a popular chord and made it easier for Clinton to argue that the principal issues facing the United States were domestic and not geopolitical. But, as Sigal (1992/93) notes, the presidential campaign of 1992 failed to prepare Americans to reorient themselves in a transformed world, and it failed to settle the issue of America's role after the Cold War. In its gestures toward Cold War discourse, the campaign proved to be the last election of the Cold War rather than the first campaign of the twenty-first century.

Concurrently, within the United States's permanent foreign policy establishment, the end of the Cold War entailed a comprehensive revision and re-write of the conventional contours of U.S. strategic discourse (Walker 1992). Like Britain after Suez, the United States had lost a defining identity and had yet to redefine a new role. For the U.S. strategic community, the fragmentation of the mirror by which America defined itself in the post-World War
Il period left it without a clear image of future strategies. Though attempts to narrate the meaning of the post-Cold War world are readily available, few have faced the intellectual challenge of defining just where America stands—or what it stands for—in the post-Cold War world. H. Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound” was, in part, a reference to the loss of jobs to Mexico, but it also was an allusion to the loss of a strategic framework that might explain what was happening on the international scene after the end of communism.

A surfeit of cartographic and navigational metaphors expressing a lack of direction and fixed positionality appeared in various strategic reviews. The new policy journal New Perspectives Quarterly (1992) described the condition of world politics after the Los Angeles riots as one of “geopolitical vertigo.” In his Foreign Affairs essay on the quest for a post-Cold War foreign policy, former Secretary of Defense, Energy, Director of the CIA, and current “Counselor” at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, James Schlesinger wrote that “[w]ith the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the shrinkage and transmutation of the Soviet threat, the United States has lost the magnetic north for calibrating its foreign policy” (1993:17). United States foreign policy, in other words, was lost without its Cold War map. There is, however, no shortage of intellectual navigators prepared to draw new ones.

Transmutations in Transnational Liberalism

Though the presidential campaign of 1992 was fought largely around the question of the domestic economy and featured an unusual degree of voter dissatisfaction with “politics as usual,” the candidates representing the two traditional parties, George Bush and Bill Clinton, were both committed economic internationalists who had beaten back the campaigns of more nationalistic “America first” candidates like Pat Buchanan and Tom Harkin in the nomination process. The Bush and Clinton campaigns thus had much in common on economic issues. As pragmatic adherents to transnational liberalism, the economic doctrine of free trade, open markets and capitalist enterprise presided over by a cooperative trilateral alliance between the U.S., Japan, and the EC (Gill 1990:20–25), both were ideologically predisposed to reject “protectionism” in economic policy (though what this meant was varied), endorse “free trade” agreements like NAFTA, and urge the ratification of the Uruguay round of GATT. Where the candidates differed was in their relative emphasis on the role and function of government in economic life. In contrast to Bush’s geopolitical vision of trilateralism, Clinton articulated a vision of trilateral liberalism that accommodated and responded to the more nationalistic and revisionist interpretations of the American economic relationship with Japan and the European Community. Clinton presented himself as a new, fresh economic quarterback leading America’s team to victory. Accepting the Democratic nomination, he declared: “George Bush talks a good game. But he has no game plan to compete and win in the world economy. I do” (Clinton 1992). Coordinating Clinton’s game plan was a proposed new Economic Security Council, a geoeconomic version of the National Security Council (established 1947) and a civilian version of the Pentagon’s DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) (Clinton and Gore 1992).

Clinton’s rhetoric more effectively represented the changed economic circumstances of the United States in the world economy. Organized around James Carville’s persistent reminder, “It’s the economy, stupid,” Clinton’s campaign competently assessed the effects of the transnationalization of the U.S. economy in the eighties. Honing his message within the “culture of contentment” (Galbraith 1992), Clinton presented himself as a member of the American middle class who understood the squeeze on middle incomes during the eighties. Though he never explicitly used the term “industrial policy,” Clinton proposed a range of programs designed to improve the competitive position of Americans in the global economy and to raise America’s standard of living. In his book The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for Twenty-First Century Capitalism, Clinton’s longtime friend, economic adviser, and subsequent Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich argued that the key economic issue is simple. It is not which nation’s citizens own what, but which nation’s citizens learn how to do what, so they are capable of adding more value to the world economy. The primary assets of each nation consist of the skills and
insights of its citizens. The primary task of government is to develop and upgrade those skills and insights, and thereby increase the value-adding power of its citizens in networks of production run by truly transnational corporations. Reich's argument is neutral to the nominal nationality of corporations, making him favorably disposed to foreign direct investment in the United States. "Nations," Reich argues, "can no longer substantially enhance the wealth of their citizens by subsidizing, protecting, or otherwise increasing the profitability of 'their' corporations; the connection between corporate profitability and the standard of living of a nation's people is growing ever more attenuated." (Reich 1991:153). This skills-focused, nationality-neutral economic philosophy was a variant of the hegemonic economic orthodoxy advanced by transnational liberalism and championed by Clinton throughout the campaign. Ross Perot's paranoid style of American politics threatened to disturb this hegemony, but his campaign quickly self-destructed.

To the extent that the Clinton campaign's geoeconomic rhetoric reconstituted America's geographical imagination, it did so by advancing a new temporal horizon for the country. "Change" was a central Clinton theme, whereas "trust" and "stability" were the key motifs of the Bush campaign. Whereas the discursive horizon of the Bush campaign was America at mid-century, with its Luce-like call for a second American century, his Trumanesque campaign against Congress, and the scene of his visions of "family values," Clinton's horizon lay in the future, in an ecologically correct, culturally diverse, U.N.-supporting, trilaterally cooperative U.S., an America wired with information superhighways, producing for global markets, consuming global products, and beaming out a pro-democracy message to less fortunate parts of the world.

Reterritorializing Wor(l)d Order

In their presidential campaign book Putting People First, Bill Clinton and Al Gore declared that the various policy proposals and the promises that they had made were part of a broader mission to revolutionize government and prepare America for the twenty-first century. But has their reinvention and recharging of the American mission resulted in new maps of meaning for the United States in a post-Cold War world? Given that Clinton still sees the U.S. in global affairs as a case of "twenty questions," it is fair to say that no single coherent map of the American role in international relations has yet emerged from the Clinton administration. The Clinton Doctrine has yet to be written (Economist 1993b). Nevertheless, within American political discourse as a whole, a number of contending cartographic systems are emerging to chart the new fault lines of world politics and provide the good ship "America" with a compass, place, and identity (Ó Tuathail 1994). Let us now turn to examine some of the contours of these cartographic chartings of these new world(s).

The West Versus the Rest

In his testimony before Congress for nomination to the post of Secretary of State, Warren Christopher stated that the Clinton administration's response to the new foreign policy environment facing the United States rested on three pillars:

First, we must elevate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy.

Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges.

Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad. (Christopher 1993:45)

Ostensibly, Christopher's three pillars do not mark any fundamental departure from traditional American foreign policy thinking. The economic pillar served as a theme, if not actually a practice, enunciated by the Bush administration when it first came into office. The military pillar was also a familiar Bush administration theme, albeit one which often conflicted in practice with the first. Lastly, the internationalist pillar constituted a part of the exceptionalist ideology that underwrote active U.S. geopolitical involvement in international affairs since the late nineteenth century (Agnew 1983).

While some have been quick to condemn the "conceptual poverty" of Clinton's foreign policy (Clarke 1993), it was only in September 1993 that his strategic reading of the new
world (dis)order was publicly presented to the media. Clinton’s National Security advisor, Anthony Lake, outlined a strategy of “enlargement” as the successor to Cold War containment. Having successfully contained the threat to market democracies during the Cold War, the U.S. should now strive to enlarge their reach throughout the globe. Whereas the old mission of American policy sought to contain the red blobs of communism on the world map, the new mission sought to enlarge the blue blobs of democracy (Economist 1993c). Lake identified four components of the strategy of enlargement: 1) strengthening the community of major market democracies, including, most importantly, the United States and the other Group of Seven nations (Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, France, and Britain); 2) fostering and consolidating new democracies and market economies; 3) countering aggression and supporting the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets; and 4) fostering democracy and market economics through humanitarian aid in stressed regions. Lake cautioned that the United States cannot expect to impose democracy on “regimes that appear to be opting for liberalization, but we may be able to help steer some of them down that path by providing penalties that raise the cost of repression and aggressive behavior.” He advocated a harder line, however, in the cases of states that are “anti-democratic” and aggressively “anti-Western.” The approach here will be “to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically. When the actions of such states directly threaten our people, our forces or our vital interests, we must be prepared to strike back unilaterally. . . . we must always maintain the military power necessary to deter or defeat aggression by these regimes” (Lake 1993:9).

Lake’s strategic reading suggests that the world is an inviting garden with disparate patches of variable strength and stress. As the head gardener, the U.S. should pursue policies that simultaneously strengthen its own market garden; foster and nourish the weak plants of democracy and capitalism in new growth territories, like Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; prepare the ground for market democracy in yet other tracts; beat back aggressive snakes, like Iran and Iraq, that “may engage in violence and lawlessness,” and, finally, endeavor to sow the seeds of democracy in the wilder jungles of the planetary garden. If that were not enough, Lake goes on to state that the administration also plans to work on behalf of “environmentally sustainable development” and early response to social and political chaos (Lake 1993).

While canonizing “enlargement” as the new foreign policy doctrine, Lake’s speech essentially amounted to a re-statement of previously vague Clinton themes about a pro-democracy foreign policy. It also openly justified pragmatism and “ad-hoc-ery” in foreign policy. “Pragmatism,” Lake noted, “must be our strategy.” To this extent, then, “enlargement” merely put a name on a non-doctrine, a mediagenic label that enshrouded the fuzziness of Clinton’s foreign policy (Economist 1993c). In many ways, Clinton’s notions of enlarging the numbers and powers of democracies echoes earlier appeals by Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy. At most, Clinton’s policy highlights how “an expanding community of market democracies not only serves our own security interests,” but makes “more reliable partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment” (Clinton 1993d:650). Still, the overarching grand vision which would impart meaning and identity to the United States in the post-Cold War world remains absent.

One attempt to outline the cartographies of such a grand geopolitical vision comes from the neoconservative wing of the Democratic Party, led by former deputy national security advisor Samuel Huntington. Huntington, a figure in the so-called “Jackson wing” of the Democratic Party (after the hawkish Washington senator, Henry Jackson), led an effort to get neoconservatives who had left the party to return during the presidential campaign of 1992. “The national leadership of the Democratic Party,” he wrote, “has too often lacked clear understanding and firm purpose in world affairs. But we believe Bill Clinton and Al Gore see the promise and dangers now before us . . .” (quoted in Moffett 1992:6).

To enable Clinton, Gore, and the U.S. foreign policy community to see the dangers before Americans, Huntington championed a “clash of civilizations” thesis. “The fault lines between civilizations,” he wrote, “will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1993:22). Huntington defined a civilization as the broadest level of identification that a people share. He
identified seven major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American (with Africa as the site of an uncertain eighth civilization). "Civilizations," he claimed, "are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most importantly, religion" (1993:25). He proceeded to make three claims (1993:48):

(1) For a variety of reasons, civilization-consciousness is rising; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global forms of conflict.

(2) Successful political, security, and economic institutions at the international level are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations are likely to be more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization. And as a corollary, violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are most likely to lead to global wars.

(3) The dominant axis of future world politics will be the struggle between "the West and the rest"; elites in non-Western countries who are trying to make their countries part of the West thus will face major obstacles; and the locus of immediate conflict will be between the West and the several Islamic-Confucian states.

Huntington's thesis is a full-fledged attempt to create a new cartography of world political blocs on the basis of ancient archaeological fault lines (Huntington's essay contains a map of the "new" old dividing line in Europe between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam). Huge swaths of territory are accorded essential identities that "stretch back deep into history" (1993:26). In class and ideological conflicts, Huntington argues, the key question is "Which side are you on?"; in the clash of civilizations, the key question is "What are you?" That, Huntington claims, "is a given that cannot be changed."

Like the geopoliticians of the Cold War, Huntington's ascissive thesis postulates the existence of ancient oppositions that are uncovered by archaeological insight, by wise men giving their seasoned readings of the Earth (Ó Tuathail 1994). Like these geopoliticians also, his new Kulturkampf thesis is less a work of description and more a work of neoconservative advocacy. It attempts to fit the polymorphous identities of the postmodern age into certain neat geographic blocs and timeless essences tied to kin-and-country. The significance of Huntington's thesis lies not in its historical persuasiveness nor in its intellectual power, but rather in its gib codification of an imaginary geography that already influences the conduct of American foreign policy. Having its origins in a domestic cultural war over the hegemony of white male values in American life, Huntington's thesis is unlikely to emerge as the grand strategic vision of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, Lake (1993) explicitly repudiated the thesis. Nevertheless, as an articulation of a fluid social unconscious with an intuitive appeal to many in the foreign policy establishment, it remains significant. When people define identity in ethnic and religious terms, as Huntington argues, "they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion" (1993:29). Given this strategy of defining friends and enemies, we can see the contours of an ethnno-religious reading of global politics amongst those institutions that make and represent American foreign policy.

The establishment press in the United States and elsewhere, like the foreign policy community, have been struggling to make sense of the post-Cold War world (Grunwald 1993). Their expertise devalued by the end of the Cold War, many reporters found themselves casting about for fresh news angles on the new world (dis)order. A large number of mass-media institutions seem to have settled on "tribalism" and "religion" as the hot topic in political coverage. From the Branch Davidians in Texas to the Islamic fundamentalists in New Jersey and Brooklyn, from the Croatian Christians and Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia to the Muslim Azeris and Christian Armenians in the Caucasus, and from Israeli Jews and Hizbullah fighters in Southern Lebanon to Islamic terrorists in Algeria, Sudan, the Occupied Territories, and Egypt (not to mention the ongoing Papal world tour qua crusade), "tribalism" and "religion" offer thematic unity amidst the confusing array of global conflicts and dramas in the new world (dis)order (Grunwald 1993:14). While the nature of these dramas are quite distinct, images of tribalistic struggle and
religious fanaticism score high on the “otherness” meter of reporters who are, for the most part, white, cosmopolitan, and secular.

Second, an echo of the theme of clashing civilizations also surfaces in President Clinton's strategic vision for “enlarging” the expanse of liberal market democracies. Clinton warns that “the resurgent aspirations of ethnic and religious groups challenge governments on terms that traditional nation-states cannot easily accommodate” (Clinton 1993d:649). In these cases he believes that the United States must turn more often to the United Nations as a means of responding to these threats. The U.N.’s peacekeeping efforts cannot, in Clinton’s opinion, “be a substitute for our own national defense efforts, but it can strongly supplement them” (Clinton 1993d:652). Yet, in making these claims, Clinton also notes that “the time has come to reinvent the way the United Nations operates” by remembering “why we are here and whom we serve” (Clinton 1993d:652). By evoking a universal “we” (read within the narrative of democratic mythology), Clinton rhetorically counters the theme of civilizational clashings with a more universalizing vision centered upon the world’s “peoples.” To reinvent the U.N. anew, the world’s leaders must remember that the first words of the U.N. Charter speak not of “We, the governments,” but rather of “We, the Peoples of the United Nations.” Appealing to these peoples as masses of individuals instead of blocs of civilizations, President Clinton re-voices Lockean individualism. “In every country the teachers, the workers, the farmers, the professionals, the fathers, the mothers, the children from the most remote village in the world to the largest metropolis, they are why we gather in this great hall. It is their futures that are at risk when we act or fail to act. And it is they who ultimately pay our bills” (Clinton 1993d:652). In this way, Clinton re-imagines the U.N. as America writ large, as an “experiment in democracy,” an experiment endlessly engaged in battle with ethnic and religious factionalism.

Third, and in contrast to Clinton’s attempt to beat back the clashing of civilizations, certain establishment foreign policy think-tanks which traditionally have provided the personnel and the ideas for the practical conduct of American foreign policy, have constructed their strategic narratives around the theme of civilizational struggles. Conservative think-tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation have joined the domestic cultural wars over university curricula, school choice, and the canon of Western civilization. Notions of “multiculturalism” in education are derided and “Western civilization” is held up as manifestly superior. Out of these domestic battles over American “values” has emerged also an anti-U.N. foreign policy and a philosophy of neo-isolationism of the right best expressed perhaps by what is now Pat Buchanan’s not George McGovern’s call to “Come Home, America.”

Not all conservatives or establishment foreign policy think-tanks are attracted to the civilizational clash thesis, however. Owen Harries, the editor of The National Interest, sees the collapse of “the West” after the Cold War. He argues that Huntington’s thesis notwithstanding, the West is not a given, natural presence in the world. Those who believe in Huntington’s West subscribe to “a way of thinking that is not only wrong in itself, but is virtually certain to lead to mistaken policies” (Harries 1993:41–42). Nor are all establishment think-tanks rushing to embrace Huntington’s thesis. In their recent review of think-tanks and the new world (dis)order, Roberts, Burnett, and Weidenbaum (1993), all of whom are associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the journal Washington Quarterly, outline a new agenda for think-tanks, one that puts more emphasis on the geo-economic challenges facing the United States rather than on an emergent inter-civilizational Kulturkampf. It is this alternative narrative, with its new logic about the reterritorialization of world politics, to which we now turn.

The Best in the West

In many ways, Robert Reich raises the most critical question of the post-Cold War era in The Work of Nations when he asks: “Who is us?” On one level, traditional discursive representations of “us” in terms of culture/kin/country provide one vision of how the world perhaps once was or might become in the future. Yet, these categories are continually cross-cut and compromised by globalizing tendencies in
the world economy as capital, labor, technologies, and markets are more and more transnational. Here, the discursive representations of "us" must recognize how thoroughly the members of different civilizations are enmeshed together by the same 747s, IBM PC clones, Coca Cola, Toyotas, global warming trends, Sony Walkmans, Madonna, CNN cable feed, and Spielberg movies. Who owns or who controls what, under these circumstances, is more and more diffuse. As President Clinton put it before the United Nations, "economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world toward integration. These forces are fueling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization, but they also are threatening to destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people feel more insecure" (Clinton 1993d:649). So while Huntington sees new civilizational barriers rising, global mutual fund managers, transnational corporations, humanitarian organizations, and media networks keep jumping under, over, and around them.

Yet, contra-Reich, other geo-economic intellectuals in the United States have less difficulty answering the question: Who is us? Management consultant, media commentator, and sometime Democratic Party advisor, Lester Thurow articulates a more traditional vision in Head To Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America. Thurow's analysis of the post-Cold War era both echoes and contradicts Huntington's clash-of-civilizations thesis. He regards "the economic leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United Kingdom and the United States," as being forced "to alter their modes of playing the economic game" (1992:15) in order to cope with twenty-first century geopolitical realities. The unipolar world of Pax Americana has evolved into a tripolar world that brings the United States "head to head" with two new rivals.

In Europe an economic giant, the European Community, is in the process of being created. For the first time in modern history, an oriental tiger, Japan, has emerged as a competitor fully equal to any in Europe or North America. Because of their different histories and present circumstances, both of these new players are going to be infusing the capitalist economic game with strategies very different from those found in the Anglo-Saxon world. (Thurow 1992:15)

Thurow insists that the quickened pace of change, the loss of national economic autonomy, and the ascent of popular insecurity will force the United States to institute fundamental changes in its economic and political arrangements, arrangements that will enable the United States to deal with nations as economic and technological equals and jettison outmoded institutions, procedures, and rules that were designed for managing conflicts that have vanished with the end of the Cold War era.

Arguing that the military competition of the Cold War has ended, Thurow sees a new administrative/economic/technical rivalry forming the basis of twenty-first century geopolitics. That is, "Who can make the best products? Who has the best-educated and best-skilled work force in the world? Who is the world's leader in investment—plant and equipment, research and development, or infrastructure? Who organizes best? Whose institutions—government, education, business—are world leaders in efficiency?" (1992:23–24). As an economist, of course, Thurow's strategic analysis is decidedly ultra-economic. Nonetheless, it does picture a particular set of conflicts and contradictions as the center of global power struggles, and this picture frames Japan and the EC as the major threat to the United States.

Though he sees no single nation or region as the dominant power in the twenty-first century, Thurow hedges in saying that based on "the last twenty years, Japan would have to be considered the betting favorite to win the economic honors of the twenty-first century" (1992:247). The United States faces major disadvantages: investment is not world class, the American workforce is poorly trained, productivity growth is slow, trading partners in Latin America are poor, and the sense of complacency is often paralyzing. But, Japan too faces major obstacles: an economy dependent on trade, a weak domestic sector, Asian trading partners who are going their own way, and an insular culture that often adapts slowly. Having pointed out the problems faced by the U.S. and Japan, Thurow hedges again and tags the European Community (now the European Un-
ion) as the region most likely to dominate the next century. In the final analysis, “strategic position is on the side of the Europeans” (1992:257).

To respond to these dismal projections of decline, America must adopt “an economic game plan.” And Throow’s version of this response projects elements of Japanization, as Throow reads Japan, onto the United States. Like Japan, or, at least, the images constructed of Japan in contemporary political discourses (Ô Tuathail 1993), the United States must begin saving and investing at higher levels, improving the skills of its workforce, involving corporate business groups in collaborative enterprises, and innovating through coordinated nationwide industrial policies. Reaganism, as an experiment in laissez-faire individualism, has failed while cooperative teamwork in Japan and Germany has worked. Hence, Throow calls for some “bottom-line benchmarking” in the United States and for the “organization of teams—teams that involve workers and managers, teams that involve suppliers and customers, teams that involve government and business” (Throow 1992:298). Throow thus dissents from Huntington’s thesis about conflicts between “the West and the rest”; his arguments, in contrast, see that real conflicts will be over who is “the best in the West.” Some of these conflicts contain “civilizational” undertones, but the central issues turn on non-cultural criteria of technical proficiency, managerial acumen, labor efficiency, and social organization. Throow thus envisions a matchup of rivals within the West rather than a clash of civilizations.

While we can distinguish between the “globalist” vision of Clinton’s Labor Secretary, Robert Reich, and the more nationally focused “Japanization” strategy of intellectuals like Lester Throow, it is perhaps unwise to see these reterritorializations of America’s place in the new world as incompatible. So far the Clinton administration seems to be navigating with both maps in hand, using one or the other, as the occasions warrant. In his inaugural address, Clinton echoed Reich’s themes: “There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic” (Clinton 1993b:259). Yet, six months later, Clinton’s reproach of Tokyo stole the thunder of certain American “revisionists.” While repudiating the notion that America saw Japan as a threat and reiterating the standard conventions of transnational liberal discourse, Clinton went on to state: “it is clear that our markets are more open to your products and your investments than yours are to ours. And it is clear that government policies consistently promoting production over consumption, exports over domestic sales and protection of the home market contribute to this problem” (Clinton 1993b:644).6 Pointing out that Japan’s trade deficit with the United States is on the rise even as the yen rises against the dollar, Clinton called on the Japanese government to move its economy away from its producer bias towards greater consumerism. Rather than relying exclusively on the platitude of laissez-faire free trade, Clinton called for managed trade, for “better results from better rules of trade” (Clinton 1993b:644). Here, Clinton drew upon the emergent trilateral consensus on U.S.-Japan relations, a consensus cultivated by the Aspen Institute in which America’s task is to “harness the rising sun” by “enmeshing Japan in a network of international institutions designed to facilitate close economic and security cooperation between the two countries” (Dam et al. 1993:39).

Complicating these strategies of trilateral management is Ross Perot and his anti-NAFTA campaign. Perot, of course, harbors no hesitations about identifying “who is us.” “Us” is “America” or “the people” for whom Perot is empowered to speak through his representation of USA (United We Stand America)—even though it is an organization that Perot created and financed (Perot 1992). Every issue in United We Stand America, according to Perot, must pass through one filter: “is it good for our country?” (Perot 1993). The parochialism of this plain-talking rhetoric belies its significance as a conduit for the popular desire to reassert or return to a simpler isolationist world, a world where America was America and foreigners were, unambiguously, foreign (Choate 1990; Perot and Choate 1993). Perot’s appeal has less to do with the power of his ideas than with a widespread visceral response to the current malaise of uncertainty and confusion. Insofar as Perot has a geopolitical or a geopolitical imagination, his vision seeks to re-invent America as a nation once again, a “city upon a hill” separated from the world by
the uniqueness of its populist institutions, by the height of its security fences, and by the vigilance of its patriots.

**Green Governmentality**

To these geopolitical and geoeconomic readings of the post-Cold War era can be added one further approach to overcoming the chaos and confusion in the contemporary world. This approach offers a geoeconomic interpretation of current affairs. In these readings, the Earth is caught "in the balance" not between capitalism and socialism but between "ecological sustainability" and "environmental destruction." Beyond civilization disputes and trading bloc frictions, these narratives call for mounting a centered, unified, and disciplined response to the geoeconomic challenge (Dalby 1992). And, not surprisingly, advocates of this approach find that the global intervention apparatus devised for the Cold War is rather very well-suited to the task. Even though the Cold War has ended, according to President Clinton, "the United States intends to remain engaged and to lead. We cannot solve every problem, but we must and will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace." At the same time, Clinton's strategy of enlargement is infused with an ecological commitment: "if we do not nurture our people and our planet through sustainable development, we will deepen conflict, and waste, the very wonders that make our efforts worth doing" (Clinton 1993d).

Ecological critique thrives on a discourse of environmental dangers, but they are rarely attuned to the political dangers of a discourse that depends on the discursive frames imposed by successive American administrations. After denying that the environmental crisis was a serious problem under President Reagan, despite President Nixon's proclamation of an environmental "crisis" in the 1970s, the presidency passed to George Bush who labeled himself "The Environmental President," but he did little to justify the claim. In Clinton, at last, we might have a more environmental president, and the most environmentally sensitive of vice-presidents, Al Gore.

Pondering the state of the world at the end of the Cold War, Gore's best selling book, *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*, argued that "the resounding philosophical defeat of communism...has left an ideological vacuum that invites either a bold and visionary strategy to facilitate the emergence of democratic governments and modified free markets throughout the world—in a truly global system—or growing chaos of the kind that is already all too common from Cambodia to Colombia, Liberia to Lebanon, and Zaire to Azerbaijan" (1992:298). Believing that "strategic thinking is useless without consensus," Gore argued that the U.S. ought to organize and manage "a unified global response to the environmental crisis" (1992:297) along the lines of "a Global Marshall Plan." To avoid chaos and enforce consensus, Gore's vision of the post-Cold War era invited America to discover its new(est) frontier—on one level, in the environment, and, on another level, in the Third World. That is, the U.S. must devise "a healthier and more balanced pattern in world civilization that integrates the Third World into the global economy" (Gore 1992:301). This new economic integration will center upon a "cooperative global effort to save the environment" (Gore 1992:302). Thus, Gore envisioned the United States could lead the world in "going for the green" in the next century by going green itself by the century's end.

Gore's project assumes that "the responsibility for taking the initiative, for innovating, catalyzing, and leading such an effort, falls disproportionately on the United States" (1992:304). To accomplish this healing of the global environment, Gore sees a Global Marshall Plan as a vehicle for the retention of American leadership in global affairs after the Cold War. Gore believes that by remobilizing international multilateral cooperations, as it has done for decades in the OECD, U.N. or NATO, the U.S. could address six major strategic problems.

Gore maintains that the global environment is being menaced by: 1) unchecked population growth; 2) the proliferation of inappropriate industrial technologies; 3) ecologically irresponsible economies; 4) unregulated global environments; 5) broadly based ecological ignorance; and 6) unfocused commitments to sustainability. Gore acknowledges that modernization policies advocated by the West helped to create this situation during the Cold War era, and their unintended ecological consequences now need to be addressed. The challenge for the United States is to bring some
semblance of law and order to these lawless parts with new policies organized around: 1) stabilizing the world population; 2) developing sustainable technologies; 3) changing the economic “rules of the road” to ecological ones; 4) negotiating new international regulations; 5) educating the world on global environmental imperatives; and 6) affirming America’s belief in sustainability as national policy. This strategy requires enforcing compliance with the somewhat vague model of a “sustainable society” (Gore 1992:305–307).

On each of these points, Gore charges the United States with the responsibility for policing and providing for this reterritorialization of the old industrial world-system as a new ecological world-system. From reducing population growth to mounting a technological Strategic Environmental Initiative and from rewriting global economics as global eco-nomics to fabricating a Digital Earth climatic monitoring apparatus, Gore maintains that the United States must take the lead in designing, developing, and deploying this “Mission to Planet Earth.” His metaphor is revealing insomuch as it casts the polluted planet as a virgin territory, awaiting the explorations and organizations of right-thinking, green-minded conquerors. Insofar as the emphasis on global ecological systems subverts the interests of nation states in global politics, Gore’s geoeccological construction of the world offers a new (and contentious) operational logic for subsuming geopolitical and geoeconomic structures into a truly new green wor(l)d order.

President Clinton has echoed Gore’s ecological discourse in many settings. In a speech at the U.S. Botanical Gardens on Earth Day 1993 he warned his audience that:

Unless we act, and act now, we face a future where our planet will be home to 9 billion people within our lifetime, but its capacity to support and sustain our lives will be very much diminished. Unless we act, we face the extinction of untold numbers of species that might support our livelihoods and provide medication to save our lives. Unless we act, we face a future where the sun may scorch us, not warm us; where the change of season may take on a dreadful new meaning; and where our children’s children will inherit a planet far less hospitable than the world in which we came of age. (Clinton 1993b:277)

More significantly, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly, Clinton tagged the global environmental crisis, along with ethnic conflicts, religious wars, and terrorism, as one of “the serious threats” still facing the United States. Arguing that “the malignant neglect of our global environment threatens our children’s health and their very security,” he pledged that Americans will “work far more ambitiously to fulfill our obligations as custodians of this planet not only to improve the quality of life for our citizens and the quality of our air and water and the earth itself, but also because the roots of conflict are so often entangled with the roots of environmental neglect and the calamities of famine and disease” (Clinton 1993d).

In this fashion, Clinton has linked the national security agenda of the United States with an environmental political economy—a linkage that enlarges the scope of markets and the sphere of democratic institutions through American-endorsed programs of sustainable development. Clinton’s vision of security, therefore, outstretches the older military constructions by integrating new challenges to American security rising from concerns for global security. In this regard, Clinton accepts Paul Kennedy’s more expansive interpretation, namely, “we may eventually come to agree that a threat to national security means anything on the globe which challenges a people’s health, economic well-being, social stability, and political peace” (Kennedy 1993:130).

It can be argued that the shift to more “environmentalized” conceptions of space, time, power, and control marks, at one level, a response by hegemonic elites to the post-Cold War context, and, at another level, an ideological commitment to environmentalized discourses of stability and security. In any event, Clinton’s strategic shift from an exclusive focus on strictly territorial “sovereignty” to a more expansive concern for environmental “sustainability” signals the emergence of new ideological agendas that must be accommodated by the administrative apparatus of contemporary states. Thus, a deterritorialization of old alliances that were tied to American containment policies is unfolding even as fresh coalitions maneuver to reterritorialize new alliances around the agendas of an ecological political economy.

Yet, one must exercise caution in interpreting the current debates about ecology and politics. What might sound at first like a design for an ecological democratic populism may, in
fact, become a codified environmental guidebook for bureaucratic states. The critical sweep of green reasoning, as well as its presumption of the authority to correct environmental ills uncovered by its critiques, imparts tremendous powers, determines important roles, and defines major challenges to well-intentioned green bureaucrats. As they elaborate their authority over the state apparatus in the course of achieving such master concepts as “ecological survival” or “sustainable development,” green bureaucrats have the potential to be empowered as the scientifically legitimated master conceptualizers. And, from that vantage point, they might divest the world of its existing cultural/economic/territorial (b)order(s) and replace them with new units of discourse, that is, with “environments” at the ready for Strategic Environmental Initiatives. Most importantly, the American commitment to go anywhere at anytime to defend the cause of “sustainability” authorizes bureaucratic experts to deploy the full force of state power and positive science in pursuing other equally problematic values, including stability, diversity, and interdependence. If ecological intentions of stability, diversity, and interdependence are enacted in the spirit intended, these might prove to be positive developments. Conversely, environmental strategies based on a univocal discourse of Nature’s putatively moral economy lend themselves to abuse by state or supra-state greens seeking to redirect global growth and political stability in behalf of other interests. The bureaucracy envisioned in Gore’s Global Marshall Plan, albeit keyed to enforcing alleged biological imperatives, might as readily pursue its own interests or the interest of those it was created to regulate.

Conclusions

Here perhaps one sees the outlines of an emergent order foreshadowing new blocs of national interest, new strategic analyses, and new forms of economic collaboration that will emerge in the twenty-first century. New regions, be they neighborhoods, city-states, region states (Ohmae 1993), nation-states, or continental blocs, are divided by lines of conflict. Some regions create and enjoy access to the globalizing informational economy, while others cannot gain access to (and enjoy-
zones" and "tame zones" will require a sense of Realpolitik, but it will also accentuate the role of environmental worldwatching. Do we pay off Brazil so it does not cut down every tree in Amazonia, or sell everyone in China a CFC-free household refrigerator, subsidize condom handouts in Bangladesh, buy off Ukrainian bureaucrats to junk nuclear warheads, build hospices in AIDS-ravaged Uganda, or loan money to Romanian farmers to keep them on their land and out of Western Europe's cities? With geoeconomic teamwork, American elites may well retain access to the new global informational economy. With geopolitical caution, the American military might have the capacity to contain the most threatening regional wild zones. And, with geocological vision, the American state could remain in the driver's seat, steering the planet's ecological future in accord with American judgments about the parameters of cost, benefit, and survival, while setting the geopolitical costs and geoecomic benefits of accessibility and inaccessibility to other upmarket informational societies. The rest of the Earth, meanwhile, hangs in the balance.

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Notes

1. We take the terms deterterritorialization and reterritorialization from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983; 1987). Using both Freud and Marx they develop an understanding of capitalism and state power as forces which simultaneously seek to produce rigid identities and assert fixed geographies, yet tend in their very operation to undermine traditional identities, social relations, and the very geographical codes set down in practice. We use Deleuze and Guattari's terminology, as they encourage their readers to do, for our own purposes and our own ends, content to leave aside the more psychoanalytic dimensions of their writings for now. We write, as they write, as geographers, as students of borderlines.

2. The concept of "governmentality" is outlined in the later works of Michel Foucault (Foucault 1991). The concept refers to the rationality or art of government, how government as an activity and practice normalizes ways of knowing and a system for thinking about the management of objects such as "population," "economy," "security," or "environment." See Burchell, Gordon, and Miller (1991).

3. Bush's speech to the Ukrainian parliament in August 1991 urged Ukrainians not to precipitate the disintegration of the Soviet Union nor to seek independence for the Ukraine.

4. Clinton CIA Director James Woolsey, in a public hearing on March 9, 1993, remarked: "Yes, we have slain the dragon. But we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes" (Economist 1993a).

5. In the Economists's survey of the next 150 years, Daniel J. Boorstin rails against the "new American moralism" (political correctness) which, because "blacks," for example, want to hyphenate themselves as "African-American," threatens to turn America into a tangle of squabbling nationalities. "While we seem to have escaped many Old World ills—religious and linguistic wars, hereditary class distinctions, ideological politics—some citizens seem on the way to making us a Balkan America" (Boorstin 1993:24).

6. The Clinton administration's trade policy towards Japan has been notably tougher than that of the Bush administration. It has adopted a policy of seeking specific numerical targets for U.S. exports to Japan. Japanese arguments against these managed-trade tactics have not been helped by the rise in the country's trade surplus in 1992 to $117.6 billion. See Lee (1993) for a review of the details of U.S.-Japan trade relations under Clinton.

7. While our reading of the reterritorialization of global conflict may seem unlikely, this disjunctive perspective is spreading in American intellectual debate. In a sense, Huntington's construction of the world in terms of "the West" and "the rest" implicitly sees these regionalizations as "tame" and "wild," respectively. And, even more recently, Max Singer's and Aaron Wildaevsky's The Real World Order: Zone of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (1993) has reconstructed global space in terms of the 85 percent of the planet that is a zone of hopeless poverty and turmoil ("the rest" of the world), and the 15 percent of the world that is a zone of affluence, that is, in the U.S., Canada, Japan, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand (or, "the West"). These civilizational and nation-state readings of global reterritorialization ignore, however, the "wild zones" in many major Western cities and regions as much as they overlook the "tame zones" in some major non-Western cities and regions. Paul Kennedy (1993) advances a similar framework of "rich" and "poor" regions in his continent-by-continent survey of the world. Poor regions tend to be primary-commodity producing economies. They have very high illiteracy rates, high population growth rates, and high levels of international indebtedness coupled with low investments in public education, basic infrastructure, and high value-added industries. Governmental instability, institutional underdevelopment, and environmental degradation also typically characterize these areas. Richer regions have
opposite tendencies: literacy is high, population growth is low, indebtedness is stable, education is highly valued, infrastructure is sound, and high valued-added industry is strong. Governments there usually are stable, institutions are adaptable, and the environment is not overly stressed. At the level of the nation-state, Kennedy’s overview of the world’s poor nations identifies many that are in the wild zones—Somalia, Burundi, Peru, Afghanistan, Yemen, Angola, Bolivia, and Yugoslavia. Yet, the wild zones also open up within rich nation-states and regions. Kennedy overlooks this dimension in the current world system. There are Burundis in Mexico and India, Afghans in Russia and Brazil, Bolivias in Thailand and Zimbabwe. Similarly, there are Medellins in Los Angeles and New York, Dakar in Marseilles and Milan, and Calcuttas in Seoul and Manila. Wild and tame zones are highly fluid; they can swamp entire continents or flow mainly through certain regions, cities, and neighborhoods, occasionally spilling over into tame suburban zones. Likewise, relatively rich regions, like Yugoslavia or Ulster, can be wild; while, on the other hand, comparatively poor regions, like Mongolia or Jordan, can be tame.

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Since the end of the Cold War, the political geography of world order has been the subject of much confusion, uncertainty and speculation. Strange new tendencies are emerging in the new world (dis)order. Old geopolitical blocs are disintegrating, previously coherent units are fracturing, and once stable identities are unraveling. Simultaneously, new geo-economic blocs are defining themselves, emergent geographies of uneven global connectedness are taking shape, and new discourses of danger are rewriting identity and meaning in global affairs. Old Cold War word orders are giving way to new post-Cold War word orders. This paper explores this double dynamic of deteriorization and reterritorialization in the new wor(l)d order through an
analysis of U.S. foreign policy discourse. Beginning with observations on deterritorialization from the 1992 presidential election, we examine how fresh geopolitical, geoeconomic and geoe
cological readings of global politics after the Cold War are reterritorializing the surface of global affairs. Official and foreign policy community narratives of (1) the West versus the rest, (2) the best in the West, and (3) planetary ecological crisis are re-mapping understandings of global politics in the 1990s. Rather than championing any of these narrative maps of meaning, we point to an emergent global political geography of "tame" and "wild" zones in a differentially con
nected global informational economy. Key Words: Clinton, environment, geopolitics, global, new world order, U.S. foreign policy, the West.